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Abstract:  This dissertation begins with a problem. Democracy as a concept, and as a 
practice, has come under attack. This dissertation is concerned with bringing to attention 
the ways in which Shakespeare’s theater gives us access to experiences that could allow 
us to imagine new democratic practices or techniques of the self. I see role-playing, 
courage, optimism, and overhearing as a set of democratic practices that I argue can help 
revitalize democracy, analyzing themes from Shakespeare with and against contemporary 
theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Lauren Berlant, and Jacques Ranciere. I argue that 
Shakespeare’s writing gives us access to dramatizations of experiences and rich 
characterizations of human beings that can allow us to imagine democratic ideals in fresh 
and exciting new ways. Through close readings and more cultural analyses, I appropriate 
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Introduction: Is it curtains for democracy? The case for one last act 
 
 This dissertation begins with a problem. Democracy as a concept, and as a 
practice, has come under attack. To a number of contemporary theorists, it seems 
threadbare, nothing more than an empty term, a false promise. As Wendy Brown writes, 
democracy “has never been more conceptually footloose and substantively hollow” 
(Brown 2009: 44). For Brown, particularly worrisome is the neoliberal-capitalist 
stranglehold on democracy. Corporate and state power are welded by more than 
haphazard catalysis: State power is designed to support the accumulation of capital, 
undermining democratic practices of popular rule, canalizing democrats’ dwindling 
energies into bread and circuses (the spectacle of the 2016 presidential election illustrates 
this perfectly). “Powerless to say no to capital’s needs, they [the populace] mostly watch 
passively as their own are abandoned” (Brown 2009: 47). Neoliberal emphases on costs, 
benefits, productivity and the market undermine the importance of democratic principles 
such as freedom and equality. Suspension of rights and racial profiling are ascribed to the 
exigencies of the security state. What is worse: “the majority of Westerners have come to 
prefer moralizing, consuming, conforming, luxuriating, fighting, simply being told what 
to be, think, and do over the task of authoring their own lives (Brown 2009: 55).1 Given 
this assessment of democracy, to pin our lives on such a concept seems delusional. 
 For Jodi Dean and Alain Badiou, championing democracy sidelines a rigorous 
leftist critique of capitalism. As Badiou writes, the literal meaning of democracy is “the 
power of peoples over their own existence,” and for him, this will only come to fruition, 
                                                
1 See also Brown, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” where she argues that the ideals of 
“democracy” give cover to the workings of an insidious and pervasive neoliberal market rationality. In 
neoliberalism, “the body politic ceases to be a body but is, rather, a group of individual entrepreneurs and 
consumers” (Brown 2003: 7). Neoliberalism signals the death of liberal democracy as we knew it. Instead, 
democracy is refigured as a ubiquitous entrepreneurialism. 
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“we will only ever be true democrats[,]…when we become communists” (Badiou 2009: 
15). Dean sees less in the very term democracy—both as evoked by the left and by 
democratic theorists who implicitly assume no alternative. As Dean writes: "Calling for 
democracy, leftists fail to emphasize the divisions necessary for politics, divisions that 
should lead us to organize against the interests of corporations and their stockholders, 
against the values of fundamentalists and individualists, and on behalf of collectivist 
arrangements designed to redistribute benefits and opportunities more equitably” (Dean 
2009: 76). As she reminds us, "existing constitutional democracies privilege the wealthy" 
and protect a neoliberal capitalism that oppresses the underprivileged even as it expands a 
middle-class brand of hope that everyone can believe in (ibid). Democracy, I would add, 
is not only a neoliberal fantasy—allowing us to believe that democratic participation will 
help change an oppressive economic and social system—but a liberal one. For example, 
Stephen White writes that political liberalism “takes shape, albeit tacitly, around a sense 
of the moderate well-being (both economically and politically) of large portions of the 
population in Western, liberal democracies” and that this is partly to blame for an 
inadequate sensitivity to or ability to alleviate the “substantial suffering on the part of 
other segments [of a state’s population]” (White 2001: 183-184). There is little hope that 
democratic participation alone will help change an oppressive economic and social 
system. 
Adding to these academic worries are pronouncements in the popular press 
regarding the democracy’s loss of momentum in the 21st Century (“What’s Gone 
Wrong,” 2014; Plattner 2015). The number of democratic countries seems to have 
reached its peak in the second half of the 20th century, but that progress seems to have 
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stalled in the past 16 years. With China's rise, Putin's power consolidation, and the Arab 
spring's failures, democracy looks less and less attractive as a state model, especially for 
capitalist states that value efficiency and swift legislative action. Countries that had made 
healthy democratic strides 20 years ago have descended into forms of despotism, one-
party rule, or electoral chaos: Turkey, South Africa, Bangladesh, and Thailand, for 
example. Extremist, populist candidates in France, Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands 
demonstrate the drawbacks of popular rule. Even the US, with its long, illustrious 
democratic history, does not make a very desirable case for this system of rule. Party 
polarization, gerrymandering, and campaign finance regulations that allow wealthy 
donors to shape politics make all too visible democracy’s weaknesses. 
But if, according to these pronouncements about democracy, the house is on fire, 
this dissertation takes a turn at the pump. But it is important first to clarify what I mean 
by democracy, as democracy is a constellation of (contested) concepts. Am I concerned 
with freedom of the press, human dignity, universal suffrage, rule of law, freedom, fair 
elections? The main concept in democracy I wish to draw out, the primary value within 
the multivalent “democracy” to which I give priority, is equality. I do this despite the fact 
that, as Brown writes, “the promise of modern democracy has always been freedom” as 
opposed to a premodern, republican emphasis on the principle of equality (Brown 2009: 
51, emphasis original). I take equality to be the most important perhaps because it is one 
of the least practiced and most difficult to implement elements of democracy today—
further undermined by a capitalist system that awards those already on the top of the 
hierarchy.2  
                                                
2 It should go without saying, I view democratic equality as distinct from capitalism. If there is an equality 
central to capitalism, it is more this idea that everyone is equally vulnerable to capitalist “risk, threat, and 
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If our democratic practices are not self-activating (as they seem not to be just 
looking at the empirical data), if we need periodically to cultivate a set of spirited virtues3 
to enliven those practices, how can we best do that? What exemplars can we turn to for 
inspiration, as guides? How can we best motivate broad-scale democratic empowerment? 
This project is indebted to Sharon Krause’s work (2002) that answers similar 
questions. Her book Liberalism with Honor responds to a problem she has diagnosed in 
neoliberal society today, the sobering insight that we have lost faith in individual agency. 
Krause seeks to invigorate the civic sources of liberal democracy by affirming honor as 
both a code of conduct and a quality of character that can motivate us to act well as 
liberal democratic citizens. Part of the problem for Krause is the era we are living in—
one in which, she claims, we have lost the ability to conceive of honor or great sacrifice 
for the good of the nation as a motivation to action: “an era in which we have forgotten 
how to connect sacrifice to personal ambition, or higher purposes to self-concern. Honor, 
perhaps more than any other quality, combines them” (Krause 2002: 173). As Krause 
shows with her reading of Dr. King, democracies sometimes need exceptional citizens to 
lead them toward the realization of their democratic ideals.4 My project offers a different 
set of solutions than Krause’s. Instead of great citizens to inspire others, I focus on 
dramatic actors and their techniques to help reinvigorate democratic agency. 
                                                                                                                                            
ongoing anxiety”—which comes to stand in for what “democracy” is supposed to mean (Berlant 2011: 
203). It is a “democratic” equality to vulnerability in capitalism. Everyone can fail, even the richest 
businessman. This is the new bar to assess if something is equal: the equal opportunity to achieve failure. 
Berlant: “finally the wealthy are experiencing the material and sensual fragilities and unpredictability that 
have long been distributed to the poor and socially marginal” (Berlant 2011: 195). While I value 
vulnerability in democratic deliberation and exchange, my idea of a more substantive equality would mean 
recognition as a human being with a dignity and worth equal to other human beings. 
3 I use the term virtue and practice interchangeably and discuss virtues in more detail below, in my third 
section of this introduction. 
4 Although I too focus on courage, Krause is more focused in her study than I will be on unique acts of 
heroism that can revitalize and change our American democracy. I am interested less in unique acts of 
bravery or courage that lead to serious change than in the potential for courage to create a general mood 
and ethos of equality in which all citizens can exercise democratic agency. 
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When I speak of democracy in this dissertation, I speak of democracy capaciously 
understood. I refer to an ethos more than to a technical system of government. I consider 
it an assemblage, a relational network of and between ideas and forces (the value I most 
privilege in this assemblage being, again, equality). I hold up as laudable for 21st 
democracy, characters who trigger nascent democratic assemblages in their communities. 
By “democratic assemblage,” I mean to mark not a coherent stable entity that represents 
The Democratic but rather a manifold arrangement of bodies and styles and signs and 
visions temporally diverse, spanning space and time, interacting with both democratic 
and nondemocratic elements in affectively democratic ways—that is, the moods are 
democratic in the mere fact of moods and characters’ emotions being changeable. No one 
is stuck or static, caught in a hierarchy or a singular, monological existence. Each 
character blends into a whole—not a constricting or conformist “oneness” but rather an 
assemblage of manifold actualities. I wish to think “democracy” in its plural, 
deindividualized forms, “the democratic” as something of a hybrid construction pieced 
together out of a motley elements, formed as a thing that mutates and expands with the 
times and the contexts and the characters—a sort of flexible monster conglomeration, 
both within a self and between selves. The equality that democracy entails also argues for 
democracy’s inclusionary aspects. The democratic can open out to encompass the whole, 
distinct and varied bodies and affects and disguises. In situations examined in this 
dissertation, characters often playfully adopt ways of being at odds with their staid, 
normal ways of being, sometimes at odds with their noble or otherwise privileged selves. 
They possesses what C.L. Barber (1990) calls the power of redefinition. They 
courageously resist authority, a resistance that stems from breaking free from any one 
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identity category. They are actorly. As Barber notes of Falstaff, “It is the essence of his 
character, and his role, in Part One, that he never comes to rest where we can see him for 
what he ‘is.’ He is always in motion, always adopting postures, assuming characters’ 
(Barber 1990: 198). I argue that democracy requires empathy, vulnerability, and ways of 
being to cultivate new moods, a playfulness to resist oppressive forms of authority, and 
that it is best to conceive of democracy as an assemblage in order to demonstrate these 
points. 
This dissertation is concerned with bringing to attention the ways in which 
Shakespeare’s theater gives us access to experiences that could allow us to imagine new 
democratic practices or techniques of the self. These Renaissance characters, while not 
democratic, set as they are against a background of aristocratic absolutism, nonetheless 
hold potential as exemplars for improving our own democracy. At bottom this 
dissertation is concerned with the lived or everyday mechanics and requisites for 
maintaining a healthy democracy, or reviving one. While I believe that lively debate is a 
crucial element for a thriving democracy, unlike Habermas, I do not believe that untruths 
sap the vigor of American public discussion. Rather, I make the case to view dramatic 
acting as a practice that helps aid, and the theater as a central forum for, democratic 
exchange and togetherness. 
I see role-playing, courage, optimism, and overhearing as a set of democratic 
practices that I argue can help revitalize democracy, analyzing themes from Shakespeare 
with and against contemporary theorists such as Lauren Berlant, Jacques Ranciere, and 
Jürgen Habermas. A central thesis of this dissertation, a braid of ideas taken from or in 
response to Habermas, Berlant, and Ranciere, is that theater and its techniques can 
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provides us with and revitalize a dialogic model of democratic discourse that aids the 
process of subject-formation, the recognition of those with logos. I argue that 
Shakespeare’s writing gives us access to dramatizations of experiences and rich 
characterizations of human beings that can allow us to imagine democratic ideals in fresh 
and exciting new ways. In other words, I use the way Shakespeare dramatizes certain 
experiences or events in order to help me think anew about democratic virtues. Part of my 
aim in searching through Shakespeare for democratic models of being stems from a 
desire to appropriate Shakespeare for our own time, to make him relevant politically for 
us. 
Shakespeare’s work has its historical origins in a political context of absolutist 
monarchy.5 I am less interested in speculation over Shakespeare’s political leanings or his 
intentions—Was he a republican? Or a strict monarchist? (He was surely quite 
conservative in the way he portrayed the lower classes as ignorant)—and more interested 
in how certain strains of his thought might be valuable for democrats today.6 I seek to go 
beyond readings of Shakespeare in a democratic or republican tradition by a closer focus 
on situations or scenes within his work that can disclose lessons for fostering an 
egalitarianism of style. When relevant, I mine the creative appropriations of 
Shakespeare’s works by American directors, actors, and novelists over the past century, 
especially those who adapt Shakespeare to democratic ends. 
                                                
5 There are scholars who argue, however that while aristocratic power was staged at the English 
Renaissance playhouse, the democratic elements afoot at the theater or at least “collaborative conditions of 
Renaissance drama” should not be ignored (Stallybrass and Kastan 1991: 10). See also Patterson 1989. 
6 Besides, books on democracy may draw on non-democratic sources. As Jill Frank says of (anti-
democratic) Aristotle’s work: “it opens the way to a particularly dynamic form of democracy that can 
accommodate the reciprocal relation between institutions and citizens” (Frank 2005: 8). 
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Uniting each chapter is a counter-intuitive quality. For example, in the acting 
chapter, I emphasize creative responsiveness, vulnerability, being open to the other and 
the "becomings" that happen when Bottom stages his show for the aristocrats. I 
emphasize how acting makes you more sincere (because you are more vulnerable and 
responsive to the other person). In the courage chapter, I argue that acting courageous, 
especially if you are a coward, can be a kind of courage, one more helpful for democracy. 
In the optimism chapter, I look to the optimism of villains, although villains are not 
usually associated with much that is positive. In the overhearing chapter, I challenge the 
common sense belief that what is overheard is more true or less manipulated. 
Shakespeare and Democracy 
I am not the first to suggest Shakespeare’s value to democrats. Orson Welles’ 
1937 production of Julius Caesar is one of the most effective deployments of a 
Shakespeare play for democratic ends. Staging and editing the play to give it ripped-
from-the-headlines relevance, he laid it in Fascist Italy and subtitled it “The Death of a 
Dictator.” Welles added lines from Coriolanus and fabricated his own to associate Brutus 
with democratic government and Caesar with rising autocrat Benito Mussolini. Brutus 
represents the fulfillment of history’s telos from absolutism to modern republican 
democracy. In Welles’ treatment, Brutus was “an almost saintly man, a man ever fixed in 
principle and faithful to his conscience,” a courageous dissident standing firm for 
democracy (Whipple 2014: 442). 
 German-born American academic Alwin Thaler also turned to Shakespeare in 
wartime. In his book Shakespeare and Democracy (1941), he cites a 1940 report of the 
German news service complaining of British propaganda in the US to which one 
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commentator replies: “the greatest propagandist that the British have lies peacefully in his 
grave. His name is Shakespeare” (quoted in Thaler 1941: 4). Breasting the crushing tide 
of authoritarian powers, the English-speaking allied forces turned to Shakespeare at the 
moment when their freedom was most precarious. Thaler recommends “marshalling our 
spiritual resources for this struggle,” gathering comfort and inspiration “from the man 
who, of all ancients and moderns, ‘had the largest and most comprehensive soul’” (Thaler 
1941: 9). For a liberalism that prides itself on its “myriad-mindedness,” to quote 
Coleridge’s famous adjective for Shakespeare, the British bard is a model (Coleridge 
1907: 64). Drawing evidence from an illustrious list of early American presidents, 
English and American poets, Emerson, and Whitman, Thaler concludes that 
“Shakespeare does speak-forth prophetically something of what the heart of democracy 
means” (Thaler 1941: 29) and that Shakespeare cannot “safely be ignored by anyone 
seriously interested in the past and present of democracy” (Thaler 1941: 31). 
 There are two dimensions to this valuation of Shakespeare: moral/psychological 
and political. President John Adams calls Shakespeare “a great teacher of morality and 
politics” (Adams 2014: 8). Shakespeare sketches the moral conditions of a broad variety 
of personalities, what Whitman refers to as “splendid personalizations” which could serve 
“as models of Democracy” (Whitman 1902a: 137). In portraying tyrants and despots like 
Richard III and King John so uncompromisingly, as anti-models, Shakespeare implicitly 
makes the case (negatively) for republican controls of sovereigns and limitations to 
government over-reach—even in plays like Richard III where there is no voice for 
republican government per se as we find in the Roman plays and in particular, Julius 
Caesar. If we see his plays as briefs supporting limited government power, then we can 
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also locate his plays historically as precursors to constitutional order and, eventually, 
republican democracy. 
 Such was the way Walt Whitman came to read the plays, particularly the 
histories. It is true that Whitman famously called for American poets to create new 
models for the democratic sensibility, rejecting Old World ideas and standards of beauty 
(including by name Shakespeare), but he also advised us pay heed to “the most important 
and pregnant principle of all, viz.: that Art is one [and] includes all times and forms and 
sorts—is not exclusively aristocratic or democratic or oriental or occidental” (Whitman 
1902b: 86). The advance of democracy requires that Shakespeare’s work came before, to 
signal the need for new forms of government and new moral sensibilities to match them. 
In his history plays, Whitman argues, Shakespeare “put[s] on record the first full 
exposé…of the political theory and results…which America has come on earth to 
abnegate and replace” (Whitman 1964: 555). To Whitman, these plays point towards and 
demonstrate the “necessity” of modern democracy. In these historical plays, according to 
Whitman, Shakespeare demonstrates a conscious plan to undermine the old order, to 
expose its hypocrisies and cruelties. Whitman sought the “real purpose and meaning” of 
the plays, purposely “veil’d” (Whitman 1964: 555). 
 In this uncovering work—unearthing a “secret plan” on Shakespeare’s part—
Whitman helps advance a goal of his contemporary, American antebellum writer Delia 
Bacon. Although Bacon was part of the anti-Stratfordians who cast doubt on 
Shakespeare’s authorship, attributing his works instead to Sir Francis Bacon, she agreed 
with Whitman that the plays express hidden meanings that can be decoded as attacks on 
monarchy and arbitrary power. Although Whitman reads the plays in light of a 
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democratic future, while Bacon sees the plays as supporting republican government and 
self-governing individuals, both see in Shakespeare the theory that “the State is 
composed throughout...of individual men...clothed of nature with the same faculties and 
essential human dignities...” (Bacon 1857: 208). At the heart of both arguments is the 
belief that the best state places the interest of the individual human being first and 
foremost. Bacon expounded her reading of King Lear, Julius Caesar, and Coriolanus in 
her 582-page tome, The Philosophy of Shakespeare's Plays Unfolded (1857). As in 
Welles’s production, for Bacon as well, Brutus is the hero, champion of republican ideals 
that set a sharp (if anachronistic) contrast to the Tudor and Stuart monarchies of the time. 
 Helen Hackett has argued that “the appropriation of Shakespeare by Americans 
was especially energetic at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth” (Hackett 2009: 175). These American Shakespeares were often 
antiauthoritarian, painting Shakespeare as a more progressive American than he ever 
could be as an adherent of British monarchy. Some of these readings also expressed, 
according to Heckett, “the desire to challenge the ancient cultural predominance of 
Britain” (ibid). Granting Shakespeare American citizenship seemed a logical way to do 
so. In insisting on Shakespeare’s distance from British culture and political life, 
Shakespeare could be used by Americans not only to fight British cultural preeminence 
but to develop their own culture as well. Frances Teague argues that Shakespeare helped 
early Americans “form a national identity” (Teague 2006: 39). 
 Not only could Shakespeare be an American (proto-) democrat and republican, 
but he could take on these modern identities because he was read through the times. 
Thaler, writing in the midst of World War II, challenges his reader to “reread 
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Shakespeare for himself in the light of what is now going on in the world and of what is 
promised or threatened for to-morrow” (Thaler 1941: 35). Jan Kott’s Shakespeare, Our 
Contemporary (1964) makes a similar case to apply Shakespeare to post-war Europe. 
Hamlet “immediately absorbs all the problems of our time,” Kott writes. “What matters is 
that through Shakespeare’s text we ought to get at our modern experience, anxiety and 
sensibility” (Kott 1964: 57, 53). Closer to our own time, Annabel Patterson’s 
Shakespeare and the Popular Voice (1989) presents Shakespeare’s attitude to order, like 
Thaler and Kott, in light of our present realities. She has been attacked by critics for 
presenting a “vision of the Bard as a Jeffersonian democrat” (Wilson 2014: 17) and for 
enlisting Shakespeare as a “contemporary” spokesman for liberal politics (Arnold 2007: 
11). Although, to be fair to Patterson, her readings contain rigorous historical analyses as 
she situates Shakespeare in his time. Nonetheless, the disagreements between her view of 
Shakespeare as proto-democratic and those who regard this view as anachronistic and 
wrong indicate the controversy surrounding Shakespeare’s politics. That Shakespeare 
was claimed so fervently during World War II by the Americans and British as an ally in 
the cause of republican democracy does not negate the fact that he was claimed by Nazi 
scholars during this time too, as dramatist of their own political beliefs (Symington 2005; 
Thaler 1941). 
 In the early twentieth and late nineteenth centuries especially, Americans who 
claimed Shakespeare for democracy tend towards both an anthropocentrism and also 
sometimes a religiously Christian bent—both of which will be challenged in my study. 
As for the first characterization, consider American Shakespeare scholar Charles William 
Wallace’s rather dramatic pronouncement that:  
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Shakespeare and America were born together, twinned at a single birth, children 
of the same ideal, and have for each other a companionship of spirit now 
possessed in common with no other nation. America alone still retains the broad 
outlook consonant with the spirit that begot both in those days when men of the 
Old World looked to the West where a man might lift up his head and say, as we 
do now, even with the kings of the earth, ‘I am a Man’ (Wallace quoted in 
Robinson 1979: 12-13). 
 
For Wallace, writing in 1914, Shakespeare is American insofar as he believes firmly in 
American freedoms, the “broad outlook” of its settlers, and the dignity and rights of 
“Man,” with the M capitalized perhaps to emphasize his divine nature. For Wallace, 
Shakespeare’s advocacy of freedom for the individual begot the American ideal. Thaler 
defines “democracy” as manifest in Shakespeare’s cannon in a similar fashion: He says, 
“democracy, like Christianity, is built upon the rock: the supreme validity of the 
individual soul” (Thaler 1941: 7). Thaler’s argument hinges on the claim that 
Shakespeare “believed in God and man” (Thaler 1941: 44). These readings privilege 
permanence and stability, being and eternity, over becoming and theories of change. 
They privilege the subject of rights and freedoms, his and her (mainly his) individualism, 
over a vaguer and more general mood or ethos of equality in the commons. 
 My dissertation will challenge this equation of democracy with either the freedom 
of the Christian soul or of the individual man by looking at acting as a democratic virtue. 
Acting is a practice, a skill, a technique that can enrich democracy. I will not, however, 
challenge the aspects of these readings of Shakespeare that see him as a champion, in his 
own fashion, of basic notions of equality and fairness that came to be seen as essential to 
modern democracy. Although writing in a different historical time, Shakespeare offers us 
unique, creative ideas for fostering our democracy. It is true that, as Paul Kottman says 
about his similar modern-day application of Shakespeare’s plays, these dramatic works 
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have their origins in linguistic and historical contexts utterly different from our 
own; however, the decision to refer to these texts arises from the hunch that 
contemporary problems cannot be adequately addressed in purely contemporary 
terms, and that seemingly foreign or antiquated words, categories or experiences 
have a surprisingly transformative power when expropriated in certain ways 
(Kottman 2008: 18). 
 
This is my wager too—that the transformative power of the experiences of Shakespeare’s 
characters can teach us about democracy in the 21st century where more situated, timely, 
or contemporary analyses fall short. Lessons from his plays involving aristocratic 
characters can be adjusted to serve a democratic order. 
Although this is the first project to offer sustained reflection on Shakespeare’s 
plays to propose that they offer a subset of undertheorized American political virtues—
theatrical acting, a playful kind of courage, optimism, and cultivating what Nietzsche 
calls a “third ear”—it is indebted to a great variety of research that has preceded it 
(Nietzsche 1966: 182). Another, more recent primary influence has been those scholars 
who presented Shakespeare as a marker of multivalent meanings, as anything but fixed 
and stable—including those who recovered the variety of American renderings of 
Shakespeare (e.g., Busse 2006; Shapiro 2014; Smith 2001; Smith 2004; Thompson 
2011). Since the earliest performances of Shakespeare, there has been an improvisatory 
element to his texts: they were never approached as final and complete by even the first 
adaptors of his plays (Johanson 2013). True to how he has been appropriated in 
performance situations, then, I seek to render Shakespeare as contingent, playing 
differently to various times and places. In pursuing Shakespeare as a political, highly 
contingent figure, able to speak to American political concerns, I aim to invite not only 
scholarly reflection and dialogue but action as well, to usher open new avenues for 
engaging our contemporary realities. 
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One last word regarding Shakespeare and politics. Within the political theory 
canon, Shakespeare is “minor.” Deleuze writes, “Is there not…great interest in submitting 
authors considered major to treatment as minor authors, in order to rediscover their 
potential for becoming? Shakespeare, for example?” (Deleuze 1997: 208). When we do 
this, Deleuze says, unexpected potentialities, fresh multiplicities emerge when the “active 
minoritarian force” is “rediscovered” in Shakespeare (ibid). The majoritarian normalizes. 
The minor includes being disgraced and deformed—like hunchbacked Richard III, a 
character examined in my chapter on villains. Actors, I argue, minoritize. The audience, 
the actor, the scenery becomes “disorganized, disarticulated” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 
280) as they blend with the world around them, as they find themselves set within and 
forced to respond to a series of performative, contextual, or affective relations. I am 
interested in applying this Deleuzean system in which subject, event, cause, and effect all 
enter into mutual interaction and transform each other into new multiplicities. 
Virtues/Practices and Conceptions of Selfhood 
 I isolate four democratic practices or virtues in Shakespeare’s work. By using the 
term “virtue,” I draw on Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981). MacIntyre’s book 
represents the mainstream approach to the question of democratic virtue, and, as such, 
helps me to highlight what is distinctive about my own approach to the topic. MacIntyre 
laments the evisceration of the language of morality and describes post-Enlightenment 
ethics as incoherent. But what if incoherence were celebrated as a condition for the 
emergence of something new—as opening the ground up for a new experience of and 
connection between the virtues? Democracy in the 21st century requires, I will argue, a 
more sensitive attunement to new assemblages of meaning and ethics, as well as a greater 
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appreciation of skills like acting, eavesdropping, playfulness and optimism. Furthermore, 
“it was rarely essences and centralities which the drama of the English Renaissance most 
powerfully staged, but inversions, perversions, the local maneuvers of dressing up and of 
masquerade” (Stallybrass and Kastan 1991: 11). For MacIntyre, such masquerade and 
perversion—and the art of acting—clearly does not belong within the sphere of virtue 
and ethics. 
I locate myself (and my reading of Shakespeare) in-between Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
work on virtues as practices and Erving Goffman’s work on the self as a product of 
dramaturgy (Goffman 1973). For Alasdair MacIntyre, the idea of acting as a virtue, the 
central argument of this dissertation, would be nonsense. Only a whole, consistent self 
can contain virtue. Our soul has a unified disposition that fits into a hierarchical order of 
selves. Opposed to MacIntyre’s conception of the self, dramaturgy theory in sociology 
argues that we all play roles, that there is no essential self. I discuss Erving Goffman as 
representative of this view. My view shares elements from both theorists. 
MacIntyre holds the rather strong thesis that role-playing simply cannot be a 
virtue. “The unity of a virtue in someone’s life is intelligible only as a characteristic of a 
unitary life, a life that can be conceived and evaluated as a whole” (MacIntyre 1981: 205). 
It is only the nasty effect of modern individualism, of liberal, market-driven utilitarianism, 
that the self becomes experienced as detachable from this wholeness. Against liberal 
individualism, MacIntye argues that “the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way 
that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
commitments” (MacIntyre 1981: 259). The Aristotelian tradition of the virtues quests for 
“the good and the best,” standards made according to the community in which shared 
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values are rooted (MacIntyre 1981: 275, emphasis original). There is no individual with 
his own conception of the good; rather, “it is always part of an ordered community that I 
have to seek the human good” (MacIntyre 1981: 173). But in Shakespeare’s world, just as 
in ours, there is not always in place “a shared background foundation for moral discourse 
and action,” which is the setting for MacIntyre’s Aristotelian account of the virtues 
(MacIntyre 1981: 50). This is what King Lear dramatizes, where a Christian universe 
comes up against Gloucester's "As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods" (King Lear 
4.1.37).7 In that play, Edgar and Edmund embody this rupture and give voice to these 
contradictory worldviews. It is also present in Coriolanus. 
MacIntyre does, however, allow for an understanding of a virtue as a practice. 
Although he believes in a community of shared ideals, a community that decides what the 
prized virtues are, the telos of virtue shifts as one seeks the good. “To move towards the 
good is to move in time and that movement may itself involve new understandings of 
what it is to move towards the good” (MacIntyre 1981: 176). MacIntyre’s conception of 
the shifting telos follows from his understanding of a virtue as a practice; indeed, his 
definition sounds a lot like an art, because the agreed-upon standard of excellence shifts 
as artists develop their craft. 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form 
of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definite of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions 
of the ends and good involved, are systematically extended (MacIntyre 1981: 187, 
my emphasis). 
 
                                                
7 All references to Shakespeare are to Shakespeare 2008. References to King Lear are hereafter abbreviated 
as Lr. I cite from the conflated text. 
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The goal of a practice or virtue moves when great people set the standards of excellence 
anew: “Practices never have a goal or goals fixed for all time—painting has no such goal 
nor has physics—but the goals themselves are transmuted by the history of the activity” 
(MacIntyre 1981: 193-194). As I will show in my first chapter on acting, this also holds 
true for the practices of the stage. Practices also elevate the lives of the entire community: 
“the pursuit of excellence in a way that extends human powers is at the heart of human 
life” (MacIntyre 1981: 199). Jill Frank describes this position: “virtue (no less than vice) 
is acquired and maintained, or lost, by practice. Not a static trait of character, something 
one has or lacks, it is better understood not simply as a noun but also as a verb” (Frank 
2005: 13). Acting is a practice and a virtue, then, that develops creative responsiveness, a 
practice sensitive to one’s surroundings, without a fixed goal or standard. Standards must 
be flexible to shift in shifting environments, evolving and developing based on context. 
 Although I agree with MacIntyre that virtues can serve the advancement of 
common life, I part ways with his claim that there is only one standard of excellence. The 
Aristotelian tradition of the virtues that quests for the good and the best, on MacIntyre’s 
account, are standards out of place in pluralist, democratic communities. The acting 
methods discussed here are experimental strivings, strolls along winding trackways and 
hedgerows rather than sprints to a known, albeit developing, destination. Although 
MacIntyre does acknowledge that our standards of excellence shift as practitioners of the 
virtues re-orient themselves towards their goal, and as achievements advance, to the 
extent that he posits a community in control of those standards, his moral vision is simply 
too limited to be applicable in today’s multicultural society. There is a slightly different 
questing after the good needful today: You gaze at one goal, but as you advance in its 
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direction, it looks slightly different. Disruptive events happen. Every insight into the 
future rests on uncertainty. Maps are useless. As in whitewater rafting, you dip your oar 
in the roiling waters to avoid crashing into the rocks, and you can see just a bit further 
down the river. But never all the way. There is always a questing, a trajectory, a 
teleology—but without finalism, as Bergson would say (Bergson 2007). You can’t set 
precise standards in advance because in our world, standards regarding “the good” are 
multiple and competing. 
 This stance need not dissolve into the radical individualism MacIntyre believes it 
must. Just because there is no unanimous agreement on standards of excellence to guide 
creative responders does not leave us with a human being creating her or his own virtues 
in a vacuum, apart from any community whatsoever. MacIntyre posits a straw man here, 
a product of liberal individualist modernity (MacIntyre 1981: 259). That straw man takes 
shape in sociological theorist Erving Goffman (MacIntyre 1981: 115). For Goffman, 
socially approved role-playing, the performances of everyday life, constitutes one’s 
identity. Goffman’s self could never carry Aristotelian virtues because “the liquidation of 
the self into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing allows no scope for the exercise of 
dispositions which could genuinely be accounted virtues in any sense remotely 
Aristotelian” (MacIntyre 1981: 205). There must be consistency to the virtue, as it strives 
toward the telos always, not just in some situations or contexts. From Goffman’s 
perspective, MacIntyre exhibits what is commonly viewed as the modern lament for the 
lack of a single coherent identity, what Peter Gay has called “a hunger for wholeness” 
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(cited in Cmiel 1990: 93).8 From MacIntyre’s perspective, Goffman’s floorboards-giving-
way model of subjectivity empties the modern self of any potential for virtue. 
 There are, however, some insights from Goffman’s work I would like to apply 
here. And, pace MacIntyre, I do believe we can have virtue without “wholeness”—
indeed, it is my argument that acting is a gateway virtue for the possession of additional 
virtues.9 While Goffman does speak of “a man behind the mask,” he believes the self is a 
product of dramaturgy (Goffman 1973: 212). At the conclusion of his study, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, he writes that: 
In this report the performed self was seen as some kind of image, usually 
creditable, which the individual on stage and in character effectively attempts to 
induce others to hold in regard to him. While this image is entertained concerning 
the individual, so that a self is imputed to him, this self itself does not derive from 
its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated by that 
attribute of local events which renders them interpretable by witnesses. A 
correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a 
performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a product of a scene that 
comes off, and is not a cause of it. The self, then, as a performed character, is not 
an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate is to be born, 
to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that is 
presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be 
credited or discredited (Goffman 1973: 252-253, emphasis original). 
 
A self is not more or less “true” or “organic”—it is only more or less credible from others’ 
viewpoints. Goffman is concerned with the self as a dramatic effect arising from a 
situation, an event, or a scene. We project a self onto those we interact with, but our 
                                                
8 “Rousseau, Hegel, Coleridge, Marx, and others both of the left and the right have exhibited what Peter 
Gay has called a ‘hunger for wholeness,’	  the dream of reintegrating man into a unified whole”	  (93). These, 
like MacIntyre, are reactionaries against modernity’s fragmentation. 
9 This idea of a virtue that is prerequisite to the others, I take from MacIntyre. He describes the virtue of 
constancy in Jane Austen’s work and phronesis in Aristotle’s in this way: “In some ways constancy plays a 
role in Jane Austen analogous to that of phronesis in Aristotle; it is a virtue the possession of which is a 
prerequisite for the possession of other virtues” (MacIntyre 1981: 183). I think methods of response 
nurtured by acting techniques are prerequisite to the other practices of democratic character I discuss: 
courage; optimism; and the virtue of hearing green, or repartitioning the sensible via overhearing—because 
role-playing helps one achieve those three more fully (as the characters held up as exemplars in these 
situations show). 
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judgments of them do not stem from any true self within. Goffman says that an individual 
might believe in the truth of him- or herself, but fundamentally, we are all actors due to 
the nature of social interaction in our society. “[T]he very obligation and profitability of 
appearing always in a steady moral light, of being a socialized character, forces one to be 
the sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage” (Goffman 1973: 251, my 
emphasis). This person, the self as dramatic effect of the scene, is the dramatic effect of 
the event. 
 Not only is the self a projection of his or her environment, but, as Luigi Pirandello 
knew, our personalities are fluid despite our obstinate belief that they are fixed and stable. 
As his character Father says in Six Characters in Search of an Author: 
There is not a 'you,' only a shifting set of vanishing atoms that make up a myriad 
of 'you's. ... [Y]ou cling to the illusion of a consistent presence—your unchanging 
truth—but you are no more than twenty-four tiny truths a second—a set of 
flickering flames... (Pirandello 2014: 94). 
 
It is the techniques of acting that allow us to draw out these different selves, and to 
eventually become better democrats, more empathetic, more sensitive to our surroundings, 
cognizant of how those surroundings, and how others, change us. Our subjectivity has 
no immutable foundation. As Marie and Pierre Curie did when they ground up and 
separated samples of pitchblende time and time again in a painstaking and excruciating 
process to eventually discover the new elements polonium and radium, the actor analyzes, 
dissolves, and discovers elements of themselves, new dimensions of their personality. 
Discovering something new requires separating out the various aspects of oneself to see 
the new elements. 
 I hope the foregoing has made clear my rejection of any fantasy of self-
ontogenesis grounded on a disavowal of subjects’ dependence on others, their 
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environments, and their histories. And, as my discussion of Habermas in my first chapter 
will make clear, I do not accept the view of the autonomous subject of instrumental 
reason. However, as I discuss in my chapter on tragic optimism, for some of 
Shakespeare’s villains, a fantasy of sovereign selfhood should not always be dismissed as 
worthless. I seek the middle-ground between MacIntyre’s Aristotelian unified soul on one 
hand and Goffman’s role-playing and masks on the other—but all from the perspective of 
the actor. In other words, not to necessarily undermine that dichotomy but to capture it 
from another angle. 
Chapter-By-Chapter Breakdown 
In the first chapter, “‘Sometimes I Mean Things So Much I Have To Act’: 
Rethinking Communicative Action,” I push back against the work of Habermas. Liberal 
models of democratic citizenship, from Rawls to Habermas, believe that when 
deliberating, rational citizens should not practice deception. For example, for Rawls, the 
conception of justice as fairness must be constructed from first principles that must not be 
misrepresented (Rawls 1999). I argue, however, the practice of acting, or playful 
misrepresentation, helps citizens to encounter unsettling circumstances in daily life; 
respond to others in more open, genuine ways; and expand the relatively stable repertoire 
of selves each person cultivates through life.  
Open and sincere dialogue is central to discourse ethics, and Habermas assumes 
that people will seek agreement on fundamental truths, and that they will do this by not 
lying. In Habermas's "ideal speech situation," each utterance conveys a "rational will in 
relation to a common interest ascertained without deception" (Habermas 1975: 108, my 
emphasis). A rationally willing subject will be comprehensible, first and foremost (that is 
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his primary validity claim). But even when a subject cannot rationally understand, that 
subject may feel differently after an utterance, the utterance may affect his mood—and 
surely that difference in feeling is a part of communication. Also, regarding Habermas’s 
fear of deception: What about the “lies like truth” that happen in the theater (Macbeth: 
5.5.43)10? Actors might be affectively sincere and re-enacting a fictitious situation at the 
same time. Or, sometimes citizens need acting techniques to express parts of themselves 
otherwise concealed—for example, I argue that Cordelia would do well with acting skills 
in order to express her true feelings towards her father; and Coriolanus would do well 
with the same to gain favor with the plebeians. Characters like Coriolanus and Cordelia 
demonstrate the needfulness of acting skills in real life, simply to communicate certain 
aspects of oneself to others. We might say that Falstaff, a showman, and Coriolanus, a 
brave hero, have what is lacking in the other. 
I put forth positive notions of theatricality and rationality without consolidating 
them into a theory of truth or judgment. Conceiving of democratic citizens as theatrical 
actors opens up the idea as agents as both scripted by dominant and dissident discourses 
and yet able to enact and rescript their own performances as historical agents of their own. 
This is one way to view the agency of actors of Shakespeare in the American context. 
They often—think of Welles’s Brutus (Julius Caesar 1937), or the prominent nineteenth-
century Shakespearean actor Edwin Forrest’s radical restaging of Othello without an Iago 
(Othello 1826), or Baz Luhrmann's hip, updated Romeo + Juliet (1996)—rescripted 
Shakespeare for a new time and place. In this chapter, I explore the democratic potential 
for theatrical role-playing to develop the capacity within selves for a responsiveness to 
others by broadening one’s creative experiences. There are several models of role-
                                                
10 References to Macbeth are hereafter abbreviated as Mac.	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playing: stylized, artificial forms, tradition and conventions, gestures studied and unfelt 
but painted in broad strokes; early 20th century techniques that seek after veracity and 
loath the artificial and posed as meaningless; and a style of self-conscious acting where 
the theater’s machinations are exposed for all to see. I theorize the democrat as an 
excitable actor who triggers modes of interaction that further the aims and sentiments of 
the democratic community—this is especially true of Bottom from A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream. Bottom’s hijinks and shenanigans, his multiple and sometimes forestalled 
“becomings,” can help elaborate possibilities for a contemporary ethos of democracy, an 
equality in the style of our interactions with each other. Admittedly, we are not all born 
with acting talents, but the variety of different acting styles ensures that there are 
practices for everyone to cultivate.  
Whereas Hamlet and Habermas regard the theater as a vehicle to behold actors 
offering nature a “mirror,” (Hamlet 3.2.20)11 Bottom and Deleuze expose the myth that 
theatrical dramatization can ever be stable repetition of an image. Dramatization is 
always about becoming and process rather than being and stability. This is partly why 
some Renaissance audiences and dramatists found the theater so menacing. By moralists, 
the theater was seen as a school for vice and mendacity, not least of all because greatness 
of stature and position could be faked and often was on the Renaissance stage, 
underscoring the social order’s constructed quality in a way that upsets the purported 
naturalism of an aristocratic social order. Phillip Stubbes complained, “it is verie hard to 
knowe who is noble, who is worshipful, who is a gentleman, who is not” at the playhouse 
(cited in Stallybrass and Kastan 1991: 9). Further, there was a pronounced self-
consciousness about role-playing—e.g., Cleopatra’s fear that “I shall see / Some 
                                                
11 References to Hamlet are hereafter abbreviated as Ham.	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squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness” (Antony and Cleopatra 5.2.215-6). James 
Edward Siemon goes so far as to call such role-creation and disguise “a consistent feature 
of Renaissance dramatic thought” (Siemon 1975: 106). I examine this strain of 
“Renaissance dramatic thought” in several plays of Shakespeare, against contemporary 
theorists of philosophy and the theater, to reclaim acting for American democracy today. 
Moreover, acting can extend our basic knowledges, perceptions, and judgements, 
offering a deepened intensity of affect. Acting can foster a richer, more robust democratic 
citizenry given the theater’s capacity to create new dispositions, expansive atmospheres, 
unexpected values, dynamic assemblages, and disorderly participations. Adopting the 
character of another person also fosters empathy and allows for greater self-
understanding, which is important, I argue, to the politics of a multi-cultural, pluralistic 
society. Acting also develops what DuBois calls “wide judgment” and hails as essential 
to freedom (DuBois quoted in Rogers 2012: 195). It broadens our capacity for judgment, 
one’s capacity to “see feelingly,” not just rationally. In asking what potential acting holds 
for a more participatory democracy, for more engaged deliberative discussions, this 
chapter serves as a springboard for the rest of the dissertation. Each chapter discusses a 
central character who is an actor. 
The second chapter, “Comic courage,” argues that the quality of courage changes 
based on the genre in which it appears. Courage, as depicted by political theorists, takes 
on a tragic or heroic cast. I make the case for what I call comic courage in a playful 
mood. This demands acting skills. It takes courage to take on the role of pretend courage 
because you do not know where it will lead; there is uncertainty as to its effects. Here I 
first examine the martial, tragic courage of Julius Caesar and the melodramatic courage 
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of Hamlet and Brutus. I draw on Derrida’s links between justice, revenge, and ghosts to 
delineate the difference between tragic and melodrama courage (Derrida 1993). My key 
exemplar of comic courage in a playful mood is Rosalind in As You Like It.12 This is a 
courage of play-acting and mood-switching. It includes the ability to exercise control 
over the mood of a scene; it involves a disregard for authenticity or any forms of so-
called authentic meaning; it helps create democratic assemblages by extending our 
repertoire of actions and the actions of those around us. The possessor of comic courage 
can actively (in every sense of the word) embrace potentially tragic events playfully. 
 In the third chapter, “Dissatisfied With The Now: Optimism And Equality Amid 
Villains,” I consider equality as a mood of Shakespeare’s political villains. Optimists are 
often portrayed as naifs: One more often thinks of innocents like Pollyanna than villains 
like Richard III. But in Shakespeare’s plays, villains are oftentimes the optimists. For 
example, in King Lear, Edmund designates events as objects or means to his optimism 
(“All’s meet with me” [Lr. 1.2.168]). What comes his way, he can fashion fit. There are 
no premanufactured meanings, prefabricated values. The villainous actor is not only the 
Machiavel, manipulating his subjects with impenetrable deception and a program of lies. 
He is something more, something that can be admired by democrats. I examine the 
political energies of this vitally affirmative mood in Shakespeare’s villains by 
considering Edmund from King Lear and Richard III against contemporary theorists of 
optimism and happiness, Lauren Berlant and Sara Ahmed. The villains in Shakespeare’s 
                                                
12 Incidentally, feminist critics have claimed that Shakespeare’s female characters have privileges within a 
comedic genre that they lack in other genres, further claiming “the incompatibility of patriarchal and comic 
structures” (Riefer 1987, 144). Patriarchal society is in a fundamental conflict with comedy, because it is 
women who are able to control the course of the plot in comedies. “[T]he pervasiveness of chauvinism and 
the possibility of comic resolution are indirectly proportional. In other words, the stronger the forces of 
patriarchy, the less likely—or at least less convincing—comic resolution becomes” (ibid.). Consider, for 
example, the extent to which misogyny drives the plot of Othello. See also Bamber 1982.	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plays all have an attachment to what turns out to be, by the end of the play, what Berlant 
calls “compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be 
impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” (Berlant 2011: 24). Richard finds 
the objective correlative for his secret optimism in the English crown, Edmund in his 
father’s estate and in Goneril and Regan’s love. These attachments are “cruel” because 
the objects of desire threaten their well-being, but the desire for the object keeps them 
going, gives them something to look forward to and live for, allows them to redeem their 
existence. These villains do not seek happiness; they like games, which give purpose to 
their lives. They are "arch" villains in two senses of the word—playfully and principally. 
True, these villains desire to rank above others, never dislodging the hierarchical ideal in 
place in monarchy—but they are initially motivated by the lack of being affording basic 
rights of equal consideration with others they consider their equals. Shakespeare’s 
villains are of an almost impossible villainy, but sympathy with them is not impossible. 
In fact, American author Jane Smiley so identified with the villainous sisters in King Lear 
that she chose the oldest sister Goneril to narrate her novel A Thousand Acres, based on 
King Lear but set on an Iowan farm in the 1980s (Smiley 1991). This novel reveals a 
forward-looking attachment to the capitalist dream of more land and its devastating 
effects, and the sustaining efforts of the Goneril character and her sister to locate hope 
and so-called “good luck” elsewhere. What new avenues to democracy take shape when 
optimism provides a horizon for our dreams and experiences? 
 It is true, there is a tension between Berlant’s focus on optimistic structures and 
mine on affective, personal moods. But surely the two are related. Cruel optimism, for 
Berlant, helps maintain the social order. So what could a mood do? Optimism is not 
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bread, it cannot cure world hunger, establish world peace, or enact tangible effects on a 
scale that passing a law might do. It might even be detrimental if it keeps people trapped 
in the habitrail of trying to achieve and failing. But what is the alternative anyway to 
being trapped? To be optimistic is always better, I believe, than to despair—despair being 
only the fervor of starved expectation and hope. At worst, optimism will be futile against 
the domination and hierarchy of the current social order. At best, it will change that order. 
In cultivating optimism, one seeks to ensure that one always finds the best of a situation 
and tries to improve it. It need not lull anyone into complacency or acceptance of the 
orders that be. 
Chapter four, drawing on the work of Jacques Ranciere, examines overhearing as 
a way to repartition the sensible. In this chapter, which focuses on Measure for Measure, 
I seek to expose how dominant ideas about representation, listening, and speaking fail to 
capture less normative modes of democratic exchange. Overhearing can be a kind of 
unauthorized, secretive reinvention of what is said. It is oppositional listening, listening 
as resistance. Eavesdropping undermines hermeneutic certainty. “Democratic 
overhearing: cultivating a ‘third ear’ and repartitioning the sensible” explores 
contemporary possibilities in the Renaissance idea of “hearing green.” Bruce Smith has 
examined the concept of “hearing green” in Renaissance texts, which he uses to call into 
question the notion that the faculty of reason exists in a superior position to the senses 
and that the subject exists in isolation from what that subject perceives (Smith 2001; 
Smith 2004). To “green” a word means to dissolve it into nonsemantic sound. To hear 
green is to hear more than the rational. As Rousseau forcefully puts the matter: “Always 
to reason is the mania of small minds. Strong souls have quite another language. It is with 
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this language that one persuades and makes others act” (Rousseau 1979: 321, my 
emphasis). Jane P. Tompkins, in Reader Response Criticism, goes so far as to argue that 
Renaissance readers did not care about the meaning of texts—only their effects 
(Tompkins 1980). Hence the fears by anti-theatricalists regarding the Renaissance theater 
as a house of vice, corrupting audience members’ moral sensibilities and unraveling the 
threads of decent society. 
Also desiring that his readers “hear green,” Nietzsche speaks of those who have 
“a third ear,” a delicate, spiritual perceptive ability. He was attentive to—and asked his 
readers to be attentive to—the musicality of the spoken word, its alluring and seductive 
qualities. Music is “the above, beyond, and before,” and the greatest books’ rhythms 
should “dance” (Nietzsche 1966: 182). How words are packaged, the force they have 
upon a listener, might have unforeseen and detrimental effects (consider Othello or 
Gloucester): we sometimes hear what others want us to hear, or what the genre or frame 
suggests. Overhearing, or overlooking, in Shakespeare often goes tragically awry: 
consider how Cassius asks his servant to ascend to a lookout spot high on a hill to watch 
and describe the final battle in Julius Caesar. Cassius's servant thinks he sees an officer 
in Cassius's army being taken prisoner. Upon hearing of this sight, Cassius despairs and 
kills himself before news comes that his officer was not taken (Julius Caesar 5.3).13 
Overlooking, just as overhearing, can be misleading. Mistakes and misunderstandings 
often occur. We as a theater audience also “overhear,” setting in motion the potential to 
consider the theater a place where repartitionings of the sensible happen perhaps not-so-
subversively depending on the production. In hearing green, this aural and sensual 
dislocation, because it sets into motion an affective placelessness, there is no ground to 
                                                
13 References to Julius Caesar are hereafter abbreviated as JC.	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give you your expectations or bearings. Finally, following through on arguments on 
acting that constitute the core of this dissertation, I consider the consequences that the 
character in Measure for Measure who does all the overhearing is a character in disguise. 
Finally, my conclusion ponders the question of what exactly actorly techniques 
can help us with today. I look specifically at trauma and overcoming past injury: the 
traumas of terrorism, of modernity, of the death of god. In cultivating actorly sensitivity 
and responsiveness, these techniques can also be a way of working through the past. 
Acting engages those sympathies that are always eager for healing postures and histrionic 
gestures that, by overdramatizing, make things easier to bear. One of the most exciting 
moments of exaggeration, a balm to cover over hurt, occurs in As You Like It when 
Orlando tells Rosalind he must leave for a couple hours. She confesses at first: “Alas, 
dear love, I cannot lack thee two hours” (As You Like It 4.1.153).14 When he re-
emphasizes his engagement, she says, “Ay, go your ways, go your ways. I knew what 
you would prove; my friends told me as must, and I thought no less. That flattering 
tongue of yours won me. ’Tis but one cast away, and so, come, death! Two o’clock is 
your hour?” (AYL 4.1.156-159). Overacting is a way to cover over our real insecurities 
and pains—Rosalind is very disappointed in news of Orlando’s impending absence—and 
in exaggerating, she makes it humorous and hence more bearable. Can acting help us 
refashion our wounds in a society where it seems that the suppression of traumatic 
memories in social discourse seems to be a condition of going about the daily business of 
living? It is my argument that acting, acting courageously, being optimistic, and 
eavesdropping can ultimately inspire true forms of genuine togetherness, neighbor-loving, 
                                                
14 References to As You Like It are hereafter abbreviated as AYL.	  
 31 
and democratic self-government. I aim to posit a vision of democratic mutuality and 

























‘Sometimes I Mean Things So Much I Have To Act’: Rethinking Communicative 
Action  
 Consider political campaigning today. Many, including those inside the arena, 
have noted its overt theatricality and spectacular nature. “It's like going to the circus: You 
have acrobats and clowns and dancing bears” (Cruz quoted in Mascaro 2016). This would 
seem to confirm Habermas’s thesis on the decline of the vibrant public sphere of the 
1700s and what he worries is a turn toward the display of public persons. Habermas has 
argued that in the late 1800s, the expansion of capitalism eroded public-private 
distinctions, and once-active voters became passive consumers dedicated to personal 
consumption and private interests rather than to a vibrant democratic polity. On the one 
side of the dichotomy is theatrical representation of public officials; on the other, rational 
democratic debate. Today, we sit back and watch the show that has become politics, 
rather than participate in the show. With the rise of welfare state capitalism in the 
twentieth century,15 companies became increasingly able to manipulate the media and 
governmental institutions, and "rational-critical political debate" began to disappear from 
public spaces (Habermas 1989: 176). Capitalism, Habermas argues, largely "relieved" the 
public of its democratic-deliberative functions: 
On the one hand…collectively organized private interests directly attempted to 
take on the form of political agency; on the other hand….parties…fused with the 
organs of public authority, established themselves…above the public whose 
instruments they once were. The process of the politically relevant exercise and 
equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, 
special interest associations, parties, and public administration. The public as such 
is included only sporadically in this circuit of power, and even then it is brought 
in only to contribute its acclamation (ibid, emphasis original). 
 
                                                
15 Habermas, originally writing in 1962 (the work from which I cite was translated into English in 1989), 
partly credits the rise of the welfare state with the public sphere’s demise. Perhaps today he would be 
equally concerned with the virulent forms of neoliberal capitalism at work. 
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Habermas laments that there is no permanent public sphere beyond sporadic, state-
engineered elections. Habermas speaks with disdain of “the staged and manipulative 
effectiveness of a publicity aimed at rendering the broad population…infectiously ready 
for acclamation” (Habermas 1989: 211, my emphasis). The public only exists—is 
passively “brought in” as he says above, as if on wheels from the wings to the edges of 
the stage—to mindlessly applaud this “staged” publicity. Habermas here registers his 
anti-theatricalism. The theater and its tricks remain beyond the pale of rational, public 
discourse. For him, rational communication does not include the artistic. He excludes 
“dramaturgical action” from communicative action because it tends to be strategic (the 
performer is trying to influence her audience; her utterances are perlocutionary) and 
communicative reason cannot be strategic (Colclasure 2010). 
 This chapter argues that, contra Habermas, theatrical techniques, the tools of the 
actor, have a lot to offer democratic debate. This may seem like a dangerous or 
irresponsible argument to make at a time when there is such a lack of basic agreement on 
a set of factual truths in public discourse today. Even as recently as, say, the 1970s, the 
American public seemed more willing to agree on the basics. When Walter Cronkite said 
we were doing badly in Vietnam, we were doing badly in Vietnam. Today, when Tom 
Brokaw delivers news, large segments of Americans dismiss him as a mouthpiece for 
“the liberal media” (Alterman 2008). Of further worry to deliberate democrats, we have 
this ability today with social media to tune in to select news sources that can reinforce our 
wrong facts. Some today, for example, actually believe that President Obama was born in 
Kenya, despite having access to the factual truth (Jackson 2015). Maybe today is not the 
time to be defending actors and “clowns” against the Habermasian model of 
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communication action that emphasizes normative rightness, theoretical truth, and 
expressive sincerity.  
 But acting skills can be essential for the tasks of genuine expressiveness, the 
actions with which we express ourselves in public. Acting makes us more sincere, 
vulnerable, responsive, and it takes courage.16 Pace Plato’s arguments against mimesis, I 
argue that we can foster democratic character traits such as empathy and mutual 
understanding with illusions, with untruths, with, as Shakespeare writes in Macbeth, “lies 
like truth,” the stuff of the stage (Plato 1992; Mac. 5.5.43). The beginning of this chapter 
discusses Habermas’s anti-theatricalism in more depth before examining a number of 
Shakespearean characters who demonstrate how actorly techniques can help foster a 
better democracy. I survey a spectrum of acting styles, such as “naturalistic” acting 
(Viola in Twelfth Night, and all characters who seek to “pass” while in disguise), 
“stylized” acting (the players in Hamlet whom Hamlet accuses of heavy exaggeration) or 
what we today might call “bad” acting17 (Bottom in A Midsummer Night’s Dream), and 
“presentational” acting (which stems from an actor’s decision to play his role self-
consciously, placing himself between the audience and his character). To conclude, I 
argue that acting is sometimes essential to expressing one’s self and the perils of not 
being able to act are exemplified by Cordelia and Coriolanus’s plights, respectively. 
Although my account of acting theory draws heavily upon actors’ perspectives, I 
seek to blur the line between actor and audience for a more holistic understanding of the 
                                                
16 This paradox of acting as a way to be genuine towards others, this “honesty” through “deception,” has 
parallels in Shakespeare’s plays where characters must act or pretend to be “dead” in order to “live” (Hero, 
Juliet, Falstaff). These characters emerge, through paradox, to something more sincere and alive. 
17 Whether acting is good or bad according to a standard is less important than whether a connection is 
made, an affectively democratic assemblage triggered. Both “good” and “bad” acting can be politically 
exemplary or instructive. A sign of democracy, as I understand it here, in a Deleuzian sense, is its 
productivity, its capacity to create new dispositions, expansive atmospheres, unusual values, dynamic 
assemblages, disorderly participations. 
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democratic spheres, or combinations, or assemblages produced. The trigger of the 
assemblage may be an actor, or a prop, but the arc between playwright and actor and 
character and audience member is fluid, shifting, and creative—just as it is between 
playwright and actor and character and audience member in Shakespeare’s plays within 
plays. 
One final note: Even as these Shakespearean actors exist in aristocratic-run 
communities that assume the great chain of being, they are both sincere and affectively 
democratic in the way they engage others. Their actions bespeak an equality of style and 
a sincerity that I promote as central to successful, creative democratic deliberation in this 
chapter. 
Habermas and the theater 
 
 Habermas views theater in Shakespeare’s time as mimetic. Its association with 
nobility—Habermas quotes from Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister here: “On the boards the 
polished man appears in his splendor…just as he does so in the upper classes of society” 
(Habermas 1989: 14)—hindered the advent of the bourgeois public sphere. Before the 
bourgeois public sphere emerged, a “lord” was “public” by virtue of “representation” 
(Habermas 1989: 13). The theater existed for the nobility to reflect back upon itself 
admiringly and establish its dominion over the populace. Habermas admits that, in 
Renaissance England, the populace was allowed into the theater, unlike in countries 
where theaters were part of the court and the royal residence (Germany, e.g.). In England, 
the lower classes were always “ready for a ‘spectacle’,” he says (Habermas 1989: 38): 
Here again we see Habermas describing the theater in terms of the coercive customary 
practices of the modern, proscenium theater—the silent, unseen, consuming audience 
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hidden in the dark, immobilized before the action on stage, unable to participate, 
disciplined to stay quiet and still; this describes modern theater often enough, but hardly 
comes close to capturing the boisterous, interactive, collective theater of Shakespeare’s 
day—projecting back on the very different theater of the Renaissance the conventions of 
modern theater. Yes, Habermas admits, the lower classes came to the show, “[b]ut,” 
Habermas cautions, “they were all still part of a different types of publicity in which the 
‘ranks’…paraded themselves, and the people applauded” (ibid). Theater existed to prop 
up the princely state, was regressive vis-à-vis Habermas’s prized public sphere, was 
oriented to maintaining the authority of the state. Theater heightened the dominance of 
church and state. 
 Habermas notes with dismay that elements of this authoritarian mode of 
representation have once again reared their head. As he understands it, “publicity” stands 
opposed to his most valued “public discussion.” Today (he is writing in 1989 but has not 
retracted his argument), “organizations and functionaries display representation” 
(Habermas 1989: 200, emphasis original). He cautions: “Representative publicity of the 
old type [i.e., as existed in Renaissance England] is not thereby revived; but it still lends 
certain traits to a refeudalized public sphere of civil society” (ibid). Special interests 
become the general interest through the mirage of a staged (i.e., faked) “representation.” 
Here is Habermas in illuminating detail: 
The aura of personally represented authority returns as an aspect of publicity; to 
this extent modern publicity indeed has affinity with feudal publicity. Public 
relations do not genuinely concern public opinion but opinion in the sense of 
reputation. The public sphere becomes the court before whose public prestige can 
be displayed—rather than in which public critical debate is carried on (Habermas 
1989: 200-201, emphasis original). 
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The public sphere becomes the Renaissance court in which prestige is acted out. The 
space for public critical debate shrinks. Today we witness a predicament in our ability to 
engage with each other in rational deliberation essential to the healthy functioning of our 
democracies. From Habermas’s views on theater, we can deduce that theater would be 
the last place he would look for solutions to expanding (or strengthening the quality of) 
the public sphere. 
 Critics charge that Habermas overvalues rationalist discourse at the cost of 
neglecting the imaginative, creative, and visceral realms. As William Connolly parcels it 
out from an analysis of early Habermasian models of discourse from 18th century salon 
conversations: Habermas values “rational argument, true publicity, public opinion, 
collective consensus, and political action” and meanwhile sidelines “manipulative 
effectiveness, staging, interest compromise, unstable settlement, behavior, and infectious 
acclamation” (Connolly 1999: 35). Trapped together on the negative outside of 
Habermas’s elevated public sphere is “staging” alongside more devious forms of 
manipulation. The authoritative, rational force of argument must not be tainted by crafty 
theatrics. Behind this position, strengthening and ennobling it, lies the Habermasian 
notion of truth. In privileging the rational capacities of public sphere individuals, as a 
pathway to truth, Habermas overlooks the ways theatrical irrationality can serve 
democratic debate. In his view, rational communication precludes aesthetic expression 
and non-transparent exchanges of ideas. Although he does not eliminate emotional, non-
verbal expression as part of deliberation (Neblo 2003)18, Habermas clearly elevates 
verbal discourse and rational discursive capability above more general forms of 
communication action.  
                                                
18 Habermas brushes such expressive dimensions aside in one of his early works (Habermas 1979: 1). 
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In an early work, he gives what he calls “manifest communication” the prominent 
place, contrasting it with what he calls “experiential expressions” (Habermas 1972: 166). 
The latter include “the immediately corporeal reactions of blushing and turning pale, 
rigidification, nervous glance, relaxation, and even laughing and crying” (ibid). He 
understands these as a signal for “unstated intentions” to better parse the truth. 
Experiential expressions, he notes, 
can legitimate and emphasize, deny and disavow, make ironic twists clear, 
unmask dissimulations or signalize deceptions as such. In connection with words 
and acts, expression serves as an indication of how seriously something is meant, 
whether the communicating subject is deceiving itself or others, to what degree it 
wants to or may identify itself with an actual expression of its own life, and how 
broad is the spectrum of connotation, concealment, or contrary intentions 
(Habermas 1972: 167). 
 
Here we have the ultimate anti-theater: experiential expression, as one dimension of 
the structure of ordinary language, can “unmask dissimulations.” Habermas even goes 
to far as to claim for it the ability to communicate whether someone is “deceiving 
itself or others”—to know one from the other. Habermas’s consensus theory of truth 
requires that to one’s own self, one be true: “betrayal of another is simultaneously 
betrayal of oneself” (Heinrich quoted in Habermas 1987: 325). The “cooperative 
quest for truth” requires a fundamental honesty with oneself (Habermas 1987: 347). 
Here we see Habermas’s overriding concern with meaning in statements, their truth 
content. 
 But it is interesting that Habermas chooses to credit “blushing and turning pale” 
and “nervous glances” as tools for parsing truth. Because for actors, such is the miracle of 
moments on stage. George Bernard Shaw gives a first-hand account of Italian actress 
Eleonora Duse’s ability to blush on cue. Shaw writes, “She began to blush; and in another 
moment she was conscious of it, and the blush was slowly spreading and deepening until, 
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after a few vain efforts to avert her face…without seeming to do so, she gave up and hid 
the blush in her hands. … I could detect no trick in it” (Shaw quoted in Meisner and 
Longwell 1989: 14). Sometimes acting is the opposite of “tricks” and manipulation. To 
create an illusion and then at once to hide it behind one’s hands is a quintessential 
example of naturalistic acting. It is what Shakespeare’s disguised characters do to get by. 
Acting is not about talking; it is about truthful behavior engendered by living in the 
moment, responding honestly to one’s surroundings. For Habermas, theatrics did not 
contribute to the public sphere: It is what came before. It was “the precondition of 
rational-critical debate” (Habermas 1989: 164). Property-owning private people would 
meet after the theater, after a concert or museum, and discuss. As such, the theater is 
excluded from his model of rational deliberation. 
Others have noted that Habermas neglects, as Nicholas Garnham recounts the 
charge, “the rhetorical and playful aspects of communicative action, which leads to too 
sharp a distinction between information and entertainment and to a neglect of the link, in 
for instance Rousseau’s notion of public festivals, between citizenship and theatricality” 
(Garnham 1992: 360). I believe this stems from Habermas’s association of theater with 
“spectacle,” the word he uses to describe seventeenth century theater (Habermas 1989: 
38). Habermas judges theater to be solely representation and removed from any 
possibility of dialogic interchange—in contrast to letter-writing (which led to diary-
writing, “a letter addressed to the sender” [Habermas 1989: 49]) and “the psychological 
novel.” He praises the latter three for ushering in the bourgeois public sphere. “It is no 
accident,” Habermas writes, “that the eighteenth century became the century of the letter: 
through letter writing the individual unfolded himself in his subjectivity” (Habermas 
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1989: 48). Letter-writing cultivated the idea of the private self, created a fundamental 
alteration in self-conception and consciousness, that would allow for the growth of the 
public sphere. Habermas similarly praises epistolary novels like Samuel Richardson’s 
Pamela and Clarissa for the feedback between reality and fiction they offered readers, by 
developing a dialogue between readers and characters and author. “Richardson wept over 
the actors in his novels as much as his readers did; author and reader themselves became 
actors who ‘talked heart to heart’” (Habermas 1989: 50). Habermas argues that “the 
empathetic reader repeated within himself the private relationships displayed before him 
in literature” (ibid). The literary public sphere was formed when private readers come 
together to reflect on what they read. This contributes to enlightenment and rational-
critical debate, argues Habermas, eventually leading to the political public sphere. But 
there is no reason why the theater could not serve the exact same function. Why could 
theatergoers not “themselves became actors who talked heart to heart” with the characters 
on stage (imaginatively in the moment, or following the performance)? Why could 
empathetic audience members not “repeat within themselves the private relationships 
displayed before him” in the theater? Theater also offers actors and those influenced by 
them the opportunity to “unfold themselves in their subjectivity.” 
Nancy Fraser has raised a question akin to one of performance. To her, “public 
spheres are not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are 
arenas for the formation and enactment of society identities” (Fraser 1992: 125). When 
subjects speak, they do not utter their opinions in a cultural vacuum. Aside from the 
content of what they say, their style of expression is not neutral. The public sphere is also 
the place for one to “construct and express one’s cultural identity through idiom and 
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style” (Fraser 1992: 126). Institutions, journals, wherever democratic discourse takes 
place, can make it easier or harder for some voices to be heard. Hence Fraser posits the 
existence of a multiplicity of public spheres. This idea bears resemblance to the idea of 
various assemblages that actors enter into, discussed below. But it also indicates the 
importance of acting and stylization—what we could call character development—to 
democratic deliberation. My argument is that acting practices can lend social actors a set 
of techniques useful to their greater participation in publics. 
When Habermas laments that the great majority of the consuming public is 
uncritical, that their debates are now administered by capitalist forces, that so-called 
democratic discussion “assumes the form of a consumer item” (Habermas 1989: 164), he 
notes particularly the decline of a literary public sphere. The reading public that discussed 
culture critically has been supplanted by mass (uncritical) consumers of culture. He 
seems to believe that theater can only be unilaterally, passively consumed and adds 
nothing to rational debate. But I would argue, just as important as the ebb in bourgeois 
reading publics has been the collapse of a theatrical public sphere in the 20th century, a 
public space to attend theatrical shows and critically discuss them afterwards. According 
to drama critic Harold Clurman: “In volume of production and in the ambition of its 
effort the period between 1920-1930 was the richest in American theatre history” 
(Clurman 1957: 7).19 This was the time of early O'Neill, the influence of repertory 
theater, the demise of the European-influenced operetta and the rise of the American 
musical. The decade following saw noteworthy developments as well. As a founding 
                                                
19 Although he was writing in 1957, this is still true, I believe. In fact today, the only Broadway shows that 
turn a profit are musicals. John Lahr, writing in 1995, says: “We are in danger of losing our theater 
culture;” “The golden egg may still be there, but Broadway’s goose is more or less cooked” (Lahr 1996: 
xiii, xiv). 
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member of The Group Theatre, a group of actors, directors, and playwrights working 
together from 1931-1940, Clurman helped establish “a new kind of theatre that was truly 
collaborative and which spoke to the moral and social issues of th[e] time” (Silverberg 
1994: 4).20 Exponentially more than books or letters, the theater takes place in collective 
spaces and fosters dialogic, critical thinking. It depends on immediate and responsive 
audiences, social ideologies, feedback from the critics, and the material conditions of 
local communities. What Tennessee Williams calls “the incontinent blaze of a live 
theater, a theater meant for seeing and for feeling” (Williams 2009: 71) is something 
indescribably explosive, leaky, dynamic and contagious. The interplay of live human 
beings and their problems and joys on stage has an intensely life-like honesty. Especially 
in Renaissance times when the audience participated unrestrictedly, but even in the 20th 
century, Williams notes that “the theater, which is called the charlatan of the arts, is 
paradoxically the one in which the charlatan is most easily detected. … It is all honest 
that does what it professes to do, and there is too much hot light and too many penetrating 
eyes cast upon the stage for the willful obscurantist to pull his tricks” (Williams 2009: 
40). Although a discussion of the theater’s immediacy and public-sphere-like qualities 
would lie outside the scope of this chapter,21 I will argue below that the theater teaches 
audience and actor alike to be more sincere, vulnerable and responsive. 
                                                
20 “Perhaps the most significant experiment in the history of American theater,” the Group staged plays that 
spoke to the critical political issues of the time, such as labor-business relations and poverty (notably the 
plays of Clifford Odets), and it was a trial run for method acting styles and psychological realism 
(Silverberg 1994: 4). Some members of the group had studied with students of Stanislavsky, whose lessons 
on acting are known as “The System,” or the Method (in popular parlance), and they incorporated his 
theories into their training techniques as they worked, exploring with his insights and ultimately 
interpreting and transforming them. Acting styles before The Group Theatre came on the scene were 
stylized, discussed below. 
21 See Mullaney 2015. Theater is there when we “want to think about how we feel, or feel about what we 
think, and do so in actual, experiential, and felt spaces as well as virtual or imaginary worlds” (Mullaney 
2015: 173). “Many	  people have	  found	  theater useful as a kind of social thought as well as an aesthetic 
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Sincerity and Rationality 
 
 In addition to his anti-theatricalism22, Habermas is clear in his privileging of 
sincerity and truth as essential for attaining shared understanding. Habermas posits three 
basic “validity claims,”23 which are claims that can be accepted or challenged by 
interlocutors; “A validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the 
validity of an utterance are fulfilled” (Habermas 1984: 38). This means that a claim must 
express sincerely one’s personal belief(s), must raise a morally or normatively right 
claim, and must make a truthful or factually correct claim about the external world—each 
relating to Habermas’s three ways of partitioning reality into the subjective world 
(sincerity), the social or intersubjective world (normative rightness), and the objective 
world (truth). All three merge of course in practice, but he designates sincerity as merely 
“expressive” as opposed to cognitive or interactive (ibid). Each party to dialogue, in order 
to agree, must recognize the validity claims. In his ideal speech situation, he takes for 
granted "the participants' orientation toward reaching understanding (that is, the sincere 
expression of utterances)" and that the truth should be sought; "a proposition is true if it 
withstands all attempts to refute it under the demanding conditions of rational discourse" 
(Habermas 1998: 367). It is not only through discourse that one sifts truths from untruths. 
With sincerity claims, persons might make claims relating to their inner beliefs or 
                                                                                                                                            
pleasure, and even, as I have proposed here, as a much-needed if not necessary means to engage unsettling 
ruptures in the social imaginary and fundamental structures of feeling” (Mullaney 2015: 172-3). 
22 However, it is worth noting some ironies in Habermas’s stance on the theater. Steven Mullaney has 
brilliantly shown Habermas’s reliance on theater metaphors in his writing on the public sphere’s 
emergence: “Habermas in fact relied on the dynamics of theatrical performance in much of his thinking 
about the nature of the public sphere” (Mullaney 2015: 151). Mullaney demonstrates “the degree to which 
Habermas seems incapable of describing novels and empathetic readers without recourse to the language of 
the stage” (ibid.: 158). Habermas describes the changes in the 1700s to the subjectivity of private 
individuals who began to write letters and read novels. For Habermas, Mullaney insightfully points out, 
“reading becomes a performative process” (ibid.: 164). So perhaps the theater has more to do with the 
initial formation of the bourgeois public sphere than Habermas’s theory will allow. 
23 Not counting comprehensibility, whether one is understood, which is a more fundamental validity claim. 
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feelings—subjective claims—but deciding on their accuracy falls not to discursive means 
but rather is only found out by comparison with personal behavior. Although early 
Habermas was wont to ignore expressivity, it is clear that assessing and “proving” one’s 
sincerity rests upon reading such non-verbal cues. 
Habermas’s primary concern is “reaching understanding” (ibid) through 
deliberative democratic practices, and he believes there must be conditions in order to 
yield a valid norm which can then structure debate so that subjects can reach rational 
consensus. The only way toward rational agreement is through the valleys and hills of 
sincerity. So close is the tie binding sincerity to rationality for Habermas, that it seems to 
be unreasonable—an unforgivable denial of our rationality—to lie while trying to reach 
consensus. “The violation of claims to truth, correctness, and sincerity affects the whole 
permeated by the bond of reason” (Habermas 1987: 324). In exchanging knowledge, all 
must be transparent, all must be in sight. Habermas laments the influence of 
postmodernism, which he associates with the fact that “society has indeed become so 
complex that it can hardly still be made transparent from within as the dynamic whole of 
a structural organization” (Habermas 1992: 140-141). Society “can no longer be grasped 
through narratives” (Habermas 1992: 141). In this mess the private individual becomes 
alienated from herself as a communicatively acting subject. We feel we are “delivered 
over to sheer contingencies” (ibid). The only thing that can save us now is Habermas’s 
concept of “linguistically embodied reason” (Habermas 1992: 142).24 While I agree with 
Habermas’s insights regarding the decentering and expansion of economic and 
                                                
24 Habermas believes in language’s potential to be a transparent medium for negotiation and expression. 
One's intentions as to meaning can be automatically rendered in one's utterance. Language conveys reality; 
it does not shape it, for Habermas. But speech can misfire—something Habermas does not give adequate 
attention to. For a discussion of this see Dahlgren 1995: 102. 
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administrative forces into all sectors of our lives, has society ever been “transparent”? 
Have “narratives” ever been adequate to the task of grasping society as a whole?25 
 Defending the postmodernists in Habermas’s sights, the long line from Nietzsche 
to Derrida whose legacy ultimately leads to irrationality according to Habermas, is a 
project very different from my own (and has been done quite comprehensively by others; 
Rabinow 1984; Connolly 1999; see Braaten 1991 for an overview; cf. Habermas 1994). I 
fully agree with these arguments, that reason is insufficient to reaching consensus in a 
multicultural democracy,26 that Habermas presents us with a desiccated vision of 
democratic deliberative discourse, that he transcendentalizes reason. I would like to argue 
for the value, pace Habermas, of sincerity over truth, of vulnerability over self-
containment, and of the emotive over the rational. I argue for the importance of 
decoupling sincerity and rationality in Habermas’s search for the “rational truth,” as if the 
truth could be reached through rationality. Although one could make grand claims about 
the theater and truth—for these eloquent claims, see Clurman (1957)—I prefer to link the 
theater to sincerity. 
 First a word about performance and dramatization in recent political theory. A 
brilliant school of thinkers have challenged simplistic notions of rationality and truth, 
concepts like “the original,” or “the essential” through what they refer to as methods of 
dramatization (Derrida 1998; Butler 1990; Deleuze 1995). Judith Butler’s concept of 
performativity, for example, describes an identity in a state of becoming rather than 
being, constantly requiring performance (Butler 1990). But as she herself notes in the 
                                                
25 Habermas assumes that competing publics, competing narratives of society, necessarily detract from 
greater democracy. But Fraser has argued for the a multiplicity of publics against Habermasian ideals of a 
“bourgeois, masculinist conception of the public sphere” (Fraser 1992: 117).	  
26 See Dana Villa (2001), who makes the case, via Arendt, for theatricality in the public sphere as a 
necessary addition or complementary dimension to Habermasian rationality. 
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preface to Gender Trouble, “my theory sometimes waffles between understanding 
performativity as linguistic and casting it as theatrical” (Butler 1990: xxvi). Of course, 
her notion of performativity, just as a speech act, has both theatrical and linguistic 
dimensions, but her notion of theatricality does not so much concern the theater. Her 
theory is too immersed in an analysis of power, regulatory regimes, and language, which 
is beyond the scope of my concern.  
 Dramatization as a method of theory conceived by Gilles Deleuze is a way to 
stage concepts so as to bring out the trajectories latent within them, to access the 
constellation of their elements (Deleuze 1997; Deleuze 2004). Deleuze opposes 
dramatization, becoming, and assemblages to action-oriented perceptions, the Idea as 
simplicity of essence, and being. Because “dramatization as method is a method of 
intensification” (Mackenzie and Porter 2011: 490), it makes vivid a scene, a set of 
indeterminate relations, putting into practice an element of surprise and responsiveness. 
But for Deleuze, and for William Connolly (2013), this is important for the concepts in a 
philosophical text. I, by contrast, am concerned with actual theater. 
I take for granted that there is no original, that words have ambiguous meanings, 
that signifiers work disorderedly to topple any coherent attempt at conveying thought. 
While my argument is indebted to arguments put forward by the thinkers cited above, I 
focus explicitly on theatrical-performative situations. 
Further, sincerity is important for me in a way it is not for other scholars who 
reclaim theatricality. For example, Arendt thought that performance in the public sphere 
enables actors to keep the private sphere at a remove. The public sphere is an escape 
(although a dangerous one). Theatricality allows for a distancing from the drudgery of 
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labor and work. Arendt appreciated a realm of public appearance separate from the 
intimate. "Human beings in the true sense of the term can exist only where there is a 
world,” that is, a public sphere of human being exchanging ideas through speech and 
action (Arendt 2005: 176). Richard Sennett makes a similar argument in describing the 
theatrum mundi of 18th century Paris and London. Sennett describes the streets of these 
cities as a place where "a bridge was built between what was believable on the stage and 
what was believable on the street" (Sennett 1977: 64). Before ideas of the authentic self, 
public life was a show. He regrets the lost art of playacting, the demise of separate public 
and private spheres, and writes that:  
In an age [like ours] wherein intimate relations determine what shall be believable, 
conventions, artifices, and rules appear only to get in the way of revealing oneself 
to another; they are obstructions to intimate expression. As the imbalance between 
public and intimate life has grown greater, people have become less expressive. 
With an emphasis on psychological authenticity, people become inartistic in daily 
life because they are unable to tap the fundamental creative strength of the actor, 
the ability to play with and invest feeling in external images of self. … In a 
society with a strong public life, there should be affinities between the domains of 
stage and street (Sennett 1977: 37, my emphasis). 
 
Sennett captures perfectly the need for expressivity in daily life, in our public interactions 
with each other on the street, in journals, in other forums for democratic deliberation. The 
world of the theater was more than metaphor in the 18th century. Rousseau acknowledged 
as much in his Letter to M. D'Alembert on the theater in 1757 (Rousseau 1960). Acting 
was the way of life in the street. The codes of credibility in daily life resembled those of 
the stage. Sennett argues that a healthy public sphere depends upon it. But Sennett sets up 
this false dichotomy between public theatricality and private authenticity or sincerity that 
the theater, I argue, dissolves. 
Habermas and Hamlet 
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Rationality underpins successful communication, for Habermas. Speech and 
action, as for Arendt, seem to be the two essentials for agreement. Most important to his 
validity claims are their essential cognitive dimension. For him, to have good reasons, 
and to express one’s reasons, requires “objective evaluation” (Habermas 1984: 22). 
Aiding the process of objective evaluation are institutions—scientific ones, legal, artistic. 
These can scrutinize the truth of statements, the rightness of actions, and the sincerity of 
expressions. How might the theater function as such an institution?  
Hamlet, Danish aristocrat and discriminating theatergoer, aims to make it function 
in such a way. For Hamlet, playing has purpose. The “purpose of playing,” he schools a 
pack of touring players, “both at the first and now, was and is to hold as ’twere the mirror 
up to nature, to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and 
body of the time his form and pressure” (Ham. 3.2.18-22). Hamlet has the travelling 
players perform for his uncle Claudius in order, like Habermas, to weed out the truth. 
Hamlet wants to know if his uncle murdered his father. Hamlet loves theater for the 
instinctual reaction it provokes; if social life, from his perspective, is false and if 
subjectivity is "duplicitously performative," then the only possibility for a truth lies in 
eliciting some index of emotion—a blush from Uncle Claudius, e.g.27 Theater effects an 
emotional change in both spectators and performers. 
In the end, the truth that Habermas and Hamlet seek is impossible. This is because 
actors participate in assemblages. What do I mean by assemblages? What I mean includes 
                                                
27 Paul Kottman (2009: 75) makes this point. I read this truth (from Hamlet’s perspective) as similar to 
what Meisner means when he discusses the “truth of the moment”—how, “In acting, truth can be activated 
most freely when it is forced to respond to something outside itself” (Silverberg 1994: 151). In discussing 
truth, I do not mean to conjure up images of the Platonic forms or to imply that emotions express one’s 
“true self” faithfully (what Rei Terada 2003 calls the “expressive hypothesis”). Rather, I mean by this, what 
lies in the energies exchanged between partners and their environment, a responsiveness to what is 
happening around you, being available to the moment through a sincere responsiveness. 
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human togetherness. Habermas does have a sense of the togetherness among subjects, 
essential to democracy, because for him, argumentation requires reciprocity. One person 
can destroy the success of the deliberative enterprise, can forestall communicative action: 
“Any violation of the structures of rational life together, to which all lay claim, affects 
everyone equally” (Habermas 1987: 324). Habermasian unity is indivisible. He also 
acknowledges the “tense interconnection of the ideal and the real” manifest in discourse 
(Habermas 1987: 323). What I highlight is the interconnection of the real and the false. 
An assemblage, for Deleuze and Guattari (2000), goes beyond the individuality of a 
human being. Assemblages involve not only bodies but the comportments of those 
bodies, what those bodies say, along with the elements with which those bodies combine. 
Combining sounds, gestures, lighting, and more, assemblages are made up of “speeds and 
affects,” as elements within the assemblage are rearranged or new elements are formed or 
subtracted, new unities forged into alliance. Deleuze and Guattari define an assemblage 
as an “increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it 
expands its connections” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 9). Actors on stage are always 
expanding their connections with things and people around them, making scenes, 
changing identities, picking up props, adopting moods and dispositions to fit the 
environment. An assemblage can just as easily include the group of people in the 
audience. 
I am arguing that actors make assemblages and it is not important whether those 
are assemblages of truth or fiction. Indeed, the assemblages actors participate in highlight 
the irrelevance of, the interconnections between, truth and falsity. It makes no sense to 
speak of assemblages as true or false. In the theater, one character’s truth is another 
 50 
character’s fantasy; one director’s insight is another director’s enigma, one act’s 
figurative is a second act’s literal. Actors put things together, make assemblages in new 
ways so as to create new worlds: Not one of these worlds is fully false or fully true. True 
and false is a knot impossible to undo. 
Different Styles of Acting, Different Styles of Democratic Discourse: Naturalistic 
 
 Habermas believes that when a subject speaks, they should, as Hamlet puts it, 
hold a mirror up to nature. The “cooperative quest for truth” involves objective, 
“cognitive” statements about reality. This would be “naturalistic” acting—the type of 
acting where, if one is given the cue to cry, one concentrates on holding back the tears 
and not crying, for this will make it look more real. This is about an actor’s identification 
with a character, honestly arrived at: I am the character, not a style but a person, and I 
embody her completely. The greatest example of this type of acting are the disguised 
characters in Shakespeare. These actors do not tread the boards; they are not trained 
actors. They are not saddled with the burdens imposed by a formal play, the constraints 
of script, the fright inspired by an audience, having to interact with a cast. Viola in 
Twelfth Night even denies being an actor (Twelfth Night 1.5.163),28 and yet she gives 
what has to be a perfect performance.29 Everyone thinks she is a man; no one ever doubts 
the truth of her disguise, and she only ever comes close to breaking character when faced 
with the immediate prospect of fighting a duel. While she has no script to constrain her, 
her always-“improvised” lines must be uttered from the mouth and character of the 
                                                
28 References to Twelfth Night are hereafter abbreviated as TN. 
29 Naturalistic acting, often manifest as disguise, is a tool of survival in Shakespeare’s plays: vulnerable 
characters (Viola, Rosalind in As You Like It, Innogen in Cymbeline, and Edgar and Kent in King Lear) 
often need disguise to survive on dangerous terrain. Consider too that Edgar and Kent in King Lear are the 
only two in this tragedy to formally disguise themselves, and, perhaps consequently, are the only two main 
characters left standing at the play’s close. These characters are forced to act another’s part in order to 
escape some form of impending danger (either banishment by a jealous or arrogant king or duke; or the 
lack of safety in travelling alone). 
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fictional male part she plays. More than this, she comes across as genuine; for consider 
the way the Duke confides in her after only three days of acquaintance: “I have unclasped 
to thee the book even of my secret soul” (TN 1.4.12-13). To become so familiar with the 
Duke so quickly, she must seem open and sincere—for such innocent guilelessness is 
often what provokes confidential disclosures from others. Viola values reciprocity and 
gratitude more than truthfulness. In one telling moment, Viola says, “I hate ingratitude 
more in a man / Than lying, vainness, babbling drunkenness…” (TN 3.4.318-9). 
Reciprocity to the kindnesses of others holds a higher place in her esteem than—
importantly—not lying. Perhaps there is a greater value to gratitude, and being open to 
the other. These are habits of being, I will argue, that Viola’s art of acting nurtures.30 
 Not only is Viola receptive to others around her, showing a responsiveness, an 
ethos of receptivity, sustained in a way unparalleled among characters in this play. 
Prerequisite to this receptivity is a genuine interest in others, a curiosity and ability to 
listen and see them, both as they present themselves to others and as others take them. 
Stephen Greenblatt notes Viola’s “improvisational boldness” (Shakespeare 2008: 1790). 
We see numerous instances of her responding to others, taking them up on their own 
terms rather than hers. In her first embassage to Olivia’s house, we hear Malvolio say of 
her before she is received, “he takes on him to understand so much,” which hints both at 
Viola’s acting ability and her perceptive skills (TN 1.5.124-5; also TN 3.1.112). Viola 
then tells Olivia to treat her kindly, for she is sensitive to and effected by the discourtesy 
of others easily (TN 1.5.156). Then, when Olivia chastises her for “beginning rudely,” 
                                                
30 Of course, part of Viola’s ability to win the Duke’s confidence stems from her sincerity and the part of 
herself she retains in the role. While experimenting with new ways of being, one must keep an orienting 
sensibility. Actors like Viola give style to themselves, fitting the various elements of their nature into an 
artistic plan.	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Viola bandies back: “The rudeness that hath appeared in me have I learned from my 
entertainment [reception]” (TN 1.5.188-9). A few lines later, when Olivia deploys a 
Biblical metaphor, Viola proceeds “[t]o answer by the method” (TN 1.5.200) and keep to 
the same imagery.31  
During her next visit to Olivia’s, Viola shows the same ability to react sensitively 
to others, and then to cast herself on their wavelength: When Sir Andrew speaks to her in 
French, she responds in kind (TN 3.1.65). And in her solitary reflections on the fool 
Feste, what she recounts can be similarly valuable when applied to the actor’s trade (and, 
I believe, can be applied to her own way of being in the world): “He must observe their 
mood on whom he jests,/The quality of persons, and the time,/And, like the haggard, 
check at every feather/That comes before his eye [“As a wild hawk must be sensitive to 
its prey’s disposition”]. This is a practice [skill]…” (TN 3.1.55-59). Naturalistic actors, 
like Feste described here, must be sensitive to “every feather,” must observe every look 
and hints of turns in their audiences’ moods and frames of mind.32 This requires a basic 
openness to the other, an openness that allows for creation, for untimely ideas and 
practices. 
This openness is a quality that Sanford Meisner’s technique for actors attempts to 
nurture. I now make a brief foray into the work of Meisner (another founding member of 
The Group Theatre) whose methods help develop a level of responsiveness to the outside 
                                                
31 Compare Le Beau in As You Like It, who answer’s Celia’s “Sport! of what color?” with a confused 
“What color, madam! how shall I answer you?” (AYL 1.2.83). Like actors in repetition games (described 
below), Viola can “answer by the method,” i.e., go with the flow—unlike Le Beau. 
32 Incidentally, Shakespeare’s disguised characters and his fools and court jesters are close cousins to what 
Connolly describes as “seers.” Seers dwell in fecund moments of time: They “allow multiple pressures and 
concerns to reverberate through” them during these moments, hoping that “a new, untimely idea, theme, or 
strategy will emerge for further exploration” (Connolly 2013: 134).	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world (Meisner and Longwell 1987; Silverberg 1994). Meisner offers actors techniques 
that share similarities with what William Connolly calls role experimentation.33 
Meisner’s techniques tread a careful line between channeling one’s unconscious, 
instinctual or visceral perceptions (techniques of self) and giving way to a perception of 
the other that bypasses the self (techniques of self loss). Before their intervention, acting 
styles hewed to imitation approaches. One declaimed lines formalistically. As one actor 
recalls: “you [gave] your solo performance no matter what any of the other actors did” 
(Stern quoted in Silverberg 1994: 152). This annoying lack of attention produces one-
note creations unresponsive to the surrounding environment. Konstantin Stanislavsky’s 
methods gave Group actors something different, something akin to an artistic plan, which 
they further developed to suit their own experiences. 
 For Stanislavsky, feeling is beyond conscious control and must be accessed 
through response and intuition (Meisner and Longwell 1989). His “System” involves a 
set of conscious techniques intended to awaken our unconscious intuitions and gut 
reactions. There is always an unpredictable element to the emotion, even if we aim to 
stimulate it with some degree of precision. Hamlet's soliloquy where he laments the 
impotence of "the motive and the cue for passion" that he possesses (Ham. 2.2.538) 
registers the tension between passion, the volitional character of emotion, and the "cue," 
which seems formal and automatic and predictable. Paul Kottman recognizes Socrates' 
encounter with Ion when the former asks, "When you sing a pitiful episode...are you at 
that time in your right mind, or do you get beside yourself?” as a precedent for Hamlet's 
                                                
33 For Connolly, role experimentation holds potential for a progressive politics. One works experimentally 
on the self to help redefine that self in its relation to the dominant powers. “If role performances become 
frozen, so do our beliefs, identities, and larger modes of political experiment” (Connolly 2013: 193). 
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lament (Kottman 2009). Getting “beside oneself” and self-forgetting are states that 
Meisner’s techniques aim to elicit in actors (or in audience members like Claudius). 
 It may seem that the prefiguration of a script undermines the notion of 
responsiveness in a given performance. Does having a fixed text allow for creativity? 
Acting as becoming democratic, or becoming responsive, captures the sense of something 
that is both scripted in advance and yet enacted and rescripted by historically situated 
agents. Acting is the creation of the same words anew night after night: a surprising 
combination of rote and impulse. The noted Shakespearean director Peter Brook 
conceives of a process that both the author and the actor engage to reach the words:  
A word does not start as a word—it is an end product which begins as an impulse, 
stimulated by attitude and behavior which dictate the need for expression. This 
process occurs inside the dramatist; it is repeated inside the actor. …both for the 
author and then for the actor the word is a small visible portion of a gigantic 
unseen formation. … the only way to find the true path to the speaking of a word 
is through a process that parallels the original creative one (Brook 1968: 12,13, 
my emphasis). 
 
This accounts for Shakespeare’s lack of stage directions: he wanted to let the creative 
process work inside the actor. Brook says, “the best dramatists explain themselves the 
least” (Brook 1968: 13). Parts are not built by actors; they are born. Built parts eventually 
erode. Parts that are born must be continually reborn, recreated each night—and hence, 
different (Brook 1968: 115). This takes effort on the part of the actor. Brook even goes so 
far as to call acting “mediumistic”—because the actor is responsive to the “tremors” 
within him, the “flickers” and “tiny inner movements,” that “mysterious inner chamber” 
of impulse that signals the creation of character (Brook 1968: 109, 111). 
 Meisner’s methods include practicing what are known as “repetition exercises.” 
Two actors sit across from each other. One begins by saying the very first thing she 
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notices about the other. The other partner repeats the observation. They continue in this 
fashion. “If we can once pay attention to what sits across from us, we free our natures to 
come up with reactions we could never plan” (Silverberg 1994: 151). The response to 
each partner must be immediate. The actor is simply a vessel for the raw emotion of his 
response.34 The exercise aims to develop the ability to respond to the other through 
instinct, and, in turn, to discern the other’s response. The actors must channel all their 
attention into the moment, what is happening now between them, all the while, in Viola’s 
words, “observ[ing] their mood…the quality of perso[n],” etc. Meisner teaches: 
More of our acting comes from true listening35 (another way of saying that is 
being fully available) than from anything else. Our fuel on stage is our partners, 
the other actors [or props, setting, etc], so that we must be open and receptive to 
them at all times. Even in the midst of the most extreme and heightened moments, 
it is imperative that we be present to our partners and our environment in every 
moment (the stage is a dangerous place!) (Silverberg 1994: 9, emphasis original). 
 
The danger lies in the unknown aspects of the creative, the responsive. The ultimate point 
is to get out of one’s head, to short-circuit one’s conscious reaction with an instinctual 
one (since “being in your head is the death of your acting” [Meisner quoted in Meisner 
and Longwell 1989: 15]). Self-consciousness, intense looking-inward, inhibits emotional 
commitments to others. Acting combines creation and discovery, and these exercises 
hone an imaginative responsiveness to the outside world. 
                                                
34 The idea of a personal feeling is different from the becomings described in the previous section. Deleuze 
describes affect outside of conscious awareness. He differentiates feeling (Meisner’s focus), emotion 
(social), and affect (abstract, a “prepersonal intensity” that concerns the body’s ability to act). For Deleuze, 
affect gives feeling intensity and is dissociated from the will whereas Meisner is interested in the 
spontaneous will prompted by one’s feeling. 
35 That Shakespeare knew the importance of listening and receptivity skills in actors can be seen by 
considering the final scene in Cymbeline, which simply is not effective without them. Granville-Barker 
(1963) notes: “For the scene to be effective one rule must be observed in its acting; it is a fundamental rule 
in all acting, strangely liable to neglect. Each actor must resolutely sustain his part through his long 
intervals of listening. The action is kept alive by a series of surprises…” (106). 
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 Being open “to the impulsive shifts in your instinctual behavior caused by what 
[is] being done to you by your partner” (Meisner and Longwell 1989: 107) requires being 
vulnerable to surprise and contingency. The vulnerable listen. This vulnerability may 
even entail passivity but, as Sara Ahmed writes, "passivity can be an ethical capacity: you 
have to be willing to be affected by others, to receive their influence" (Ahmed 2010: 
221). This sustained listening and willingness to be affected by others primes us for 
surprise elements in our encounters and supports interaction with others in a more 
genuinely democratic or responsive way. These exercises seek to combine both 
receptivity (a listening to others) and instinct (a listening to the self) in the actor. Instinct 
alone is no good. Mistress Quickly, the nurse in Romeo and Juliet, and the Bawd in 
Pericles possess instinct in abundance but lack a receptiveness. Balance is key. 
 Being open to the world in the way that naturalistic acting requires would mean to 
practice relating honestly to the world, to practice a heightened responsiveness to what is 
happening around you, being available to the moment, being attuned to the energies 
exchanged between us and the environment. Eleonora Duse said that “One must forget 
oneself” when acting (Duse quoted in Silverberg 1994: 151). This is the ultimate state of 
unknowing. There is always a death, a lack of vitality, that lies in the certainty of 
knowledge. This can sap the artist’s creativity. Instead one channels one’s child-like 
intuition before the onset of the profound self-consciousness that usually characterizes 
adulthood. Acting calls for a transcendence of self in order to engage the other (e.g., a 
fellow cast member). Self-doubt or insecurities, which stem from a self-focused looking-
inward, might prevent us from following through on emotional commitments to others 
that we would otherwise seek to secure—which is important for successful democratic 
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dialogue. This is the only way the actor can works off her partner to create something 
outside herself—or the only way democratic actors can create public spheres outside 
themselves. 
The difference between the life of the stage and of the real is one of degree, not 
kind. Engaging in honest debate might take place with subjects “disguised” in one way or 
another but this need not undermine their sincerity. 
But there is something more to say about the obstacles to naturalistic acting. In 
Hamlet, when the First Player delivers a monologue about Pyrrhus’s ancient murder of 
Priam, this sets what Richard Halpern has called “a heroic yardstick with which” Hamlet 
can “measure his own reduced condition” (Halpern 2008: 475). Here Hamlet’s “mirror” 
prompts him—moments after seeing the First Player’s performance—to berate himself 
into acting. His line here regarding his own “cue for passion” (Ham. 2.2.538), lamenting 
the impasse in his inability to feel passion even post-“cue,” registers a failed attempt to 
feel. Although it may not always be helpful to democratic discourse, when it is possible 
to act one’s passions, or to make the attempt, it just might lead to a deepened effort at 
dialogue and exchange. Otherwise, one can choose other acting styles. 
Stylized Acting 
 Stylizing acting is often contrasted with naturalistic acting.36 For naturalistic 
actors, acting is not about a conscious attempt at imitation but rather an instinctual 
                                                
36 In case one is wondering about acting styles during Shakespeare’s day: Knowledge of acting styles in 
Elizabethan times is made more difficult by the theater closure between 1642 and 1660. When plays started 
being performed again, most performers were of a different generation. If acting styles can change so 
dramatically in the last 100 years, when technology makes continuity easier—to the point where an 
individual actor like John Gielgud would look back on his Hamlet and critique his performance as too sing-
songy (Elsom 1981)—imagine how hard continuity was back then. We have no definitive knowledge on 
whether acting styles were naturalistic or formalistic, although most critics believe the latter to be true, 
despite evidence for both styles (see critics cited by Wells 1997). Theater companies used “sides” and the 
only person who had a full copy of the prompt script was the stage manager because they could not afford a 
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responsiveness to the other. Sincerity is paramount. But stylizing acting is more akin to 
what we see on the stage or in silent film. Meaning is conveyed in more conspicuous 
fashion: large gestures, exaggerated movements, overdramatic posing. It is imitation, not 
the birth and creation that Brook describes. Steward Stern describes the affected, stilted 
results of his pursuit of this old-style art of acting: “I was careful to employ my Maurice 
Evans vibrato for anything Shakespearean, my Eva Le Gallienne voice—with its haunted 
vowels and rapier consonants—for anything from Chekhov up, and my general-service-
Robert-Frost-rural-poet voice for everything American” (Stern in Silverberg 1994: 153). 
 Stylizing acting is to naturalistic acting what impressionist painting is to 
photography. Or, as Elia Kazan sums up the difference: “Stylized acting and direction is 
to realistic acting as poetry is to prose” (Kazan quoted in Murphy 1992: 26). If prose 
presents us with a more transparent picture of everyday life, poetry wraps life in ornate 
metaphors and symbolic meanings. Because this form of expression does not seem as 
sincere and honest, as heartfelt and intuitive, as naturalistic acting, we might be tempted 
to dismiss it as irrelevant to democratic deliberation. But the pomp and fuss of overacting 
has something to offer deliberative democrats too.  
 Consider some stylized actors from Shakespeare. Hamlet hates stylized acting, 
heavy exaggeration, protesting too much. Hamlet tells the touring players: “O, it offends 
me to the soul to hear a robustious, periwig-pated fellow tear a passion to tatters, to very 
rags, to split the ears of the groundings….” (Ham. 3.2.7-9). Such overripe distortions not 
only crack the theatrical “mirror” but they can gum up the smooth procession of the play. 
Bottom, the actor who magically turns into an ass and becomes the object of extended 
                                                                                                                                            
printer, so they wrote out each person's part. I am inclined to agree with Stanley Wells’ surmise that, “styles 
of acting may have varied from one performer to another, and may have altered over the years, in part to 
suit the style in which plays were written” (Wells 1997: 5). 
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ridicule by a group of aristocratic highbrows in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, embodies the cautionary tale described by Hamlet. Bottom, unlike Hamlet, loves 
to split the ears of the standing audience: “my chief humor is for a tyrant. I could play 
[H]’erc’les rarely, or a part to tear a cat in, to make all split” (A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream 1.2.22-23).37 We might judge this as “bad” acting, but its unusual conviction, 
verve, and originality cannot be denied: “You have not a man in all Athens able to 
discharge [perform] Pyramus but he” (MND 4.2.7-8), his fellow actor says. Discharge 
indeed—like a cannonball. 
 Poetry can be conceived of as something more than the prosaic, more connected 
to other images, to other worlds. Recall Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of an 
assemblage as an “increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in 
nature as it expands its connections.” Expanding connections can also describe theatrical 
becomings, taking on new characters, new modes of expression. An actor expands his 
connections, but never with complete control. Tracing the genesis of a scene or 
assemblage created between actors allows us to note the teleodynamic processes at work 
in its formation, a panoramic as opposed to strictly linear idea of time. There is no strict 
cause and effect at work. Additionally, experience is not what a subject undergoes but, 
for actors, it is a journey from self to self, experimental strivings. A genuine 
transformation happens through such passages. For Deleuze and Guattari, "becoming" 
refers to transformative connection between actors, actions, and effects; against the 
stability of “being,” it acknowledges the shifting, precarious and circumstantial nature of 
experience and relationships (Deleuze and Guattari 2000). If Hamlet says he sees a play 
to behold actors offering nature a “mirror,” Deleuze and Guattari allow us to view 
                                                
37 References to A Midsummer Night’s Dream are hereafter abbreviated as MND. 
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Hamlet’s perspective as misguided. For Deleuze, theatrical dramatization is never a 
stable repetition of the image (and cannot be used to inculcate morality via pure 
transmission); dramatization is always about becoming rather than being. Becoming is a 
process “not content to proceed by resemblance” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 233), 
imitation, A = A. Theatrical magic lies in the ability to inaugurate a series of becomings 
on “a creative vanishing line” as spectators behold “minor transformations in relation to 
dominant forms and subjects” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 251-252). Charged along lines 
of flight that shoot through stable subjects like electrified rails, disruptive becomings can 
upend one’s habitual ways of being by awakening us to an outside world of non-human 
interactions. 
This is what Bottom’s acting does. We might describe Bottom the way Carson 
McCullers describes the hunchback in Ballad of the Sad Cafe:  
There is a type of person who has a quality about him that sets him apart from 
other and more ordinary human beings. Such a person has an instinct which is 
usually found only in small children, an instinct to establish immediate and vital 
contact between himself and all things in the world. Certainly the hunchback was 
of this type. … This could account for the air of freedom and illicit gladness 
(McCullers 2005: 20).  
 
Bottom has this instinct to establish contact with the world, to form assemblages. Bottom 
demonstrates an overwhelming enthusiasm for any and all roles in The Most Lamentable 
Comedy and Most Cruel Death of Pyramus and Thisby—including Heracles, a lion, a 
moon, a woman, and the chink of a wall. If Hannah Arendt values theater for being “the 
only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to others” (Arendt 1998: 188), 
Pyramus and Thisby of Bottom’s friends extends that subject explicitly to man in his 
relationship to non-human actors. Here is a truly pluralistic ethos. The wall that divides 
the lovers, the lion that scares Thisbe, and lantern who sheds much-needed light: These 
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figures shore up the main throughline of the show. Further, Bottom’s hijinks, his multiple 
“becomings,” can help elaborate possibilities for a contemporary ethos of democracy. 
 In Bottom’s friends’ assortment of roles, we witness non-human objects, nature, 
and humans intertwined in a dynamic display of creative agency. As Jane Bennett puts it, 
“insofar as anything ‘acts’ at all, it had already entered an agentic assemblage” (Bennett 
2010: 121). Each act is a conjoint endeavor between humans and the objects and events 
in the spaces they occupy. Humans take on new distinctions as they participate and 
respond creatively to their spaces. 
 The theater is not life reduced or in miniature, to Bottom. It is life 
overdramatized, exaggerated, infinitely fresh and fun. Bottom lives in a space of 
passion,38 visceral and transformative, of pasteboard and dazzle. He displays his 
enthusiasm at its most becoming angles. If Hamlet craves resemblance, strict fidelity to 
his mode of “real life,” the standard model, the Platonic idea, becomings offer something 
different: an uncharted journey. Deleuze and Guattari oppose resemblances to journeys 
along a “vanishing line” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 235), lines of flight away from a 
stable subject—like a walk over the narrow wire of a tightrope dancer suspended over an 
abyss. Bottom undertakes these journeys.39 As Rene Girard describes it: Bottom “enters 
into all conceivable and inconceivable roles with such passion that he is losing sight of 
                                                
38 "Aside from the genius of their verse, what has mattered most to audiences and readers over the 
centuries, what has moved them most profoundly, and what they have most remembered, are the plays' 
representation of states of emotion, 'the passions' as they were called in the Renaissance: (Kirsch 26). 
39 Taking inspiration from a paradoxical line from Gilles Deleuze’s “One Less Manifesto”—Deleuze’s 
most direct engagement with the theater, I like to think of Bottom as a genius. In this essay, Deleuze quotes 
the director Carmelo Bene approvingly, expanding on his sentiments: “truly great authors are the minor 
ones, the untimely ones” (Deleuze 1997: 242). The greatness of the minor lies, for Deleuze, in the minor’s 
ability to initiate what he calls “becomings.” The initiators of becomings, Deleuze calls “geniuses”: “The 
genius is someone who knows how to make everybody/the whole world a becoming” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2000: 200)—notably because of his or her heightened perceptive ability: “think of it as an affair of 
perception” (194; F. Scott Fitzgerald is an example they give). The genius is not a stable subject, but rather 
a position: “Sometimes each and every animal…occupies this dynamic position” (Deleuze and Guattari 
2000: 17). 
 62 
his own personality” (Girard 1987: 101); Bottom exemplifies the loss of self-identity that 
follows in the wake of mimetic contagion. Girard reads acting as mimesis: “Those who 
desire mimetically are really trying to exchange their own despised being against the 
glorious being of their victorious model” (Girard 1987: 113). But even stylized acting is 
not solely about imitating someone else. I also resist the stability implied by an 
immutable “someone else.” What happens to “selves” is not necessarily the most 
important element in an acting assemblage. 
 Bottom’s madcap journeys signal a theater that celebrates a logic of infinite 
variation rather than the solid, privileged realm of fidelity and representation. Pyramus 
and Thisby holds promise for what Deleuze calls “a revolutionary theater, a simple loving 
potentiality, an element for a new becoming of consciousness” (Deleuze 1997: 256). 
There are no standards here, no authorial representations affirmed by an actor’s authority 
or the hierarchical political structure of codified power. Bottom is an aspiring tragedian, 
but when his audience flings laughs at him, no matter: He does not consider his work to 
have failed. The attempt at a sort of realism is there—within safe parameters: Bottom 
wonders how to personify moonshine, or how loudly that lion should roar so as not to 
upset the audience. By not conforming to stringent standards of realism, by patently, 
purposefully puncturing the illusion of faithful imitation (“know that I as Snug the jointer 
am / A lion” [MND 5.1.218-9]), the amateurs enter into a state of becoming. 
 If we conceive of acting in terms of becomings, a provocation to pursue the 
shifting nexus of reflection and refraction rather than the closed circuit of real self = fake 
self, this opens up a much less human-centered view of the craft. We can also begin to 
see, in the distance, new figurations of togetherness. Actorly assemblages are more 
 63 
attuned to the instabilities and vacancies of identity, the different registers of spacio-
temporality, the becomings blooming, buzzing, and busting in the human, non-human, 
supra-human, and extra-human worlds. Becoming also gives equal weight to the actors, 
the roles, the audience, and their interactions, the fleeting in-between-ness of objects, 
selves, and environment. “Becoming produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a 
false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming 
itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which 
becomes passes” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 238, emphasis mine). Becomings transpire 
on the fuzzy end of the existential lollipop, with protean moods and unfocused energies 
that exceed the parameters of established identity categories. 
 When Bottom begs to be the lion (and when he unwittingly plays the ass in real 
life), he strives to unhinge his dogmatic attachment to being Bottom, playfully 
rearranging the pregiven elements of his identity. Deleuze and Guattari conceive of these 
efforts as “becomings-animal,” which trace a logic of creative variation. They describe an 
episode of becoming-animal where Vladimir Slepian covers his hands with shoes to 
establish “a new relation” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 258). Slepian’s hands “become” 
paws in an “unnatural participation” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 260). Like acting, all 
becomings allow us to become more flexible in who we are, but becoming-animal is a 
childhood game that induces a sense of magic in its practitioners: “all children…do it to a 
greater or lesser degree…” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000, 274). Bottom, to a greater 
degree, as evinced in his attempt to grab all the limelight (“Let me play the lion too; I will 
roar, that I will do any man’s heart good to hear me; I will roar, that I will make the duke 
say, ‘Let him roar again, let him roar again’” [MND 1.2.58-60]). Everyone in Bottom’s 
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troupe shares this sense of wonder, this enchantment with make-believe. The opening 
lines of the prologue run, “Gentles, perchance you wonder at this [dumb] show; / But 
wonder on…” (MND 5.1.126-7). Theater is magic for them, an occasion for wonderment 
and playful disorder in the interim before “Truth makes all things plain” and quashes the 
fun. 
Stylized Acting Up Against Anti-Democratic Judgment 
 
 Bottom and his troupe are appropriated by their aristocratic betters, who adhere to 
Hamlet’s artistic standards. Like the professional traveling players in Hamlet, Bottom and 
his troupe are likened to animals. They exist below the threshold of recognized human 
identity (Bottom literally becomes an ass), underscoring an association with the herd or 
the commonplace. As Louis Adrian Montrose notes, Bottom and his friends cut a child-
like relationship to their social betters (Montrose 1983: 85). What’s worse, their 
reputations precede them, as when Egeus recommends against their play to the Duke, 
saying “it is nothing” (MND 5.1.78). There is a background of beliefs and assumptions 
from which the aristocrats judge. 
 For one, the aristocratic perspective on Pyramus and Thisbe seems unduly 
circumscribed.40 Duke Theseus sees jangly chaos, “a tangled chain,” “all disordered”: he 
asks: “How shall we find the concord of this discord?” (MND 5.1.124, 125, 60). The 
aristocrats value concord, A = A, fidelity to “real life” as they see it. Even the title (“A 
tedious brief scene of young Pyramus and his love Thisbe: very tragical mirth”), the 
Duke finds “wondrous strange” because of its contradictions (MND 5.1.56-7, 59). But the 
strange becomings of the show portend a different style of engagement, more open, more 
                                                
40 Annabel Patterson describes this perspective as having “only one possible view of Bottom and his 
colleagues—the social condescension that laughs at, not with, their amateur theatricals” (Patterson 1998: 
167). 
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fluid, more democratic, less aristocratic. Michelle M. Dowd argues for Bottom’s “ability 
to disrupt and reimagine the forms of social differentiation” (Dowd 2013: 155). As 
opposed to the playful energies of becoming and identity-interchange that acting 
facilitates, which elude judgment and sometimes stable meaning, the aristocrats view 
themselves, or the highest in rank among them, as the ultimate arbiter of meaning. 
Further, there is an impatience and almost spiteful need to critique the working class 
players. What begins as a bald remark about Quince’s prologue by the Duke (“His speech 
was like a tangled chain—nothing impaired, but all disordered” [MND 5.1.124-5]) 
percolates into distracting banter. 
 Some productions of Midsummer minimalize this rude and distracting aristocratic 
judgment and end with the artistic triumph of the players, as does Michael Hoffman’s 
1999 movie version. Although the performance quality spans a range (it is Flute, not 
Bottom, who steals the show), the players have their audience in tears at the end. This 
contrasts with Max Rheinhardt’s 1935 film that plays the scene for laughs, capitalizing on 
James Cagney’s portrayal of Bottom. Cagney, with his strong, lower-East-side accent, 
was known for his roles in gangster films. One critic said he blended “innocent weaver, 
Chicago hood, and ugly duckling” (quoted in Jorgens 1997: 39). Bottom is a lovable idiot 
in Cagney’s hands. The question of where the audience’s sympathy is expected to lie—
with the players or with the aristocrats?—can perhaps only be decided in reference to a 
specific performance, and productions of the play take various stances on the question. 
Certainly failed art is not the sole property of the lower class in Shakespeare’s plays 
(consider Hamlet’s confession to Ophelia that he takes sick at his own bad verse: "O dear 
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Ophelia, I am ill at these numbers. I have not art to reckon my groans [express my 
feelings]..." [Ham. 2.2.120-1]).  
 Leaving aside the question of the aesthetic merit of Pyramus and Thisbe, or of 
production values, and no matter the craftsmen’s malapropisms41 (besides—they correct 
each other, as a community of equals ought do), the fact remains that they are 
misunderstood and undervalued. The aristocrats fail to enter into the magical context so 
arduously created for their benefit—and the aristocrats are similarly rude, judgmental and 
snobby in Hamlet at performance time. No wonder Hamlet feels comfortable sacrificing 
the players to pursue his own agenda—like fatted calves set alight by a realist paganism 
(“hold…the mirror up to nature”). The players and the audience live in incommensurable 
worlds. The players say Bottom can act; the audience disagrees. The players say Bottom 
is well-fitted to perform Pyramus; Egeus says not one player is appropriately cast. Whose 
word do we take? An interpretive dilemma arises as criteria for judgment dissolve. 
 Transhistorical standards are inappropriate and judgement is suspended in the 
midst of becomings. Disturbances, which acting practices inaugurate, in culturally coded 
identity categories call for a different appraisal of time and events. For example, when 
Cagney was cast as Bottom, a new assemblage was formed based partly on how the actor 
had been typecast previously: gangster-Bottom. Here Bottom is foolish but not so 
innocent. A 1939 interracial production called Swingin' the Dream showcased Louis 
Armstrong as Bottom, editing the dialogue to legitimate the mechanicals’ skillful 
performance and setting Shakespearean verse to jazz music (Swingin’ the Dream 1939). 
                                                
41 Aristotle’s (and MacIntyre’s) virtue (discussed in the introduction) requires practical intelligence, 
phronesis. Gauging intelligence presupposes a dominant standard, whereas my equalizing virtues do not 
require human intelligence. MacIntyre and I also differ regarding judgment; he writes: “judgment has an 
indispensible role in the life of the virtuous man” (MacIntyre 1981: 154). I argue against dominant 
standards of judgment. 
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Substituting a “stage audience” for the aristocratic court, and thereby cutting out the 
mockery of the upper classes, the mechanicals engage in a call and response with this 
audience. Thisbe asks, “where is my love?” and the audience sings back various tunes 
including “Way Down Yonder in New Orleans.” The audience is temporally transported 
to the American South, dwelling more vividly in the reverberations between 
Shakespearean verse and Dixieland jazz. The effect of temporal disjunction, shuttling 
between past and present temporalities, throws a wrench in attempts at judgement. There 
is no way to know in advance an “appropriate” response to a becoming or an event. A 
becoming may be untimely or anachronistic vis-à-vis its setting. Just as some events 
cannot be explained in terms of their contemporary context, or in light of some grand arc 
of history, or within a coherent narrative, so too some identity categories cannot be made 
sense of set against the contemporary background assumptions circulating in their day. 
These radical breaks defy human causality schemes. 
There are two levels of experience in the staging of Midsummer I wish to flag 
here. At the level of the text, the aristocrats critique the rude mechanicals, viewing them 
through the lens of traditional standards. The aristocrats’ rigidity surfaces humorously in 
the Duke’s demand for a level of literalness that the players are not in a position to offer: 
the Duke says, “the man should be put into the lantern. How is it else the man i' th’ 
moon?” (MND 5.1.237-39). The players’ playful designs do not register for their 
audience. Bottom and his friends offer an imaginative experience that hinges on a 
profound theatrical elasticity, forms of becoming, whereas by contrast, the aristocrats 
seek only what they know: they want the man in the moon. But at the level of 
performance, the actors are responsive agents who create a scene together and in doing 
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so, counter the dominant discourse of the aristocrats. The very co-creation of their scene 
demonstrates this alternative dimension to the dominant textual one—a democratic 
dimension immanent to their playful responsiveness, the influence they exercise on each 
other, their dependence and vulnerability to each other. By pitting text against 
performance, we can determine where democracy happens on stage and how it takes 
shape within the experience of seeing actors interact. 
The aristocrats fail to enter or even entertain the democratic assemblage on stage 
before them. The Duke sketches a sort of imaginative graciousness when he says of the 
working-class players: “It we imagine no worse of them than they of themselves, they 
may pass for excellent men” (MND 5.1.211-12). But they fail to extend the shade of 
disbelief over their portrayals. The intensity of their repartee as they poke fun at the 
play’s plot and performers takes the measure of their snobbery. Derek Attridge’s 
description of context throws into relief the aristocrats’ failures:  
[A] reader can go some way toward achieving an openness to whatever the work 
may offer. This involves an effort to clear the mind of preconceptions, thus to 
some degree resisting the pressure of context, and, somewhat paradoxically, a 
willingness to be surprised, and a willingness to treat surprise as a reason for fresh 
engagement rather than for a mental closing down (Attridge 2011: 688).  
 
Spectators share a limited capacity for surprise similar to the capacity that Meinser’s 
repetition exercises hone and that precipitates an actor’s becoming. It takes sufficient 
imagination to be fooled into belief. Although the Duke sees his viewing of the play as a 
favor—“The kinder we, to give them thanks for nothing. / Our sport shall be to take what 
they mistake, / And what poor duty cannot do, / Noble respect [consideration] takes it in 
might, not merit” (MND 5.1.89-92)—there is no readiness to be changed that comes with 
open-minded spectatorship. The Duke sees here an opportunity to show benevolence—
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“the kinder we”—but his penchant for “sport” with the workers’ “mistakes” rivals his 
initial generous impulse. Perhaps this is just proof that democracies, not dukedoms, offer 
the most fertile ground for actorly responsiveness. 
The Duke’s judgement forecloses his entry into an assemblage with the moment 
because he will not let surprise42 take him off guard. But his judgment of the play as 
“bad” illustrates the context-boundedness of such reviews. To follow Attridge again: “the 
question of what ‘good’ writing is, as a slight acquaintance with literary history shows, 
very much a matter of context” (Attridge 2011: 694). Indeed, Thisbe says of his love 
Pyramus, “His eyes were green as leeks” (MND 5.1.322), which may not rate as 
Petrarchan sonnet material. But similar analogies abound in the King James Bible and are 
judged as worship-worthy High Art: e.g., "thy belly is like a heap of wheat" (Song of 
Solomon, 7:2). The aristocrats—and the majority of critics—should not be so quick, then, 
to see Pyramus and Thisbe as failed art.43 
A more democratic responsiveness involves suspending judgment, pursuing 
surprise, Duse’s self-forgetting. In new contexts, one must drop one’s previous 
attachments to enter into new assemblages. Acting techniques offer a system, some 
preliminary guide rails along the dangerous footpaths of becoming. This is not a way to 
escape the self; rather, it reactivates the self in new directions, establishing new 
dimensions, new relationships between, within, and among selves, new designs for living, 
inviting periodic readjustment via improvisational creativity. One must eventually rest 
                                                
42 Jane Bennett (2001) glosses surprise as including “both a pleasant, charming feeling and a slightly off-
putting sense of having been disrupted or tripped (up)” (104). Our encounters with others always have 
some element of this, I suspect; and Meisner’s repetition exercises cultivate our attunement to surprise. 
Surprise is an element in her reading of enchantment, and it is little wonder that she reads Deleuze and 
Guattari as offering an enchantment tale, that “children seem to be born with a capacity for enchantment” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2000: 168), and that Bottom and his friends seem child-like. 
43 Michelle M. Dowd (2013) seems to be one of two sympathetic critics (Patterson the other). Dowd calls 
the play “an unexpected source of creative energy and theatrical pleasure” (Dowd 2013: 154). 
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back amid the comfort of one’s default habits of being—that are nonetheless always 
enhanced by the experience of acting. 
 Artists as diverse as J.M. Coetzee and Barbra Streisand have noted the 
strengthened empathy skills in actors and fiction-writers. Coetzee even makes a savvy 
link to becoming-animal: “There are no bounds to the sympathetic imagination. … If I 
can think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed, then I can think 
my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster…” (Coetzee 2003: 79). 
Streisand ties this capacity for thinking-as-someone-else to leftist politics when she asks: 
“with the rise of the women’s, environmental and gay rights movements, there has been 
an increase in artists who support liberal causes. Why is that?” Streisand argues that,  
The basic task of the artist is to explore the human condition. In order to do what 
we do well, the writer, the director, the actor has to inhabit other people’s psyches, 
understand other people’s problems. We have to walk in other people’s shoes and 
live in other people’s skins. This does tend to make us more sympathetic to politics 
that are more tolerant (Streisand 1995). 
 
Acting methods broaden our identities, paving the way for us to embrace an ethos of 
pluralism and liberal openness. 
 It is best to conceptualize acting as “play,” a term that designated acting in 
Renaissance England. Given the unaccountable nature of human agency, play is never 
something one has conscious control over; it is childlike, borne of an intuition that 
Meisner’s techniques seek to re-activate and capture. To channel the play element of 
acting, one must be alive to the moment before you (via intuition and responsiveness) and 
dead to the rigid identity behind you (via acting). 
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 However, this does not prevent that uniqueness from being appropriated into 
already crystallized identity categories.44 Bottom and his friends want to be seen as 
“actors” yet Egeus calls them “hard-handed men [rough workmen]” (MND 5.2.116, 72). 
Nonetheless, this work on the self to become your aspirational self could be represented 
by the model of the actor. 
Presentational Acting 
 
 Recall Habermas’s association of the pre-18th century theater with the 
representation of monarchical figures. Representation acting privileges the power of who 
is being represented on stage. Presentation acting privileges the power of who represents; 
the stuff of stagecraft becomes the center of attention. Presentational acting is when 
actors break the forth wall. The actor is openly an intermediary between audience and 
role. The actors invite the audience to participate in the theatrical assemblage. The 
audience is no longer passive. In Shakespeare’s plays, it is actors on the periphery of the 
stage who tend to wink and nod at the audience, to gain them as fellow conspirators: 
Richard III, Hamlet in the first three acts, Iago (Gurr 2012). It is a setting that actors share 
with the audience. The aside and the soliloquy are the tools of presentational acting. 
 Of course, this may play into Habermas’ concern with the increasing ability of 
capitalist forces to manipulate publics and narrow the sphere for rational-critical debate. 
Public figures address us, but they can still do so insincerely, scheming for our vote, 
oiling their way through town hall meetings. But the divide between the mimetic space of 
center stage and the presentation space of the sidelines is shifting and productive. The 
spectator has a role to play. Both spectator and actor can delight in each other’s presence. 
                                                
44 Warner 1999. Appropriation from without, by others, takes place despite our own identarian intentions or 
commitments. 
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Puncturing the illusion of play-acting allows for a different variety of openness. It allows 
the spectator a greater measure of control. 
Consider the care Bottom takes to guide his audience. In the Cagney version, 
Cagney steps up to Theseus on the dais and confides to him the plot developments as he 
would to a friend (Midsummer 1935). The excitement Bottom has for the show is 
infectious. Presentational acting dissolves the spectrum which stylized and naturalistic 
acting occupy, meanwhile inviting more subjects into the production. By using 
presentational methods, directors test the audience: How much do you need to see sincere 
acting in order to believe a story? Presentational acting asks the audience to take delight 
in the stuff of the theater, in the artifice even while knowing the artifice is artifice. 
Presentational acting makes theater even more collaborative. 
An actor’s tools are many. If we conceive of the public sphere of democratic 
debate as a stage, then presentational acting which happens on the periphery might 
represent democracy’s interaction with things non-democratic. We can remember that 
democratic debate never happens in a vacuum. If no scripted and staged performance is 
exactly the same night after night, then how much truer is this for a presentational 
performance? If the audience refuses to commiserate with a presentational actor, the 
show can be irreconcilable with the pervious night’s show. What creates performative 
force are the elements outside of the specific sphere of debate or decision-making. The 
conditions of performance create the force of the words. Deliberative democrats do well 
to remember this. Drama is not merely about words—it may be least about words. 
Performance reconstitutes the words each time they are said in a new context, at a 
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different time, to a different audience. Democracy is by nature collaborative, and that 
means we are complicit too with the Richard IIIs or the Iagos on the periphery. 
 Just as dramatic performances are not primarily or essentially about utterances, 
neither is rational-critical debate simply about speech. Meanings result from 
performance—the style of performance, the conditions of performance, the conventions 
of performance, the history of performance, the materiality of performance. Text is 
transformed in the process of being acted. Acting is not simply an important dimension to 
the ideal speech situation. It is everything. 
Conclusion: Meaning Things So Much You Have To Act 
 
Hopefully it is clear that I am not simply making an analogy, saying that 
democrats should act like actors. Rather, I have explored how actorly techniques can help 
foster a better democracy. Each acting style has something to offer deliberative 
democrats. So: How can acting help us in our daily lives? Acting out scenes of daily life, 
especially scenes of crisis, revolution, political turmoil, can stage a plurality of forces, a 
constellation of elements, allowing us to see them clearly. It can be helpful for the 
audience seeing these scenes to think through them.  
But on a more personal level, characters like Coriolanus and Cordelia show us 
how one may need to use acting in one’s life simply to communicate certain aspects of 
oneself to an audience. Allan Bloom writes of the Roman: “he wants others to admire 
him for what he really is” (Bloom 1964: 85). They would admire him, if he could express 
himself in more actorly ways. When Coriolanus’s mother and the senators beg him to 
“frame his spirit” and ask the support of the plebeians in the market place, she says, “I 
would dissemble with my nature where / My fortunes and my friends at stake requir'd / I 
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should do so in honor” (Coriolanus 3.2.62-64). This is both a cynical acceptance of a 
politician’s need for public dissemblances and a critique of Coriolanus’s inflexibility. 
Both he and Cordelia are too honest and inflexible for their own good. When Lear 
administers a public love test among his daughters, Cordelia is taken with “stage fright,” 
as Thomas Dumm puts it: “Cordelia, in the position of actually loving Lear, cannot 
summon the ability to pretend to love him” (Dumm 2008: 12, emphasis original). All of 
us had the feeling of coming short of expressing ourselves genuinely. Something we say 
strikes us as fake-sounding but is in reality deeply felt. Dumm writes that it is impossible 
for Cordelia “to say what she fells without it feeling false to her” (Dumm 2008: 1). She 
cannot take the risks of the actor. And because she does not have an actor’s tools, she 
cannot express her true feelings. Her sincerity cannot be staged, as it needs to be in order 
for her to successfully communicate.45 Neither can Coriolanus. He can’t perform as a 
warrior-hero because he thinks the performance of the truth will somehow actually 
undermine the truth, that his genuine, war-hero chops must be concealed to be true. What 
Coriolanus fails to realize is that it takes a little bit of acting to convey one’s best self to 
others. Shakespeare tells us that it is acting that makes us aware more fully of who we are 
and who we can be. Acting skills can be essential for the tasks of genuine expressiveness. 
It is not deception or acting that I value in itself—it is my argument that the dramatic 
practice of acting supports interaction with others in more genuinely democratic and 
responsive ways, a trait needful for more open, pluralistic society. Acting is a practice 
                                                
45 Bradley calls Cordelia “exceptionally sincere and unbending” (Bradley 2007: 187) but then later calls her 
a liar: “Cordelia’s speech not only tells much less than truth about her love, it actually perverts the truth 
when it implies that to give love to a husband is to take it from a father” (Bradley 2007: 244). I find 
Bradley’s analysis to be masculinist and to demonstrate a profound lack of sensitivity to Cordelia’s own 
feelings of being torn between husband and father. I would disagree with Bradley on both counts: Cordelia 
is not sincere, and this is because she tells the truth, but without the skills to carry it off. 
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that can end in an enriched experience as a human being and democratic citizen. The 
most successful characters in Shakespeare (Viola, Rosalind, Imogene, Antony in Julius 
Caesar [but not in Antony and Cleopatra where he loses control of his craft], even Iago 
could be counted) tend to be the most sincere, the most responsive actors. 
If acting does make one more genuine in interactions with others, it should be the 
primary virtue in 21st century democratic life. Erving Goffman helps us to see why: 
A character staged in a theater is not in some ways real, nor does it have the same 
kind of real consequences as does the thoroughly contrived character performed 
by a confidence man; but the successful staging of either of these types of false 
figures involves use of real techniques—the same techniques by which everyday 
persons sustain their real social situations (Goffman 1973: 254). 
 
Techniques: the common denominator between the real and the staged. Goffman isolates 
what both professional actors and real-life actors have in common: techniques of the self, 
which are the same in both situations. In Shakespeare’s day, the similarity was more 
pronounced. There was no artificial proscenium frame, “a picture stage set apart from life 
and constituting a world of its own for the representation of mimetic story” (Burton 1914: 
55). It is modern theater that immobilizes its audience, sets it at a remove, and 
discourages participation in the scene. It is less easy to realize today what Shakespeare 
must have known: that both the traffic of the stage and the traffic of real-life seek 
genuineness, forged out of the energies of interaction. 
 To end my reflections on this theme, I wish to tie together a few thoughts to 
demonstrate why acting is equalizing, or at least humbling. We each participate in scenes 
that produce the illusion of a self, a self generated by local happenings. Intuition and 
responsiveness sharpens our awareness of this embeddedness of self and world, the local 
events of our life’s scenes. Human beings exist in, as Jane Bennett puts it, “an interstitial 
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field of non-personal, human forces, flows, tendencies, and trajectories” (Bennett 2010: 
61). Bottom grasps the forces beyond human agency in his universe because those forces 
(symbolized by the fairies and Puck) transform him into a beast. Puck shares the ability to 
enter into animal becomings, for he bestows that ability on Bottom: “Sometimes a horse 
I’ll be, sometimes a hound, / A hog, a headless bear…” (MND 3.1.96-97). It is true that, 
as Montrose notes, Oberon, Titania, and Puck express a top-down form of absolutist, 
sovereign power, forcing the humans of the play into bodies and forms against their will 
(the fairies are setting their own stage), but it is also true that Bottom seems to affirm that 
power, playfully saying, “I willed it thus!” (Nietzsche 2008). After all, he fancies 
transforming that experience into a ballad, “Bottom’s Dream.” When we broaden our 
identities the way Bottom does, derigidify them to better enter pluralist assemblages, we 
also learn a sympathy with our surroundings, an appreciation for the interconnectedness 
of participants in the scene—whether those be lifeless forces like wind and rain or animal 
beings like asses and “Bottoms.” 
 In his novels, James Hilton captures this well (Hilton 1951; Hilton 1941). When 
he writes of stylized actors, he speaks of them as being realer than real—characters 
covered in the rich cloth of stereotype.46 This is not quite overacting; it can be sincere 
although it may not seem so. But do the subtle distinctions between the real and the too 
real always hold? Do they always matter? The “too real” can serve a purpose—as when 
another of Hilton’s characters, not a professional actor, must act in order to be sincere. 
She says: “You think I’m acting, don’t you? [an indication maybe she has been “too 
real”] And you think that means I’m not sincere? You don’t understand that sometimes I 
                                                
46 I am thinking here of how he describes the working-class acting troupe in Random Harvest (Hilton 
1941). 
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mean things so much I have to act?” (Hilton 1951: 316, emphasis original). Acting is not 
about faking. Acting is trying to make something happen. It can be about genuine 
expressiveness, whether that registers as fake or “too real” to someone else. We do not 
know how our words or actions will be judged, hence their perlocutionary force. The 
Habermasian argument that you need to assume everyone is sincere for the ideal situation 
of communicative action doesn't take into account that even when people are acting, there 
can be heartfelt sincerity. 
Here it is important to remember that there is no such thing as an “inappropriate” 
response as long as one is responsive to the moment. Titus Andronicus laughs when he 
exhausts his supply of tears after his daughter has been raped, her tongue cut out, and her 
arms lopped off. His brother reacts to his laughter with, “Why dost thou laugh? It fits not 
with this hour” (Titus Andronicus 3.1.264), as if he would police the “right” and the 
“wrong” response. But life is full of “wrong” lines, moments of misunderstanding, 
impasse. What we judge as “right,” or as “good” depends on context, imagination, and 
serendipity too. Interpretations change. Each time one performs, it is different. Things 
transpire that no one intends. All we can do is begin, begin dialogue, begin action, 
without conditions of control, but hopefully with a good sense of our surroundings. 
 Actors, I argue, can be models for a democratic responsiveness, intuitiveness, and 
creativity. The practice of acting, embodied in these methods, is a technique of self that 
leads to the advancement of common life, of responsiveness to others and a renewed 
appreciation of their value. Character is not a fixed locus of meaning but a process. 
Democracy requires a flexibility of character, and there is an irreverence, a flexibility that 
actors have. Pace Habermas, one can easily foster democratic character traits—empathy, 
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responsiveness, sincerity—with illusions, untruths, and fantasy. In theater, none of the 
roles are more authentic or original, Deleuze says. Hierarchies collapse. We open 
ourselves to the new and undiscovered, like explorers, but also like creators. Jack 
Nicolson says, "I like to play people that haven't existed yet, a future something, a cusp 
character" (Nicolson quoted in McDougal 2008: 130). As democrats in crisis time, we are 
all cusp characters, incipient characters, striving characters. We all have the potential for 







“Comedy is and should be a dangerous business.” 
—Michael Moore 
 
 Courage is rarely identified as essential to democracy, or to liberal politics. It is 
seldom embraced as a valued feature of leadership or citizenship. Both the general public 
and political theorists today, respectively, generally give little thought to courage. 
 But when they do, they take courage seriously. That is to say, they consider it 
meaningful, poignant, even sometimes existential, as when Richard Avramenko writes: 
“Courage appeals because, once expressed in its most poignant form, it reveals the 
possibility of increased vitality and consequently the possibility of deepened meaning in 
one’s life” (Avramenko 2011: 64, my emphasis). There is often a depth and 
profoundness, even solemnity, to the courage they praise, or—if they fear a courage that 
gets out of hand—caution against. Even if circumspect concerning the moral content of 
courage, they implicitly posit genre space around the acts of courage. They locate it 
within a genre, usually either tragedy or melodrama. It is my argument that the kind of 
courage political theorists celebrate remains tethered to a too-narrow conception of genre. 
 Although courage might at first seem to be an immutable trait, then, this chapter 
aims to show how courage as a concept is refashioned based on the literary genre in 
which it appears. A “genre,” as I understand it, is a modality of representing particular 
interpersonal and transpersonal dynamics, experiences, and affective phenomena; it 
organizes disparate narrative elements within a story and presents them in such a way that 
they become recognizable as a particular form or style that can be used to classify and 
describe a number of artistic works and performances. While works falling under the 
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rubric may not exhibit all the genre’s characteristic features, we might privilege a certain 
work as the genre’s quintessential form. 
 I elucidate aspects of courage expressed through three different genres: tragedy, 
melodrama, and comedy. First, I give a brief history of how theorists, from Aristotle to 
George Steiner, have talked about the genres of tragedy and comedy. Although 
“melodrama” is not an early modern generic category (it would perhaps be more 
historically faithful to discuss the morality plays that allegorized vice and virtue figures 
in Christian doctrine and depicted these as absolutes), it becomes essential when talking 
about production history, and how Shakespeare’s Tragedy of Julius Caesar, in particular, 
has been reappropriated for modern audiences. I then show how political theorists have 
presented courage in a serious mood and claim that courage is most likely to be 
recognized as courage when it is portrayed in a solemn, melodramatic cast; when its 
bearers are committed to the rightness of their cause; and when they assume apodictic 
bearings and carry through in a resolute manner. This is what Avramenko does, for 
example. My final moves give an account of what I call comic courage, when comedy 
becomes an engine for a certain kind of courage, and the way Shakespeare dramatizes 
experiences and events in the light of this courage. These dramatizations can help us 
think anew about democratic virtues and ways we might trigger nascent democratic 
modes and styles today. Shakespeare’s writing paradoxically gives us access to 
experiences—experiences that take place in the otherwise aristocratic communities 
within which these plays are set and with which they are concerned—that could allow us 
to imagine democratic virtues. Especially in the abridged and imperiled democracy of the 
US today, an irreverence to set roles and a mood of playfulness—in both senses of the 
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word: improvisatory, light, but also, like a play—displayed by Shakespearean characters 
like Rosalind and Falstaff can offer a model of an ethos of equality and democratic 
possibility. 
Comedy and tragedy: roots and meanings 
 
 Narrative elements can be separated from genre, defined by tone, context, and 
expectations. The bare actions of physical courage—for example, throwing a punch—are 
extractable and can look the same in each genre. In this sense, “courage” is portable from 
one genre to the other. But the world of comedy exposes aspects of courage in a way that 
the world of tragedy does not. Genre modulates the courage it depicts. Courage in the 
comedic world is rewarded with marriage or joy of some kind (e.g., in Dante’s Divine 
Comedy, the ascent of the soul to God). Courage in a tragedy often earns its bearers 
death. Accordingly, then, courage is valued differently. It sometimes has no use-value in 
tragedy. 
 Aristotle’s Poetics links comedy to democracy and what is common (Aristotle 
2002). Tragedy is an elevated vision of humans and comedy is a degraded one. (This 
seems to have both moral dimensions—comedy is about humankind’s “shameful” 
qualities and concerns the “base” and “lowly” in social status and rank [Aristotle 2002: 
1448a 34, 32.) Although Aristotle breezily dismisses the origins of comedy, “because it 
was of no stature from the beginning,” several notices about comedy in ancient literary 
history say that while “tragedy dissolves life, comedy puts it together” (Aristotle 2002: 
1449b 1, p.15n42). Extrapolating from this ancient wisdom, comedy perhaps holds more 
promise for theorizing or, better yet, dramatizing democracy today, assessing its 
constellations and coordinates, the forces latent within the multifaceted concept: self-
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government, fairness, equality, self-questioning, checks and balances. Holding all these 
elements in tension propels democracies forward, lends them energy and dynamism. 
Comedy puts things together, makes a pattern of the interpersonal and subjective material 
at hand, brings people together in a laugh or a joke, makes them accomplices and rivals. 
Aristotle speaks of the Dorians who claim that comedians wandered “from village to 
village” (Aristotle 2002: 1448a 39), outlying districts, whereas tragedians seem to be 
more centrally located, static. Aristotle links comedy more explicitly to democracy when 
he says that comedy has been alleged to have originated under a democracy: “the local 
Megarians make a claim to comedy as having emerged at the time of their democracy” 
(Aristotle 2002: 1448a 31-32). 
 Dante, in his letter to Cangrande that prefaces The Divine Comedy, gives us a 
similar etymology of the genre of comedy: “‘comedy’ comes from komos, ‘village’ and 
oda, which means ‘song,’ whence ‘comedy’ sort of means ‘country song’” (Dante 2015: 
par. 9). Again, the root of comedy is located in the village, the komos, and its speech, 
Dante says, tends to be “loose and humble” in order to best represent (and speak to) the 
people (Dante 2015: par. 9). Dante used the title La commedia for his epic poem because, 
although his subject was serious and religious, it was written in the vernacular rather than 
in an elevated mode or in Latin. There is an attention to gender in Dante’s discussion of 
comedy: He writes, “it is in the vulgar tongue, in which also women communicate” 
(Dante 2015: par. 10). Comedy, then, is not as exclusionary along gender lines as tragedy 
would seem to be, in Dante’s opinion. 
 If comedy is linked to the village, the common people, and to democracy, then 
what about tragedy? Tragedy has often meant for its critics what they want it to mean, 
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based on their judgments and hopes for the present, and as such it has suffered its share of 
anachronistic readings.47 Peter Euben takes Attic tragedy as a model for theorizing 
politics because tragedies, like democratic citizens, do not grasp at final solutions or 
explanations and they embrace uncertainty (Euben 1990). Indeed, Dennis Schmidt argues 
that the turn to tragedy in contemporary philosophy has been precipitated by philosophy’s 
growing doubts concerning the value of reason and method as basic premises, and 
tragedy’s ability to speak to those doubts, given its themes of human error and 
epistemological limitations (Schmidt 2001). Some contemporary theorists prize tragedy 
for its rejection of absolute judgments and well-defined choices between right and wrong, 
following Hegel’s thesis that tragedy dramatizes the conflict between goods or equally 
legitimate rights rather than a moral clash of good and evil.48 
 But other critics reject tragedy for its conservatism, as did feminist scholars who 
viewed tragedy as necessarily involving masculine hubris, the fall of the supposedly 
autonomous, self-creating “great man.”49 Others view tragedy as apolitical: Raymond 
                                                
47 See authors cited below for examples. For a less anachronistic and more historical (but nonetheless 
theoretical) view of tragedy, see Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s study Myth and Tragedy in 
Ancient Greece (1990). They argue that Attic tragedy “introduces a new types of spectacle into the system 
of the city-state’s public festivals. Furthermore, as a specific form of human expression it conveys hitherto 
unrecognized aspects of human experience; it marks a new stage in the development of inner man and of 
the responsible agent” (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1990: 23). This is what Harold Bloom argues 
Shakespeare’e work does in the Renaissance, or what Habermas argues letter-writing, diary-writing, and 
the epistolary novel did in the 18th century—develops the idea of inner man, develops a richness to our 
subjectivity that never existed before that point in time. It is easy to raise an eyebrow to these claims 
(Bloom 1998; Habermas 1989). 
48 See Terry Eagleton’s (2003) claims about modern democracy as that which multiplies our choices and 
therefore our potential to make regrettable judgments. Martha Nussbaum (1981: 5) also notes the 
multiplication of incompatible goods as a quotidian part of our existence. Christopher Rocco (1997) turns 
to tragedy as a way of shedding light on the conflicts within democracy and false polarizations in 
Enlightenment thought. 
49 Many of these feminist studies, however, in addition to showing Greek tragedy’s support of a male 
dominated social structure and the genre's and previous critics' androcentricism, also sought to show the 
ways female agency was enacted and highlighted spaces of feminine resistance to male structures. See 
Rabinowitz, 1993; Wohl 1998; Foley 2001. Kahn 1981 examines Shakespearean manliness from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, including a chapter on the downfalls of Coriolanus and Macbeth. Some early 
20th century thinkers viewed tragedy as (conservatively) transcendent, such as Maud Bodkin (1963) and 
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Williams argues that in the 20th century, we see "the ordinary separation of social 
thinking and tragic thinking" (Williams 2006: 63). Tragedy’s fatalism was rejected. 
According to Williams, “The most influential kinds of explicitly social thinking have 
often rejected tragedy as in itself defeatist” (ibid.). Tragedy teaches us that mankind’s 
attempts to change the human condition are hopeless. As literary theorist Kenneth Burke 
writes, a tragic “frame of acceptance admonished one to 'resign' himself to a sense of his 
limitations” (Burke 1937: 39). Williams is also writing against critic George Steiner who 
sees tragedy as uninterested in everyday social and political life (Williams 2006: 48). 
More recently but in a similar vein, French historian Nicole Loraux takes aim at critics 
who, she argues, unduly politicize Athenian tragedy. Loraux instead describes Attic 
tragedy as anti-political in the sense that it concerns itself with antagonisms and rejects 
civic ideologies and duties (Loraux 2002). 
Given the impossibility of avoiding such proleptic attributions, especially given 
tragedy's great variety in its politics, conventions, and experiences, I focus on a few key 
attributes of Greek tragedy (agreeing with George Steiner when he says that, “nearly till 
the moment of their decline, the tragic forms are Hellenic” [Steiner 1996: 3]) that seem to 
garner critical consensus: its aristocratic protagonists, its masculinism, the way courage 
supports hierarchy, its serious mood, the quest for moral meaning, for justice and 
expiation, and its linearity. These will come out below in my reading of two Shakespeare 
tragedies, Hamlet and Julius Caesar. 
But I also index below the waning availability of tragedy today and, following 
Peter Brooks, consider melodrama (and, I would add, even comedy) to be our 
                                                                                                                                            
John S. Smart, who writes, that tragedy has "the power to suggest something illimitable, to place life 
against a background of eternity...” (1922: 36). I am indebted to Eagleton (2003) for drawing my attention 
to Bodkin and Smart. 
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contemporary version of tragedy (Brooks 1976: xv). Tragedy has been largely supplanted 
by the new form of melodrama. Steiner goes so far as to say that we cannot have 
authentic tragedies today. True tragedy must be bleak and insufferably pessimistic. 
According to his categorization, even many of Shakespeare’s plays are too diluted, as 
they mix “[t]he real and the fantastic, the tragic and the comic, the noble and the vile” 
(Steiner 1996: 21-22). It is not that there have been no tragic authors since “the age of 
Shakespeare and Racine,” Steiner says; it is that the tragic spirit has evaporated. In 
modern times, with the belief in progress and the advance of reason, we no longer 
possess the view, generally, of “the image of man as unwanted in life” (Steiner 1996: xi). 
If tragedy is impossible today, then it could not be the genre within which contemporary 
understandings of courage appear. 
 Before I shift discussion to melodramatic courage in the work of contemporary 
political theorists, let me offer a few preliminary remarks about the genre of melodrama. 
In contrast to tragedy, a classical mode, melodrama is a modern genre. Melodrama, in 
Peter Brooks’ influential characterization, responds to a modern longing for a clear and 
legible moral universe in the wake of the death of the sacred and other postmodern losses 
such as progressive notions of history (Brooks 1976: 20). As the world comes to feel out 
of joint, we seek all the more for a sense of place and time, of rightness in our actions and 
beliefs. Melodrama recognizes virtue and innocence in a post-sacred drive for a 
recovered moralism. Hence the moral absolutism and transparency in which the hero is 
coded as good while his opponent is coded as bad. 
Political theorists on courage 
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 Political theorists influenced by Hannah Arendt, one of the few thinkers to value 
courage wholeheartedly in the past century, tend to see courage as essential for action, 
speech, and freedom in the public sphere (Arendt 1998: 186-7; see also Bickford 1996). I 
begin with Arendt because her conception of courage shares elements of each genre 
under discussion and, because of its patent rejection of authenticity, will help me to 
illuminate “comic courage” later in the chapter. 
As Andrew Sabl points out, Arendt’s reading of courage grows out of her 
experiences in interwar Germany, of what she calls “Dark Times”: “the disorder and the 
hunger, the massacres and the slaughterers, the outrage over injustice and the despair 
‘when there was only wrong and no outrage’” (Sabl 2006; Arendt 1968: viii, my 
emphasis).50 Arendt here casts courage as a tool in the fight against injustice in a moral 
universe of black and white: in this it seems melodramatic. But, in her concern with a 
masculine conception of “greatness,” Arendt’s courage also partakes of traditionally 
tragic elements: She cites with approval Machiavelli’s location of courage “in the rise ‘of 
the Condottiere from low condition to high rank,’ from privacy to princedom, that is, 
from circumstances common to all men to the shining glory of great deeds” (Arendt 
1998: 35). Because the public sphere is a place where “great deeds” can manifest, and 
because it takes courage to leave one’s home and venture into this realm, courage, for her, 
is “one of the most elemental political attitudes” (ibid). Pace Avramenko, courage is not 
what it is has been for scores of theorists: “Courage is a big word, and I do mean the 
daring of adventure which gladly risks life for the sake of being as thoroughly and 
intensely alive as one can be only in the face of danger and death” (Arendt 1993: 156). 
Courage may entail danger and risk, but not of the swashbuckling variety. Courage is not 
                                                
50 I am indebted to Sabl’s (2006) discussion of courage in Arendt’s scholarship. 
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an exciting choice; it is a basic demand that the public realm makes upon each citizen. 
Even cowards can display what she calls this “original courage” of stepping out into the 
public realm—even more so (Arendt 1998: 186-7). As I shall show below, it is precisely 
cowards like Rosalind and Falstaff whose comic courage transvalues courage itself in its 
refusal to submit to the cultural surround. 
 Richard Avramenko, in his study of courage as a virtue, takes the opposite view 
of Arendt. It is precisely courage’s ability to satisfy our personal sense of vitality, the 
thrilling risk to one’s existence, the intensity and exhilaration courage makes possible, 
that makes it “the existential virtue par excellence” (Avramenko 2011: 9). To be 
courageous requires a willingness to relinquish that highest of all goods, life itself. As 
Avramenko puts it, “self-interested courage is not courage” (Avramenko 2011: 55). 
One’s courageous sacrifice of life betrays some fundamental care or good worthy of 
death. Hence the enduring appeal of war: War demands the utmost one can give. Both 
Avramenko and Kateb turn to an account of WWII by J. Glenn Gray: on Gray’s view, in 
Kateb’s reading, “War…has more to do with human greatness of stature than almost any 
other activity and is indissociable from all other great activities” (Kateb 2004: 61, my 
emphasis). Again, courage is associated with great deeds, as in tragedy. 
Avramenko divides courage chronologically into four categories: martial 
(exemplified by Greek warriors), political (as seen in Greek political thought), moral 
(here he turns to Rousseau), and economic (Tocqueville is the exemplar). Easiest to link 
to the tragic genre is martial courage; as Judith Shklar writes, military courage “is so vital 
to every aristocratic character” (Shklar 1984: 234). Recall the above-listed attributes of 
Hellenic tragedy: its aristocrats, its masculinism, its linearity. But it is not tragic courage 
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that Avramenko finds in today’s democracies. Avramenko turns to Tocqueville to 
describe the difference between aristocracies and democracies in ancestral terms. “[I]n 
aristocracy there is a historical connectedness that naturally makes men feel linked to the 
past” (Avramenko 2011: 217). One’s temporal horizons are broader as one feels 
connected with ancestors and duty-bound toward those in the future. This is the stuff of 
revenge tragedy: e.g., Hamlet’s need to avenge his father’s death. Democracies, by 
contrast, “make men forget their ancestors” (Tocqueville quoted in Avramenko 2011: 
218). In contemporary democracy, and for contemporary political theorists, courage is 
not a thing prompted by vengeance or the defense of aristocratic honor. 
Even so, to be courageous one must be selfless (seen as morally good) and take a 
“resolute stand” on an issue one feels to be of the utmost importance (Avramenko 2011: 
255). For Avramenko, all the historical dimensions still live in the contemporary idea of 
courage. Many cultures today still kill to defend and preserve their honor and think of 
themselves as courageous in doing so. Courage is still, he notes, “bound up with 
manliness” (Avramenko 2011: 236). There is a transcendent dimension to Avramenko’s 
courage: “Courage elevates the soldier above the general run of mankind” (ibid). The 
soldier “transcends” his own immediate self-interest, leading Avramenko to conclude that 
“martial courage is axiomatically good and worth emulation. When all is said and done, 
to be courageous and unselfish is a good thing” (ibid, my emphasis). Avramenko’s need 
to cloak even an ancient, aristocratic notion of courage in “axiomatic goodness” bears 
witness to an enduring need in democracies today to find clear examples of good and 
bad—hence the popularity of melodrama. Courage gives us our moral “grounding,” 
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Avramenko says, revealing what we collectively hold most dear as worth giving our lives 
for (Avramenko 2011: 237). 
George Kateb delineates more explicitly a moral version of physical courage. He 
argues that only when such courage is moral can it be classified as a virtue (Kateb 2004: 
66). Rather than value war for war’s sake (battlefield courage is “organized criminality,” 
he says [Kateb 2004: 64]), he considers activities like space exploration, peaceful 
political acts of resistance, and even suicide as examples of virtuous physical courage. 
“Courage is not only a practical necessity, it is also an enlargement of humanity. The task 
is to confine it morally” (Kateb 2004: 68). Seeking to recover the moral dimension of 
courage, Kateb’s prose often partakes of melodramatic notions of the stark divide 
between “innocence” and “wickedness.” It is tragedy that makes this distinction harder to 
discern: as James Baldwin says of Julius Caesar: “the play does not even suggest that we 
have the perception to know evil from good or that such a distinction can ever be clear” 
(Baldwin 2010: 67). But Kateb writes as if distinctions between evil and good were plain: 
For example, battlefield courage, he says, “is usually displayed by combatants who are 
inwardly innocent. They do not typically intend wickedness, even though most of the 
time wickedness is what results from their deeds” (Kateb 2004: 50). Kateb uses these 
moral categories without a second thought. 
When considering war, Kateb claims, “the moral question of the rightness of the 
cause in which self-sacrifice figures is paramount” (Kateb 2004: 59). If this risk to life 
and limb is what made courage “great” for Avramenko, and therefore cast courage in a 
tragic register, then the moral stakes, the thoughtful consideration of “the rightness of the 
cause,” in Kateb’s account, are what make courage melodramatic. Kateb speaks in what 
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he calls “the moral voice” and seeks “expressions of physical courage that are in fact 
dissociable from war and battlefield courage, that show forth human greatness, and that 
also are moral or compatible with morality” (Kateb 2004: 61, my emphasis). Like 
Avramenko, Kateb does not want to relinquish the ancient Greek tragic linkage of 
courage to “human greatness,” but he rejects the lack of morality associated with war. 
Kateb even speaks in a quasi-religious register of benefits to the “soul” (Kateb 2004: 64). 
I am not saying that it is inappropriate or silly of Kateb to make claims about morality, 
but only that his quest for morality in the acts of courage takes on melodramatic shades. 
When Kateb describes the victims of degenerative diseases or concentration camps as 
“totally innocent” (Kateb 2004: 71), for example, I simply ask if this is really possible 
because it seems over-stated, and over-statement is a key element of melodrama. 
Judith Shklar, who, like Kateb, does not champion courage wholesale, applauds 
the courage of nonviolent dissidents. Military courage (like Caesar’s) is aristocratic, 
while moral courage is “democratic and wholly peaceful” (Shklar 1984: 234), and 
protects us from fear—which corrupts liberal regimes. This is not quite Kateb’s courage 
of innocence and evil, but it does still entail a moral bravery to stand up against 
wrongdoing. Shklar says courage is essential for democratic dissidents: “If citizens are to 
act…especially in a democracy, to protest and block any sign of governmental illegality 
and abuse, they must have a fair share of moral courage…” (Shklar quoted in Scorza 
2001: 645). The desire to search out wrongdoing need not imply innocence against evil, 
as it seems to in Kateb’s account: for Shklar, moral courage requires resolve and tenacity 
in the face of uncertainty (instead of embracing that uncertainty as theorists of tragedy 
like Euben would ask of political participants). 
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 Holloway Sparks goes further than Shklar in theorizing what she calls “an ethic of 
political courage” as a vital element of democratic participation (Sparks 1997: 74). She 
looks specifically at Rosa Parks as a model for dissenting democratic action. In her view, 
democracy is revitalized by the moral energies of dissenting citizens. Sparks speaks of 
the religious language used by participants in the Montgomery bus boycott: “The 
ministers often used the language of ‘turning the other cheek,’ and ‘loving your enemies’ 
when speaking about nonviolence. The combination of citizenship and religious language 
proved powerful; segregationist whites had to do discursive battle with two frameworks 
that occupied sacred positions in U.S. politics” (Sparks 1997: 91). This theological 
register of “enemies” versus the implied “friends,” the “sacred” as opposed to the 
profane, allowed protesters to stand firm because they were seen as speaking truth to 
power, power being defined as evil and truth as good. I do not take issue with the 
description of racism or other forms of oppression as irredeemably bad (it goes without 
saying that they are), but only with the way in which evidence of that badness is used to 
bolster those on the “opposite” side of the fight as morally pure and innocent and above 
reproach. Sides cannot so easily be taken in all circumstances; and taking sides 
presumptively often short-circuits much-needed dialogue and an exchange of views 
(however unpalatable some of those views may seem). But the moral language of black 
and whites, the belief that dissidents unambiguously possessed “the right to protest for 
right” (Sparks 1997: 90) that so motivated scores of protesters, makes it harder to adopt 
or even bear witness to a separate point of view. One need not compromise one’s 
principles to bridge the divide through dialogue. 
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 Sparks describes courage as “a commitment to resolution and persistence in the 
face of risk, uncertainty, or fear” (Sparks 1997: 76). But confirming one’s position and 
commitment to a moral good in a world of stark black-and-whites often leads one to 
adopt the bearings of an unhealthily passionate personal conviction of and belief in one’s 
righteousness. “To dissent when one faces domination and oppression marks a level of 
commitment to participatory democracy rarely matched by nondissenting citizens” 
(Sparks 1997: 83). But is it so democratic—that is, does it lead to the flourishing of 
multiple points of view—when conscientious dissenters hold too strongly to a firm notion 
of right that becomes unbending and static? Sparks cites approvingly Socrates’s brand of 
civic courage as a disposition to be persistent and steadfast in what one believes (Sparks 
1997: 93). This requires rigid conviction. Thus, Sparks’ dissentious (what I would call 
melodramatically tinged) courage has an unpolitical, undemocratic tendency towards 
apodictic modes and bearings. 
Sparks’s dissentious courage is akin to what Jason A. Scorza calls 
“conscientious citizenship” (Scorza 2001). Scorza delineates three varieties within 
political courage specifically: the courage of patriotic citizens (sustained by loyalty to 
the nation), pragmatic leaders (sustained by commitment to official duty), and 
conscientious citizens (sustained by a commitment to moral principles), which he notes 
sometimes conflict. Although Scorza says he desires to laden courage with “very little 
normative content” and protests that he is not a moral philosopher seeking to weave 
courage into broader theoretical fabrics of morality or justice (Scorza 2001: 640), as he 
contextualizes courage, its melodramatic shades surface. 
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 Scorza first considers patriotism as a source of courage. Leaders since the time 
of Pericles have sought to promote courage in a patriotic citizenry, to rejuvenate the 
polity. In Athens, Pericles inspired citizens to be brave citizen-soldiers by evoking a 
firm love of country in his Funeral Oration: “You must daily fix your gaze upon the 
power of Athens and become lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness has 
inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men of courage…” (Pericles 
quoted in Scorza 2001: 648). The greatness of the state (the bountiful “all this”) is like a 
sun that throws its rays over everyone, allowing citizens to prosper by making them 
courageous, even as the citizens ennoble the state with their courage. The state is both 
the achieved ideal and the originary motive for courage, both its most beloved recipient 
and its greatest advocate. Scorza admits that this kind of courage, often stemming from 
blind loyalty to one’s country and can be used by leaders for immoral ends. But leaders, 
as Pericles does, often impress on citizens both a firm sense of right and the “greatness” 
of the cause, a combination of both tragic and melodramatic features. 
Scorza then considers “the courage of pragmatic leadership,” and here he cites 
John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage as a source of case studies in such courage. This 
is a melodramatic brand of courage, despite being sustained “by an often amoral 
commitment to official duty” (Scorza 2001: 651). Scorza gives as an example Daniel 
Webster’s support for the Compromise of 1850, in which Webster took a stand for 
national stability even as it went against his own ideas of equality and human dignity 
(Scorza 2001: 651). But such courage need not be reactionary: another case is West 
Germany’s reparations agreement with Israel, when took place when only 29 percent of 
the West German population believed Jews were owed restitution from Germany. Or 
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the Kennedy administration drafting civil rights legislation in the midst of heated 
struggles in the South. Sometimes the courage of unpopular, undemocratic decision-
making can serve democratic ends—and be justified in moral, melodramatic terms. 
When Congressman John Lewis received the Profile in Courage Award for his 
leadership during the civil rights struggles, he said: 
Courage is a reflection of the heart. It is a reflection of something deep within the 
man or woman or even a child who must resist and must defy an authority that is 
morally wrong. Courage makes us march on despite fear and doubt on the road 
toward justice. Courage is not heroic, but as necessary as birds need wings to fly. 
Courage is not rooted in reason but rather courage comes from a divine purpose to 
make things right (Lewis quoted in Kennedy 2006: 237). 
 
Here is courage couched in the moral language of right-versus-wrong, of divine justice 
and purpose, of emotional knowledge versus a dispassionate, disinterested reason. By 
attributing courage to God (“divine purpose”), he bestows greater meaning on his 
actions. In times of turmoil, during crises of meaning, the courage to act often receives 
divine sanction from actors. This can be dangerous when orthodox, inflexible ideas 
surface regarding what constitutes justice. Justice is defined as what God wants, which 
shores up courage. When leaders draw the terms of moral justice so starkly, they can 
both inspire citizen patriots and justify their decisions to their constituents. 
 Congressman Lewis straddles the fence between “pragmatic leaders” and 
“conscientious citizens,” who display the most blatantly moral form of courage. Here the 
exemplars include Emerson, Thoreau, and the followers of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Just as do Sparks’s dissidents, conscientious citizens “stick to their own principles” 
(Scorza 2001: 652). Scorza notes the potential danger “in getting carried away”—“the 
potential for fanaticism, which closes potentially open minds” (Scorza 2001: 654). The 
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stubbornness and moral rigidity—even fervor—in this kind of courage also place it 
within a melodramatic cast. 
 We can more clearly understand, then, from the preceding overview of various 
theories of the political virtue of courage, the reason why, as Scorza says, “The language 
of courage…has always been an affective means for motivating people” (Scorza 2001: 
642). It is the language of right and wrong, of friends and enemies, of victims and 
villains, innocents and evil-doers, that motivates political actors to take a stand. This is 
courageous, but its tropes and dynamics draw from characteristic features of the 
melodramatic mode. Traditional accounts of the varieties of courage, encapsulated above, 
overlook the question of literary genre, which, as I shall argue in more detail below, 
shapes the substance and political impact of courage. I now turn to Shakespeare. As I will 
show, the social functions of courage as they are presented in Shakespeare’s plays, and 
thus, courage’s potential for democratic culture, come to the fore in different genres of 
presentation. 
Tragic courage: the case of Caesar 
The character of Julius Caesar provides an example of tragic courage. This is the 
militaristic, masculinist courage of aristocratic protagonists. It takes a serious tone, as this 
courage searches for fixed meaning. Recall Avramenko: “Courage appeals because…it 
reveals…the possibility of deepened meaning in one’s life.” Caesar is renowned for his 
courage in battle, and “War…has more to do with human greatness of stature than almost 
any other activity and is indissociable from all other great activities” (Kateb 2004 
paraphrasing Gray 61). For just this reason, Allan Bloom argues, Shakespeare turned to 
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the Romans for models. “The Romans were the greatest political people who ever 
existed,” and Caesar was “the greatest of these great men” (Bloom 1964: 78).51  
Caesar’s courage: 1) arrogates power to itself; 2) requires a public display of an 
impossible independence and heroism; 3) is always masculinized; 4) takes a serious tone 
and shows an enmity towards laughter; 5) holds to a firm notion of right and wrong that 
lends itself to overly moralistic inflections; and 6) requires a strong ontology of the 
subject 
Shakespeare’s play describes a ceremony in which citizens offer Caesar a crown 
three times—which bears witness to Caesar’s growing power. The political integrity of 
republicanism has yielded to the exigencies of tragic courage and its need for 
conspicuous displays of power. Tragic courage not only demands scenes of unshakable 
power but also pretends to an impervious independence. Weakness presents an 
insuperable impediment to heroic expression. Cassius complains to Brutus of Caesar’s 
epileptic fits and his failure to swim as far as Cassius: “it doth amaze me / A man of such 
a feeble temper should / So get the start of the majestic world” (JC 1.2.130-133). A 
reputation for manly courage is surely stained by a “feeble” anything. Cassius has no 
sense of consecration when speaking of Caesar precisely because Caesar’s weakness 
undermines his majesty. Caesar’s hyper-masculine heroics attempt to compensate for his 
native frailty.52 
                                                
51 Pace Bloom, Shakespeare does not offer such clear images of heroic action from a humanist tradition. 
Rather, as Timothy Hampton notes, Shakespeare “leaves us with a melancholic nostalgia for aristocratic 
excellence and the world of great souls” (Hampton 1990: 233). The souls of his play seem compromised, 
their greatness diluted. “The only moment at which Caesar’s extraordinary courage is recalled is in his 
remark to his wife Calpurnia” (ibid., 216) before he goes to the Senate—a remark which resonates in a 
context that underlines Caesar’s private frailties (his deafness in the left ear, his epileptic fits, his illness in 
Spain, his inability to swim as far as Cassius). 
52 Relatedly, Mary Beth Rose (2002) has examined two dimensions of heroic identity as portrayed in 
England from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, what she calls an heroics of action 
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 Tragic courage requires a certain dignity, a patrician air, and such men typically 
wear the somber mien of a man headed for the gallows. When Decius Brutus insists to 
know the cause of Caesar's decision to refrain from going to the senate, he says, “Most 
mighty Caesar, let me know some cause, / Lest I be laughed at when I tell them so” (JC 
2.2.69-70). He knows this will bait the dictator because laughter at Decius Brutus is 
laughter at Caesar. Heroes who are laughing-stocks are heroes no longer. Foibles or 
mistakes weaken a heroic reputation. Laughter is an affront to one’s authority. 
 The spectacle of tragic courage also presents a polarized world of good and evil. 
The confederacy of courage and righteousness goes back to Aristotle. For him, to be 
courageous presumes a firm notion of right. The courageous man is one “who endures 
and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, at the right time” 
(Aristotle 1962: 1115b). This formulation leaves cowardice on the wrong side of the 
moral equation, even as it raises the question of interpretation as to the “rightness” of an 
action—a central concern of the play. Possessing courage requires commitment, 
conviction, the unwavering belief in the right (usually in the face of massive threats to 
goodness and justice). Caesar thinks he is “right” in ignoring the oracle and going to the 
senate as usual. The more conviction in one’s “rightness,” the more courage. Heroic 
leaders are always on the right side of history, according to their rhetoric. Fastening one’s 
hopes to a certain historical outcome galvanizes collective action. Courage consecrates 
one’s ideals, whose defense, in turn, requires courage. Nietzsche even goes so far as to 
say, “it is the good war that hallows any cause” rather than the other way around 
                                                                                                                                            
(gendered male) and a heroics of suffering (gendered female). To put it crudely, heroic action pertains to 
the prerogative of killing, heroic suffering, of dying. In Julius Caesar, the male characters embody an 
heroics of action while Brutus’s wife Portia takes the heroics of suffering to the extreme—first by stabbing 
herself in the thigh and then by swallowing hot coals. 
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(Nietzsche 2008: 33)—that is, courage displayed in war argues for the rightness of a 
cause and needs no motivation other than itself. I think no clear cause-and-effect structure 
exists between courage and rightness, although actors are always ready to invent one. 
 Orson Welles, for his 1937 production, begins with an imperious Caesar’s first 
line, demanding quiet: “Bid every noise be still!” (JC 1.2.16; France 2001: 108). Welles 
omits Caesar’s admission to Antony of being unable to hear in his left ear, one of a few 
moments in Shakespeare’s play that undercuts Caesar’s pretensions to godliness (France 
2001). We see instead a fearless man, firm and uncompromising, saying to Antony, “I 
rather tell thee what is to be feared / Than what I fear; for always I am Caesar” (JC 
1.2.212-13, emphasis mine; France 2001: 117). This is a monumental, ahistorical (that is, 
appropriate at any historical juncture) notion of greatness well befitting his tragic 
courage. Welles, by associating Caesar with Benito Mussolini and Brutus with 
democratic government, intended for Caesar to appear as an over-reaching autocrat. 
 While Caesar’s aristocratic courage demands a strong ontology of the moral 
subject, on my reading, Shakespeare exposes how there is at the heart of the self a 
vacancy, a vacuum unfulfillable. Shakespeare’s Caesar assumes an overbearing 
constancy—“always I am Caesar”—but one great act is never enough. If greatness entails 
courage, then the constant propulsion to prove one’s courage/greatness issues in attempts 
to always out-do oneself. No reclining on laurels. Actions must be constantly renewed, to 
no end. “[D]anger knows full well / That Caesar is more dangerous than he….” (JC 
2.2.44-45), Caesar says imperiously, resolving to out-danger danger: But does he? Why is 
Caesar compelled to verbalize this to Calpurnia, as if to testify to his full worth as a 
courageous man? There thus appears a lack at the heart of this ancient virtue that requires 
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its possessor to continually strive to fill it with new conquests and exploits. “Caesar 
should be a beast without a heart, / If he should stay at home to-day for fear,” Caesar says 
(JC 2.2.42-43). Caesar fears a lack of courage at his own center, the lack of a heart—the 
etymology of courage being the Latin “cor” for “heart.” With a savage irony, Caesar’s 
image announces a vacancy at the center of tragic courage and greatness in their ancient 
forms—but it also marks his continued, never-ending quest to find a heart in the beast, to 
find a center of meaning in the abyss of subjectivity. 
 We are now in a position to briefly summarize what we have learned about tragic 
courage from the example of Caesar: it is militaristic, masculinist, serious, moralistic, 
attempts to locate fixed meaning in a universe fundamentally unstable, is supported by an 
intense hierarchy (and supports that hierarchy in turn), and requires a spectacle of an 
heroic independence and a model of strong and decisive subjectivity. 
Julius Caesar as melodrama  
 I wish now to briefly light up the difference between three moments in the time of 
Julius Caesar. First there was the political moment in Roman history when Julius Caesar 
was assassinated. History exists without genre, although as told in narrative, it can be 
given a genre-framework by observers. It might be depicted with the colors of the tragic 
if one is sympathetic to Caesar or interprets his demise as the end of the republic, but 
there are various interpretations. Then there is the Renaissance retelling of that moment 
in a history play, classified as “tragedy” by Shakespeare. This takes place in the context 
of a monarchy and is at odds with itself about the allure and the problems of imagining 
other political forms (i.e., republics) from within a monarchy. Finally, there is a third 
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moment, an afterlife of Julius Caesar where the play is mobilized in WWII and Cold War 
contexts for various propagandistic uses. 
 Today, Caesar’s tragic courage (and, I would argue, tragic courage in general) 
registers as old hat and superfluous, signifying a former era, a bloody, battlefield courage. 
This is perhaps why liberal political theorists speak little of the virtue. To us moderns, it 
seems foolhardy, though such courage used to serve as an index of one’s worthiness as a 
citizen. Mid-century American productions of Julius Caesar—in large part because they 
do not play as tragedies anymore—pay Caesar’s courage much less attention, as if to say, 
this courage is not relevant to us today.53 
 Moreover, Julius Caesar often plays as melodrama today. Welles turned Julius 
Caesar into sheer melodrama where good = Brutus and evil = Caesar. Welles, by setting 
the play on the contemporary political scene, makes that distinction plain. In his 1937 
production, Brutus represents the fulfillment of history’s telos, from absolute 
kingship/tyranny to modern republican democracy. Not only Welles’s edits to the script 
but his theatrical techniques—what one critic called an “extreme theatricality”—gave it a 
melodramatic cast (France 2001: 104). 
 Other characteristics of melodrama include its “overwrought” expression of “raw” 
and “highly charged” emotions; and its preference for “outrageous coincidence, 
implausibility, convoluted plotting, deus ex machina resolutions, and episodic strings of 
action” (Singer 2001: 45). The 1953 MGM film version was viewed by critics as 
                                                
53 There is another example to consider that downplays Caesar’s tragic courage. The scraggly soothsayer 
inaugurates David Bradley’s 1950 film version (Julius Caesar 1950). The seer holds a lantern against utter 
blackness, moaning as he makes his way towards the camera: “Caesar, Caesar, beware the Ides of March, 
Caesar, Caesar.” The camera zooms in on his face as he yells dramatically, “The Idea of March have 
come!,” which immediately gives way with two loud, jarring chords to the opening credits. The genre 
seems a mix of horror and melodrama, especially since the second half is christened “The Revenge of 
Caesar.” Bradley passes over Caesar’s courage in favor of highlighting his vain and ill-starred effort to lick 
fate. 
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melodramatic, partly due to the “overwrought” acting but also because of “outrageous 
coincidence”—all the blatant warnings of Caesar’s death!—and “implausibility” 
(“Review,” Variety 1952; Crowther 1953). Characters like the soothsayer or Calpurnia 
demonstrate a wild, over-the-top powerlessness. Much about Julius Caesar is excessive. 
The language in the play is full of superlatives (e.g., “Most high, most mighty, and most 
puissant Caesar…”; “Thou art the ruins of the noblest man / That ever lived in the tide of 
times” [JC 3.1.33; 3.1.259-60]), as if over-signifying might cover over a lack that can 
never be filled, the empty beast with no heart. No one is just good. One is very, very 
good. One is very, very courageous and powerful. Greatness here is zero-sum. 
 A comedy skit that aired on the Ed Sullivan show in 1958 called “Rinse the Blood 
Off My Toga” mocks Caesar’s fearless courage. Calpurnia tells the private eye hired to 
investigate Caesar’s murder, “If I told him once, I told him a thousand times: Julie, Don't 
go! But would he listen to his own wife? Like talking to a wall. I told him, Julie, it's the 
Ides of March, beware already” (“Rinse the Blood” 1958). Here, Caesar’s courage is 
senseless, like a wall. The extreme moral rightness and fearlessness of melodrama 
becomes the stuff of comedy. The “outrageous coincidence” of melodrama is a joke. 
 Of course, the mockery of tragedy is not new to modernity and does not arise with 
melodrama. Shakespeare himself sent up his Romeo-and-Juliet plotline of star-crossed 
lovers in the “Pyramus and Thisby” staging in Midsummer Night’s Dream. But the way 
Shakespeare intended Julius Caesar as a tragedy (its full title is The Tragedy of Julius 
Caesar), and how tragedy is appropriated into melodrama, is unique. The energy of 
Julius Caesar originates from the morally ambiguous killing of Caesar by his friend—a 
person who does not deny this deep friendship. The distance and divergence between the 
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conspirators in the play is a huge source of power. Melodramatic renderings flatten this 
out. The energy now exists between characters who symbolize different choices rather 
than within the individual, where tragedy locates conflict. As noted above, whereas 
melodrama affirms moral absolutism and partakes of an unambiguous expressiveness that 
communicates everything there is to be said with exaggeration and heightened pathos, 
tragedy is valued (and traditionally elevated above melodrama as elite art) for its 
unwillingness to offer straightforward and clear-cut answers and unqualified judgments. 
Tragedy suggests what lies beyond human understanding, what cannot be made sense of, 
what cannot acquire a precise moral value. It emphasizes the hopelessness of our efforts 
to make complete sense of the world or remake it in our image. Tragedy undoes the 
distinction between virtu and fortuna, free will and destiny, between personal volition 
and external circumstance.54 
Although Julius Caesar was written as tragedy, its 20th century retellings, notably 
in times of heightened crisis (WWII, the Cold War), situated it in a universe of moral 
blacks and whites, of highly charged emotions, and implausible coincidence. This is 
because melodrama best seems to capture the mood of heroic—once fully tragic—
courage today. In fact, tragedy—which tends to focus on persons of high peerage and 
their fall—can only play as melodrama in a democratic context, which is not sympathetic 
to such “great men” of stature and thus is less moved by their downfall. As Rita Felski 
puts it, “Nourished by a sacred and hierarchical cosmology, the tragic flame sputters and 
dies in the inhospitable air of our secular, democratic times” (Felski 2008: 4). The 
melodrama of Caesar’s (once tragic) courage was translated further out of melodrama 
                                                
54 This description of tragedy is heavily indebted to Rita Felski’s (2008) introduction to Rethinking 
Tragedy. 
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into comedy with Calpurnia’s “it’s the Ides of March, beware already”—which reads 
Caesar as foolish to ignore warnings in a vain, doomed attempt to keep his reputation for 
courage intact. Sacrificing too much for courage betrays one’s stupidity, not one’s valor. 
 Caesar’s tragic courage always had elements of moral absolutism, but those 
elements were accentuated in mid-century productions of Julius Caesar. After all, 
melodramatic courage might often be just an exaggerated derivation of tragic courage: 
Even the most tragic of dramas can metamorphose into melodrama if played in such a 
fashion. These re-workings gave Caesar’s flashy, masculine, martial greatness less 
attention, emphasizing instead Brutus’s restrained, contemplative dissent. Brutus’s is a 
courage that seeks to endow the universe with fixed meaning (which I will contrast in my 
final section with a comic courage that represents a step beyond the insistence on 
meaning). In part because of this, his courage is melodramatic. If Caesar represents “bad” 
in these melodramatic retellings of Julius Caesar, just how exactly does Brutus play 
“good”? 
Brutus’s melodramatic courage 
 How does Brutus’s courage compare to Caesar’s? Both share a serious, even sad, 
tenor. As Nietzsche writes: “What is all of Hamlet’s melancholy compared to that of 
Brutus?” (Nietzsche 2003: 94). Hamlet had his comedic moments, but for Brutus, 
laughter would weaken the mettle of his courage. Melancholy is a mood experienced by 
main characters in both tragedies and melodramas. Moods are experienced subjectively 
by characters, whereas genres are non-personal or pre-personal and describe the overall 
affectsphere of the play. And here I wish to make a finer distinction. Courageous postures 
not only differ in changed genre contexts (tragedy, melodrama, comedy) but also based 
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on the mood of the characters who display courage. In comedies, the mood expressed by 
lead characters tends to be playful (with the exception of Jack Cade in his comedic 
scenes, discussed below). Melancholy and playful, then, are terms I use to designate the 
moods that exist within the three genres under discussion here: tragedy, melodrama, and 
comedy. (Although, of course, even though genres contour expectations and persist 
coherently over time, I should emphasize here the blending of genre in Shakespeare. 
Genre hangs on a Shakespeare play very loosely: His most heartbreaking tragedies have 
their comedic moments and vice versa.) It is the playful mood, I’ll argue below, that 
presents the most promise for a democratic politics. Following Spinoza, I make the case 
that, as opposed to negative feelings that typically impede our capacity to act, playfulness 
and joy produce the capacity for an expanded repertoire of possible actions (Spinoza 
1994). 
 Now I return to comparison of Brutus’s and Caesar’s courage. Both kinds, insofar 
as such courage manifests persistence in the face of uncertainty, share an unpolitical, 
undemocratic tendency toward apodictic modes and bearings, toward a level of resolve 
without second thoughts. Because our actions always take place in a context of 
uncertainty, to require a level of courage for those actions dramatizes, by heightening, 
our everyday encounter with a world that is fundamentally in flux and unknowable. 
“[T]hose we commonly call courageous choose to keep going when confronted with an 
obstacle or with danger. They are tenacious, committed to acting even when the outcome 
is uncertain” (Sparks 1997: 92). 
 Orson Welles emphasized the self-righteous and melodramatic aspects of Brutus’s 
courage. According to Drama Critic Sidney B. Whipple:  
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Mr. Welles, the Brutus of this novel presentation, gives us an honest man, an almost 
saintly man, a man ever fixed in principle and faithful to his conscience. The 
conspirators surrounding him, even the lean and hungry ones, are made for a time to 
appear heroic in the light of the honesty that inspires his decision. You are never in 
doubt as to the purity of a movement that must encompass the assassination of the 
dictator (Whipple 2014: 442). 
 
Purity, saintliness, conscience, heroism, honesty: these traits cling to the courageous 
Brutus as he stands firm against the evils of dictatorship. These are the traits of the very, 
very good hero in melodrama. 
 But because Brutus challenges Caesar as a fellow senator and not as, say, a slave 
or a foreigner or an ordinary citizen, he is “with himself at war” (JC 1.2.48).55 We 
witness the pathos of his extreme self-division, internal passions at cross purposes. 
Brutus belongs to the same community as does Caesar; Caesar is a father figure if not his 
actual father. Thus, killing Caesar entails overhauling everything that provided Brutus 
with a sense of selfhood as a Roman. Brutus’s internal diversity leads to his melancholy, 
introspective self-dissection, which he carries to extravagant lengths. “Rinse the Blood 
Off My Toga” comically captures this division within Brutus. Brutus goes to a private 
eye to report Caesar’s murder. In talking to the detective, he asks, “Are you sure we’re 
alone? … Then who’s that standing beside you?” When the detective says, “That’s 
YOU,” Brutus replies, “I know, but can I be trusted?” (“Rinse the Blood” 1958). The 
man who stabs another and then reports the event in hopes of being arrested is a man 
internally divided. 
                                                
55 Brutus is what Michael Walzer calls an “internal critic.” The internal critic does not challenge the core 
values of a regime but rather challenges what they see as violations of those values in practice (Waltzer 
1987: 74). The end goal of their critique is to strengthen the regime. Brutus exemplifies a dissident internal 
critic who challenges Caesar’s authority from within the system, as a Roman senator. Through Cassius’s 
encouragement, Brutus arrives at a sense of Caesar’s wrongs. It is not Caesar’s place in the sun that Brutus 
resents but rather the demise of the republican regime that his rule would make inevitable—at least that is 
the way Brutus would tell it. 
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 Brutus acts from a sense of right, expresses serious political grievances, and 
aspires to a greater level of equality. Brutus becomes a democratic “saint,” in 
Whipple/Welles’s characterization, squaring off against evil dictator Caesar in a world-
shattering attempt to renew the meaning and stature of the Roman republic. This is the 
stuff of pure melodrama. 
Melancholy moods, tragic time, and the matter of perspective 
 Consider now the serious mood of Brutus’s courage. I examine Brutus’s mood by 
assessing its similarity to Hamlet’s—Hamlet being the most famous melancholic in 
Shakespeare’s oeuvre. As noted above, melancholy is a mood experienced by characters 
in both tragedies and melodramas. Both Hamlet and Brutus see ghosts, symbolic of an 
abyss of meaning. Seeing ghosts provokes feelings of melancholy in these two 
characters,56 which they each can channel into melodramatic courage. Consider Hamlet’s 
ghost. The ghost scares Hamlet out of his wits, prompting Hamlet’s search for meaning in 
                                                
56 Most Shakespearean characters confronted by ghosts display a profound sense of melancholy that aligns 
with their courage. In Laurence Olivier’s film version of Richard III (1955), during the ghost visitation 
scene, images of Richard’s victims are superimposed on a fog in Bosworth Field (the scene of battle) in 
Richard’s dream and their montage is intercut with shots of Richard in bed, suffering. In placing the victims 
literally on top of the battle, Olivier’s imagery directly links the courage of battle with the courage of facing 
ghosts. 
 Often courage is martial, probably due to the fact that ghosts are often associated with battle in 
Shakespeare. For example, in Cymbeline, Posthumous’s brothers bear “wounds as they died in the wars,” 
say the stage directions. Hamlet emphasizes the ghosts’s military attire to significant effect: he comes 
“arm’d,” clad “in complete steel [armor]” (Ham. 1.4.33), “Armed at all points [details] exactly, cap-a-pie 
[head to foot]” (Ham. 1.2.200) with his officer’s baton. In Richard III, the ghosts visit before the major 
battle of the play, on the battlefield. So it is with Julius Caesar, wherein Caesar’s ghost visits Brutus first in 
his tent at Sardis and then during the final climactic battle at Philippi. 
But Shakespeare also provides us with a critique of this martial courage, and perhaps the clearest 
connection between ghosts and courage surfaces in Macbeth. When Macbeth has second thoughts about 
murdering King Duncan, his wife advises him to “screw courage to its sticking place,” to keep up the 
requisite level of courage to follow through on their plans. This courage, like the tragic courage of Caesar, 
entails a specific, warrior-hero manliness. After Macbeth’s first outburst at seeing the ghost of Banquo, his 
wife asks him, “Are you a man?” (Mac. 3.4.58). After he bids the ghost depart, he comforts himself with, “I 
am a man again” (Mac. 3.4.113). Mary Beth Rose argues that “Because of the gendered purity of the hero’s 
quest, Macbeth provides the most unrelenting scrutiny and scathing critique of aristocratic male heroism in 
all of English Renaissance literature” (Rose 2002: 3). She notes that Macbeth succeeds more than any other 
hero in purging himself of any association with the feminine. The play exposes aristocratic male heroism 
“as criminal violence” (Rose 2002: 25). Vanquishing fears of ghosts is a rite of passage that allows for a 
reaffirmation of manliness and of the static greatness borne of that fanatical masculinity.	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the event: “What may this mean…? Say, why is this? Wherefore? What should we do?” 
(Ham. 1.4.32, 38) Nietzsche compares Hamlet to Dionysian man who has looked into the 
abyss: “the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the 
essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action” (Nietzsche 
1967: 60, emphasis original). The knowledge Hamlet gains in seeing the ghost, 
paradoxically, is a knowledge of forgone meaning. Hamlet confronts the dark abyss, the 
fundamentally unknown and inexpressible, and attempts to overcome the absurdity of its 
meaninglessness. The abyssal refuses meaning in terms already set, defies interpretation 
in any traditional form. 
 Hamlet is not the only character who feels abandoned by all sense-making 
systems after clapping eyes on a ghost. Like Hamlet’s “Say, why is this? wherefore? what 
should we do?,” Brutus responds to his ghost with: “Art thou any thing? / Art thou some 
god, some angel, or some devil / That makes my blood cold and my hair to stare?” (JC 
4.2.329-331). Like Hamlet, Brutus asks question after question in an attempt to secure 
meaning. These crises redouble their efforts to restore meaning to events, leading Hamlet 
to vow, conservatively, “The time is out of joint: O cursed spite, / That ever I was born to 
set it right!” (Ham. 1.5.189-190) Again, similar to the moral rightness demanded by 
ghosts, Hamlet seeks a temporal rightness that would locate events in their proper order, 
confer on them their proper meaning. Just before seeing the ghost, Brutus lashes out at a 
man who fails to “know his time.” Both Brutus and Hamlet seek to “set it right”—time, 
morality, meaning itself. Ghosts give their witnesses the courage to pursue a path of 
ultimately devastating righteousness that dyes events in moral black and whites, and to 
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order time in a way that is ultimately impossible. Hamlet and Brutus’s courage seeks to 
endow the universe with fixed meaning. 
But Hamlet, and tragedy in general, teaches us that the effort to set time aright 
always fails. Julius Caesar, in contrast to Hamlet, can be played as melodrama in large 
part because the ghost does set things “right” by killing those who killed. At the heart of 
this quest after rightness is the quest for an idea of “justice.” Justice, as a meaning-
making system, endows events with a deep moral valence. As Jacques Derrida notes, to 
speak about ghosts is to speak “in the name of justice” (Derrida 1994: xviii). F. W. 
Moorman agrees: “The Shakespearean ghost is at once the embodiment of remorseful 
presentiment and the instrument of divine justice” (Moorman 1906: 192). Achieving 
justice requires courage. 
But I must make the further distinction between how viewers view tragedy and 
how the characters like Hamlet within the tragedy view their quest. As Mel Brooks says, 
“Tragedy is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you fall into an open sewer and die” 
(Brooks quoted in McDonald 2012: 78). From whose perspective does one label a play a 
tragedy? Whose stance towards action does it privilege? Is genre the stance taken towards 
what is being watched? Or does the suffering of people in a play by itself make it a 
tragedy? Further, oftentimes to differentiate between the tragic or the melodramatic 
depends in large part on how the work is played. Brutus’s courage seeks to endow the 
universe with fixed meaning. Brutus pursues what today would qualify as a melodramatic 
quest for meaning and moral order. Similar to the moral rightness demanded by Hamlet’s 
quest to “set right” a time that is “out of joint,”57 Brutus too seeks a temporal rightness 
that would locate events in their proper order, confer on them their proper meaning. Just 
                                                
57 ‘The time is out of joint: O cursed spite, / That ever I was born to set it right!’ (Ham. 1.5.189-190). 
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before seeing a ghost, Brutus lashes out at an intrusive poet who fails to “know his time” 
(JC 4.3.188). Julius Caesar, in contrast to Hamlet, can be played as melodrama in large 
part because the ghost does set things ‘right’ by killing those who killed (as Brutus and 
Cassius die in the end). Hamlet’s may be a melodramatic quest (for moral rightness and 
final order—which is what he seeks) but it takes place within the genre of tragedy (of 
varied solutions and untidy endings—which is what the audience sees). 
For the characters in the play, ghosts shake up the established order of time only 
to prompt a greater affirmation of linearity. The knowledge the ghost carries confronts 
and perhaps confounds the ghost-seer with a history not yet acknowledged, with an 
unwieldy burden of one’s relationship to past deeds, with a weight of ancestral 
provocations that cry out for redress. This is why many of the ghosts in Shakespeare’s 
plays are father figures or ancestors: Hamlet’s father, Brutus’s supposed father Caesar, 
Richard’s older cousin Henry VI, Posthumous’ father and mother and older brothers. 
They raise a larger question of one’s responsibility to the past in addition to an existential 
courage of looking into oneself. We never see only ourselves but perforce see the history 
behind us as well. 
This is why Hamlet’s courage locates itself in a linear historical horizon; in both 
Hamlet and Julius Caesar, the ghost-seer is prompted to restore linearity. The possessors 
of tragic courage or melodramatic courage (to differentiate between the two genres 
depends in large part on how the work is played) justify their actions with the moral 
language of right-versus-wrong, of divine justice and purpose. These kinds of courage 
strengthen a masculine, aristocratic form of greatness. This greatness is static rather than 
dynamic as it strives to overcome fear and evil and locate fixed meaning in the universe.  
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 But ghosts, for the viewers of the play, are radical. Derrida uses ghosts as a trope 
to conceptualize a spectral, untimely history, one that does not assume linearity. For him, 
the ghost is an event, one that always returns. As Sam Chambers writes, “a conversation 
with ghosts can never be timely since we never know when they are going to show up, 
nor if they will even speak when they do appear” (Chambers 2003: 90). Since ghosts can 
always reappear, it is in vain that we try and arrest their movement and bid them speak to 
us. We can never be done with history, as its ghosts will return. “The responsibility of an 
untimely politics consists of the need to remain ever vigilant, given its commitment to the 
possible (re)appearance of specters” (Chambers 2003: 93). Time is radically broken. The 
past and future lay claims on us we may have never foreseen. 
 This spectral history is a radical history. It does not ask for solutions, for tidy 
endings, for closure, for final or absolute meaning. Rather, it knows solutions on such 
terms are impossible. As Chambers says, “untimeliness may disturb our most assured 
convictions; it shakes even the solid ground of ontology by calling into question the very 
distinction between the actual and the spectral” (Chambers 2003: 3). Ghosts force an 
inquiry into the difference between the empirical and the nonreal because it is impossible 
to know the material reality of the ghost. Are ghosts an hallucination of the mind or do 
they have an independent, full-fledged reality? It is also difficult to extract a meaning 
from ghosts, as it is impossible to pin fixed meaning on abyssal events. We give certain 
horrific or strange events meaning, but sometimes our meaning-making systems show 
signs of wear or come apart upon closer inspection. But the unfailing failed or only 
partially successful attempts at meaning are there. Brutus demands meaning from time 
and events—questioning the ghost, directing the conspirators to bathe in Caesar’s blood 
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as an improvised ritual gesture. Sacrifice, which was undertaken to launder prior wrongs, 
to cauterize past impurity and reaffirm the greater good, must establish meaning, 
otherwise courage has been mustered for a meaningless cause. Having killed Caesar, 
Brutus’s task is to make that deed count by saving the republic through it. Abysses never 
have meaning in themselves but must have meaning given to them. In the play, Cicero 
notes the discrepancy between event and interpretation when he says, “men may construe 
things after their fashion, / Clear from the purpose of the things themselves” (JC 1.3.34-
35). The appearance of ghosts in Shakespeare’s plays prompt a search for meaning in 
events, an insistence on coherence to an unfolding story, where the effects of events have 
clearly locatable causes, where there is a telos ordered according to principles widely 
known and understood. That linearity is challenged to the greatest extent in Hamlet. 
Viewers of the play see that Hamlet’s effort at linearity fails, because doing the bidding 
of ghosts never restores order. What seem like “solutions” to Hamlet always results in 
tragic failure. Efforts to set time or meaning “aright” always fail. This is the lesson of 
tragedy. 
 Hamlet, Brutus, and Caesar display courage in a serious, sometimes melancholy, 
mood, a courage that would affirm an overriding principle of teleological time and 
meaning. That is because ghosts, themselves of such dubious materiality and cause, 
ironically tend to prompt a quest to restore linearity: Hamlet says, “if ever I was born to 
set it right!” Because ghosts represent a linear history (Hamlet’s father, Brutus’s father, 
Posthumous’s father), the courage demands conservative responsibility. To the ghost-
seer, ghosts do not radically disrupt the historical trajectory; rather, they are conservative 
forces of its perpetuation. Ghosts prompt a restoration of a smooth historical horizon, 
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because they seek revenge. They are figures of stature and deference. The ghost is a 
conservative spirit of revenge, to set things “right.” It comes to demand a “solution” to its 
murder. Hamlet is a tragedy from the viewer’s perspective, but Hamlet’s courage, like 
Brutus’s, is not tragic: its morality and its solutions are too easy and clear. To speak 
anachronistically, Hamlet and Brutus pursue what today would qualify as a melodramatic 
quest for meaning and moral order. 
Serious courage within a comic genre: the case of Cade 
 I mentioned above that Shakespeare wears genre loosely. So it is that a character 
who takes his courage very seriously—Jack Cade, from II Henry VI—comes to display 
courage in a serious mood within a comic scene (all within the context of a play 
generically classified as a “history,” to confuse the matter further). Like Brutus, Cade is a 
courageous dissident seeking to overthrow the powers that be. Each man stands by what 
he considers to be right. Further, the universe of both the Roman play and the history play 
assumes a certain justness of ends, and a linearity to history common in tragedy and 
melodrama. Although II Henry VI ends in uncertainty—York’s forces doubt whether they 
can secure their victory against King Henry’s men—there is a Christian assumption of 
stability to the universe. Eleanor’s witchcraft is banished and the peasant rebellion put 
down. Although the battle for the crown rages among the nobility, no completely unjust 
usurpers threaten the state of things. The difference between Brutus and Cade hinges on 
mood (the gallows humor in Cade’s rebellion; the seriousness of Brutus’s) and the 
position from which they lay claim to right. A playful or a serious mood can find its place 
in any genre. We can see once again not only how courage’s commitments change with 
context but also how they change depending on one’s mood. (NB: Although one might 
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argue that “courage” itself might be a mood, I consider it here as more of a character trait. 
One can be courageous with a cheery disposition or, in the context of rebellion as is the 
case here with Cade, with the glum mood of the malcontent.) 
If Brutus exemplifies dissentious action from within the sphere of political power, 
embodying delicate, heroic self-division, Cade displays himself as a vulgar, aggressive 
buffoon. His heroism, when evident, remains vague and undefined. Sometimes Cade 
speaks powerfully outside the sphere of political power, but his mindless bellicosity—
shooting a man dead for addressing him incorrectly—and clownish anti-intellectualism 
place him in the realm of farce. In Michael Kahn’s 1996 adaptation of the Henry VI 
plays, Cade’s men look like a band of misguided thugs (Henry VI 1996). Cade himself 
sports a Mohawk, shouts all his orders, and presents a convincing picture of a man as far 
from introspective self-division as possible. Loud drum-banging and ear-shattering noise 
accompany Cade’s entrances on stage. In sum, Cade exhibits a comic courage in 
unexpected and horrifying lights. Although Cade is a stooge for the Duke of York, he 
nonetheless voices his grievances from a position outside the sphere of political power.58  
 Elizabethan culture had strict rules about the genre of dissent, how rebellions 
would be depicted. There is a class association with genre. The killing of the lower 
classes were represented in a comic mode: “Peasants are a staple of laughter in 
Renaissance art”—not of a leveling laughter but rather of a “laughter that attempts to 
inscribe ineradicable differences” (Greenblatt 1983: 18, 17). Comic violence is funny to 
Renaissance audiences, and, concomitantly, secures status boundaries (Greenblatt 1983: 
                                                
58 Of course, Cade is never really outside the sphere of political power altogether. The only characters who 
exist outside the sphere of power in Shakespeare’s plays would be Timon of Athens, who repairs to a cave 
in the forest to live in solitude (although visitors seek him out there), and Belarius, Guiderius, and 
Arviragus, who live in a cave in the wilds of Wales. But the latter return to the court of Cymbeline in the 
end. 
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19). On the one hand, comedy is the genre in which working class people and servants 
speak. One might view this as symbolically empowering for the lower classes. But, as 
Greenblatt argues, “Shakespeare depicts Cade’s rebellion as a grotesque and sinister 
farce, the archetypal lower class revolt both in its motives and in its ludicrousness” 
(Greenblatt 1983: 23). Shakespeare calls attention to the “comic humbleness of the 
rebels’ social origins” (ibid). Greenblatt calls Cade’s followers—the tanner, the butcher, 
the weaver—“buffoons” (ibid) and judges the lower-class rebels’ representation much 
more harshly than do critics like Annabel Patterson (1989). 
It is hard to take Cade and his followers’ grievances seriously because of the 
macabre jokes and vile humor that color the scenes, almost shading at times into a very 
anti-democratic mode of dark authoritarian comedy (as the genre is framed to the 
audience). By contrast, the tragic genre in which Brutus is placed—in which the Roman 
conspirators are careful to play their part in somber tones and not make themselves 
“common laughters”—ensures his grievances a fairer hearing. The Roman grievances 
seem weightier than Cade’s, essentially because Cade does not articulate them 
consistently. 
 Whereas Brutus works within the genre confines of tragedy (or melodrama), Cade 
is placed (by audiences, by playwright) in the realm of comedy. Although Cade is an 
object of mockery, however, he sees his business as serious and righteous. The difference 
between being captured in a comedic mode against one’s will, as Cade is, and playing to 
the comedic mode purposefully, as Rosalind does in As You Like It, for example, hinges 
on mood. For, like Brutus, Cade has his moral blacks and whites, his good (the “honest 
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plain-dealing man” [II Henry VI 4.2.94])59 and bad (well-spoken nobles), and he is 
willing to give his life in the pursuit of justice. Cade does not seek true reform as Brutus 
does; after all, he knights himself—indicating that he seeks to rule in the fashion of the 
English kings. But Cade is just as brave. While the nobles in this play would claim a 
fearless courage to themselves—the haughty Suffolk says, “True nobility is exempt from 
fear” (2H6 4.2.131) and York says fear is for the lowly (2H6 3.1.335-6)—Cade (as does 
the modest property-owner who kills him) proves that fearlessness is not the sole 
possession of high aristocrats. He affirms even with his dying words—a time in 
Shakespeare where characters confess all truthfully—that he “never feared any” (2H6 
4.9.71). Cade asserts himself in a serious mood within a comedic genre, whereas 
characters like Rosalind in As You Like It, discussed below, act playfully (democratic 
potential lies in the latter—not in Cade’s comic courage). 
 In fact, Cade’s comic courage in a serious mood shares parallels with the 
attributes of tragic courage. Two scenes from II Henry VI recall Julius Caesar. The 
masses under Cade following his orders with a definitive “It shall be done!” (2H6 
4.7.104) echoes Antony’s blind admiration of Caesar: “When Caesar says ‘do this,’ it is 
perform’d” (JC 1.2.12). Obedience takes the same form in Rome as in Elizabethan 
England. Second, Cade’s bias against the clerk for being able to “write and read” (2H6 
4.2.77)60 plays out like the anti-poet wrath against Cinna the poet (confused with Cinna 
                                                
59	  References to II Henry VI are hereafter abbreviated as 2H6.	  
60 We are left to rue the irony in the fact that part of Cade’s platform is anti-education, for Cade would 
benefit from schooling. Cade’s story recalls Renaissance humanist Thomas Wilson’s (2000) argument that 
rhetoric buttresses the social order because reason persuades each man to choose peace over courage, to 
“live in his own vocation” rather than fight for the position of a king. “For what man, I pray you, being 
better able to maintain himself by valiant courage than by living in base subjection, would not rather look 
to rule like a Lord then to live like an underling, if by reason he were not persuaded that it behoveth every 
man to live in his own vocation and not to seek any higher room than whereunto he was at the first 
appointed?” (Wilson 2000: 176). Reason and eloquence persuades each man to be peaceable. But Cade 
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the conspirator) from Julius Caesar. “Tear him for his bad verses”—what the Romans 
say of the pathetically innocent Cinna—recalls Cade’s “Away with him, I say, hang him 
with his pen and inkhorn about his neck” (JC 3.3.29; 2H6 4.2.98-9). Although we laugh 
at Cade, and the genre is comedic, both sequences border on gross terror. 
 As the above should demonstrate, both mood and genre dictate whose grievances 
are considered worthy and whose not.61 When the nobles in II Henry VI voice popular 
grievances (Gloucester, Salisbury), their mood and the overall mood is serious. When 
commoners themselves express their discontent, although their mood is serious (and we 
can acknowledge the injustices they voice as serious), their grievances are translated into 
the stuff of comedy by the genre in which they are placed. Yet there is no substantive 
difference between the physical courage—courage in action—displayed by Cade and that 
displayed by the nobles in the play. If anything, it brings attention to the greater reserves 
of courage that unjust situations demand from marginalized citizens like Cade. The comic 
rebellion scenes in II Henry VI allow us to better observe, by seeing the contrast when we 
place them side-by-side, the serious mood of tragic (or, depending on how it is played, 
melodramatic) courage in Julius Caesar. We see similarly courageous dissidents, and 
similarly unegalitarian situations, met with two very different men in two very different 
genres. We see a man (Cade) who views himself very seriously, as does Brutus, but who 
finds himself judged in a comic light and unable to do anything about it. Brutus holds a 
similar view of himself as Cade, but is in a better social position and is therefore able to 
                                                                                                                                            
chooses courage over rhetoric, the status quo, and peace. Although discredited, Cade exemplifies courage 
taken to comedic, terrifying extremes. 
61 Patterson (1989) calls attention to Shakespeare’s use of “ventriloquism” through which the grievances 
of the peasants are voiced in the play. When Cade voices these concerns, they are “intellectually confused 
and ideologically unstable” (Patterson 1989: 49). But when the Lord Salisbury becomes the people’s 
spokesman, their concerns receive coherent and logical expression. The fact that the peoples’ grievances 
are articulated via ventriloquists does not undercut the significant fact that they are voiced at all. 
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depict his rebellion in more meaningful, recognized terms. We are therefore more likely 
to recognize Brutus as courageous. Courage is more easily distinguished as courage (by 
an audience, by us) when it is portrayed seriously; when its bearers are committed to 
“rightness”; and when they assume resolute bearings. 
Courage functions differently as the generic context changes: courage can support 
inherited privilege and hierarchy (Caesar’s valiant actions as military chief in tragedy), or 
it can bolster attempts to secure meaning in the face of everyday contingency (Brutus or 
Hamlet’s melodramatic questing). Courage also has a third generic face: Courage in a 
comic genre and playful mood can, I argue below, challenge the roles and meanings that 
traditionally anchor subjectivity and order. The most promising kind of courage for 
democratic life is comic courage executed in a mood of playfulness.  
Comic courage in a playful mood 
Nietzsche speaks of a “courage [that] wants to laugh” (Nietzsche 2008: 28).62 
When the solemnity of looking into the abyss grows oppressive, some slough it off with 
                                                
62 The question of Nietzschean laughter has been a topic of much debate. Nietzsche shared the genre bias of 
Renaissance artists in favor of tragedy. He expressed contempt for the New Comedy of Euripides, which 
ushered in the trump of the slave “who has nothing of consequence to answer for, nothing great to strive for, 
and cannot value anything of the past or future higher than the present” (Nietzsche 1967: 78). Detached 
from greatness and moored to the present, the comic counts as less profound than the tragic for Nietzsche. 
Before Euripides, the Greek artist presented a mirror to the Greeks, in which only “grand and bold traits” 
were reflected. With Attic comedy, that mirror “now showed the painful fidelity that conscientiously 
reproduces even the botched outlines of nature” (Nietzsche 1967: 77). Whereas before, pain was 
transmogrified into a glorious heroism of overcoming, now it signifies as human weakness as the tragic 
world view gives way to the slave’s cheerfulness. “This cheerfulness stands opposed to the splendid 
‘naivete’ of the earlier Greeks, which…must be conceived as the blossom of the Apollonian culture 
springing from a dark abyss, as the victory which the Hellenic will, through its mirroring of beauty, obtains 
over suffering and the wisdom of suffering” (Nietzsche 1967: 109). This abyss, for Nietzsche, is 
consciousness of the meaninglessness of existence, of the absence of a god to set things right, the absence 
of cause and effect, or as Norman Mailer puts it, “the intolerable anxiety that death being causeless, life 
was causeless as well” (Mailer 1957: I). 
Critics have delineated two types of laugher in Nietzsche’s work, that of the “height” versus that 
of the “herd,” as John Lippitt terms it (Lippitt 1999). There is a leveling sort of laughter, one that laughs 
with, and then there is one that laughs at others in order to inscribe hierarchical and indelible difference. 
But there is a shift over time in Nietzsche’s representation of laughter, which Mark Weeks identifies. 
Whereas in his early work Nietzsche marginalizes laughter in opposition to the tragic, in The Gay Science 
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laughter. Without imposing on reality a moral system, a reason, or an ideal in relation to 
it, those with comic courage can face reality without such blinders, overcoming fear and 
loathing at existence’s meaninglessness. Those in possession of comedic courage know 
                                                                                                                                            
and Zarathustra, he incorporates laughter into his project of heroic striving (Weeks 2004: 10). Laughter 
becomes a means of education. Zarathustra’s laughter, Weeks argues, is futuristic, elevating, and “a driving 
force of the will” (Weeks 2004: 14). As Nietzsche says in his introduction to The Birth of Tragedy in 1886, 
“you ought to learn to laugh, my young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then perhaps, 
as laughers, you may some day dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil—metaphysics in front” 
(Nietzsche 1967: 26). While “to the devil” a little confusedly presumes the continued existence of a 
metaphysical system, this laughter, instrumental in overcoming other-worldly metaphysical “comforts,” 
like the “naivete” of the Greeks, springs from “a dark abyss.” Overcoming metaphysical comforts requires 
confronting the dark abyss in order to overcome the absurdity of meaninglessness. 
Willing this new kind of laughter overcomes a nausea or absurdity at the abyss of existence when 
we no longer have the old metaphysical comforts of Christianity or other meaning-systems. As Nietzsche 
notes in The Gay Science, art resembles systems like Christianity in that it allows us to avoid nausea and 
suicide in the face of the abyss, i.e., the absurdity of existence, but art has the added attraction of being non-
moral. “As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable to us, and art furnishes us with the eye and 
hand and above all the good conscience to be able to make such a phenomenon of ourselves” (Nietzsche 
2003: 104, emphasis original). Through art, we furnish our existence with meaning. Without either art or 
metaphysics, without imbuing the abyss of being with a meaning, life seems savagely unfair, filled with all 
manner of useless suffering and horror. In a similar passage from The Birth of Tragedy, he calls art “the 
saving sorceress” because “She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or 
absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live: these are the sublime as the artistic taming of 
the horrible, and the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of absurdity” (Nietzsche 1967: 60). 
Throughout Nietzsche’s writings, the comic serves to counterpoint the abyss and suffering. He values this 
existential, artistic courage that overcomes suffering. One of the last comments Zarathustra makes about 
courage compares it to looking into the abyss with pride (Nietzsche 2008: 233). For the overman, the 
higher laughter in the face of the abyss represents this “pride.” 
A courage that wants to laugh, then, is an existential courage, the courage to look into the abyss 
and affirm life’s joys and sorrows, its ecstasies and horrors. This is neither a leveling nor a hierarchy-
affirming laughter. It is, rather, a laughter that meets and then overcomes squeamishness at the abyss’s 
edge—making action possible. Coupled together, the sublime and the comic redeem our suffering. These 
are tools, Nietzsche claims, Socrates did not have, for he failed to find any pleasure in looking into the 
abyss. He saw only “causes without effects and effects seemingly without causes” (Nietzsche 1967: 86). 
Taking refuge in metaphysical systems that designate effects and causes and rely on outworn notions of 
good and evil is not courageous for Nietzsche. To posit God, heaven, or lean on moral meaning is 
cowardice. But in a climate of mass destruction and war, it is all too easy to seek comfort in traditional 
solutions to the riddle of existence: in God, or in manifest destiny, some historical, progressive telos. 
Heidegger tellingly calls this groundless state of being a “lostness” (Heidegger 2008). The courageous 
solution is to embrace this state. 
Comic courage requires the ability to, as Nietzsche writes, “stay cheerful when involved in a 
gloomy and exceedingly responsible business” (Nietzsche 2003: 31). He seeks to preserve gloom within the 
joy of being, often preaching what Michael Tanner calls a “laughing seriousness” (Nietzsche 1992: ix). An 
emancipated spirit “stands in the midst of the universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism, in the faith…that 
in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed” (Nietzsche 1992: 114). We cannot separate the good 
from the bad in order to know for certain what is morally right anymore: Thus, we are bereft of an 
important prerequisite for heroic (Caesar’s) and melancholy (Brutus’s) courage. Although Nietzsche does 
privilege play and the comic in his work sometimes, and despite Derrida’s celebrated affirmation of 
jouissance and “a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance” in his work (Derrida 1991: 76), 
Nietzsche’s laughter is often aristocratic and cruel, and he does not live up to the best version of comic 
courage that I describe here. 
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that there is right and there is wrong, but they also know that deciding which is which is 
not always so easy. I use the following Venn diagram to locate the differences between 
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When I think of a comedic courage exemplified in Shakespeare’s work, what 
springs to mind immediately is Rosalind and Celia’s response to the prospect of exile in 
As You Like It. Usually, being forced into exile foretold a soul-crushing doom. Of course, 
the pastoral genre of AYL accounts somewhat for the diminished dread. One does not 
expect power-grabs, coup d’etats, banishment, and backstabbing to have the devastating 
consequences they carry in a history or tragedy in the bucolic setting of the forest of 
Ardenne, where AYL is laid. But rather than mourn a future fraught with peril, Rosalind 
and Celia express a childish delight at their fate. Their decision to take the fool 
Touchstone along bespeaks their knowledge of the lonely and cheerless life of exile, and 
a desire to have their spirits boasted by a clown. It is Rosalind’s courage in shifting the 
frame that I wish to highlight—a change in perspective that amounts to a change in genre. 
It is Rosalind’s courageous other-directedness that might be useful today, that might help 
renew the spirit of democracy, to diffuse a sense of empowerment to the greatest possible 
number of citizens. 
 First, to be clear: I am not arguing that Shakespeare regards the fantasy world of 
Ardenne as a blueprint for a viable social or political order. Ardenne is a place where 
Rosalind and Celia can explore alternative identities, teach others life-lessons, explore all 
facets of love and friendship without consequence, a place where hierarchies and 
boundaries dissolve. I withhold any arguments regarding Shakespeare’s setting; rather, I 
seek to emphasize Rosalind’s playful courage as a mood and bearing that can be useful 
for a democracy in the 21st century. Although democracy as I envision it rests on fixed, 
albeit vague, fundamental principles such as equality and freedom, democracy is also a 
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system of government that permits and realizes the multivalence of our characters, our 
changeability, the fluidity of our personalities. As I will show, comic courage in a playful 
mood can make government by the people a more enjoyable, inclusive endeavor. 
 Rosalind at first expresses her fear to Celia: “Alas, what danger will it be to us, / 
Maids as we are, to travel forth so far!” (AYL 1.3.102-3). Who knows what danger lurks 
ahead? The best way, they decide, is to play-act. What first provokes unmitigated fear in 
Rosalind soon gives way to an excitement in play-acting, deciding on the props 
involved—“A gallant curtal-axe [sword] upon my thigh, / A boar-spear in my hand…” 
(AYL 1.3.111-112)—the costumes—“poor and mean attire”—the makeup—“with a kind 
of umber smirch my face”—the character names—“look you call me Ganymede.” The 
artistry of playing pretend mitigates their fear of the unknown. Acting for Rosalind, as it 
does for the equally brave Innogen in Cymbeline, carries the double sense of both acting 
in battle and acting in a theater. Imagining her disguise, Rosalind says, “We’ll have a 
swashing and a martial outside, / As many other mannish cowards have / That do outface 
it with their semblances” (AYL 1.3.114-116, my emphasis). Comedic courage is the 
courage of cowards—but of cowards who have wits enough to act brave. Rosalind 
brandishes sword and boar-spear in order to “outface” the world by the mere appearance 
of courage. It turns out that the appearance of courage calls for courage of its own. There 
is a courage in their cheer as they construct their identities, in their excitement in 
answering the question “What will you be called?,” and in following through with their 
plans. This is the courage of play-acting. 
 Moreover, that Celia and Rosalind take a clown along with them on their travels 
demonstrates their desire for power over the affectsphere in which they find themselves 
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(one which would otherwise be one of deep dismay and gloom). Comic courage includes 
the ability to change the mood of a scene, to resist being trapped within a certain mood 
(i.e., the doleful frame of mind that threatens to overtake Rosalind and Celia). If Cade 
was trapped in a comic generic frame by his class position, or if Hamlet feels himself 
trapped within a tragic/moralistic frame by his father’s request, Rosalind refuses to be 
similarly trapped. Change of mood can act as a sort of escape clause from the genre itself, 
if only for a scene or two. This “trapped-ness” is genre-independent: it can happen in any 
generic frame. 
Celia and Rosalind’s disguises and good cheer transform their exile into a 
newfound freedom: “Now go we in content/To liberty and not to banishment.” It is a 
change in perspective that is called for, facing the abyss of banishment with good cheer 
and humor. We see this from the start of the play: Rosalind’s first line is “I show more 
mirth than I am mistress of” (AYL 1.2.2), which shows an outward attempt to change the 
color of the scene, to inject some brightness into both the scene and her outward self. The 
danger of their exile should send bolts of fear through the hearts of maids such as 
themselves. But if they do conceive of the fruits of banishment in these terms—as bitter 
and hard—they know having a clown along could only improve their mood. Perhaps 
taking the clown along demonstrates the extent of their impracticality, or a callous 
disregard for the fool’s life; they certainly do not seem prepared for the starvation that 
awaits, as we are not allowed to forget the dire material constraints they face initially, 
given the number of times characters say some version of “I faint almost to death” (AYL 
2.4.58). Celia, Adam, and Orlando here are on the edge of death. But taking the clown 
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along also shows their aim of making life into a performance on some level.63 
Touchstone the clown is always testing others’ wit—as a “touchstone”—but also drawing 
others into humorous repartee; his humor is a response to a listening to life, a 
responsiveness ideally suited for play-acting as described in chapter one. The clown’s 
humor, then, perhaps makes Rosalind and Celia’s life in the forest into a performance on 
some level meaningful to them. Making their journey performative is a way to give it 
meaning, insofar as performing material requires a self-consciousness about that material. 
Although Rosalind believes in the beneficence of a golden mean between humor and 
seriousness64, she says, “I had rather have a fool to make me merry than experience to 
make me sad” (AYL 4.1.24-25). This is why she and Celia take Touchstone along. If she 
does believe modernity goes for the mean, that it is “modern” to be moderate, Rosalind 
also believes that happiness is better than wallowing in deep contemplation (more 
appropriate to the melancholy mood of tragic or melodramatic courage). Rosalind’s 
courage is democratic because she displays an other-directedness that helps her comrades 
survive their perilous surroundings: She preserves a pleasant, optimistic outlook among 
her fellows, not dragging them down with her innermost sadness or performing the 
maxim “misery loves company,” showing more mirth than she possesses in order to 
distribute the affective wealth she manufactures through the art of acting. 
My argument is not that Rosalind is the most courageous character in this play, 
for that honor might go to another maiden-in-disguise, Celia. It is Celia who gives up 
everything (her father, her fortune, and her position at court—the entire known world), 
                                                
63 In this sense, Touchstone’s fate parallels that of King Lear’s fool, who follows his master into his own 
exile. 
64 “Those that are in extremity of either are abominable fellows, and betray themselves to every modern 
censure worse than drunkards” she says definitively, although perhaps she is just provoking the melancholy 
Jacques to argument (AYL 4.1.5-7). 
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for someone who might not even love her as much; her second line is to her cousin 
Rosalind: “Herein I see thou lovest me not with the full weigh that I love thee” (AYL 
1.2.6). After her father banishes Rosalind, Celia reproaches Rosalind again with, 
“Rosalind, lack’st thou then the love / Which teacheth thee than thou and I am one?” 
(AYL 1.3.90-91). Celia might be the character taking the most risk; her faith in and love 
of Rosalind is absolute. But what makes Rosalind’s courage more noteworthy for my 
purposes is her arch resolve, her leadership ability, and her fearless humor. 
This comic courage of play-acting is also notable in the actor Bottom of A 
Midsummer Night's Dream. When Bottom says to his fellow actors, “We will meet, and 
there we may rehearse most obscenely and courageously” (MND 1.2.87-88), the courage 
he invokes is of a particular kind. It is a courage to act in a way similar to when Falstaff 
plays dead on the battlefield to avoid being killed. Because Shakespeare often deploys 
metaphors of death as the great equalizer, when Falstaff performs as a corpse, he returns 
us to the idea of acting as an equalizing practice. In faking his death, Falstaff soundly 
rejects a tragic model of courage by giving life to Caesar’s line “Cowards die many times 
before their deaths; The valiant never taste of death but once” (JC 2.2.32-33). Caesar 
represents a model of greatness within a tragic universe. Falstaff, instead of subscribing 
to this traditional brand of courage, reasons, “The better part of valour is discretion, in the 
which better part [role] I have saved my life” (I Henry IV 5.4.117-118). This is a courage 
to act in the face of death, the courage—if the occasion calls for it, or if that is the role 
you choose to play—to be a coward. 
Even Brutus’s moves after killing Caesar are colored with a playfulness, when his 
search for meaning turns up empty. First Brutus locates the assassination within the realm 
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of the religious to give it moral moorings: He conceives of himself and the conspirators 
as “sacrificers, but not butchers” (JC 2.1.166). Sacrifice is but a means to a greater end. 
“Sacrificers” flags the ritual or religious aspect of the killing, its higher purpose. The 
death of Caesar will live forever because Romans will keep investing that deed with 
meaning. Ann Molan suggests that by bathing in Caesar’s blood, as Brutus directs the 
conspirators to do, Brutus creates “a sort of bonding…. [I]t seems that for Brutus so long 
as there is some ritual gesture, its meaning can be filled in later” (Molan 1984: 91). This 
postponement of meaning is what I would call playful. The ritual nature of the act itself 
would give it meaning, would inscribe meaning in the meaningless abyss of Caesar’s 
blood, but has no intrinsic significance. It is the drama, the playacting, that gives it 
meaning. As Hampton notes, “the murder of the tyrant in the theater of Pompey is 
revealed by Brutus as the stuff of performance” (Hampton 1990: 227). Cassius says, 
“How many ages hence / Shall this our lofty scene be acted over, / In states unborn and 
accents yet unknown!” (JC 3.1.112-114). Brutus replies, “How many times shall Caesar 
bleed in sport [for entertainment]…” (JC 3.1.115). In a very self-congratulatory manner, 
they are locating themselves theatrically, celebrating their acts as a performance just 
moments later—almost confusing their action and play-action.65 
 In emphasizing acting courageously as a form of courage—this playful element 
including the ability to approach life like a play—I align myself with Arendt’s belief that, 
since motives or intentions or authenticity can never be proven, and political masks can 
never be removed, best to avoid parsing the difference between the real and the apparent, 
                                                
65 Theater and sedition were linked in the popular Elizabethan imagination. In both Julius Caesar and II 
Henry VI, Shakespeare stages a confusion between real life and play-acting that fevered the minds of his 
Elizabethan audiences and made them especially sensitive to depictions of rebellion. Once a crowd 
gathered to see a play, the propertied class feared that conspirators might easily take advantage of the 
crowd to spread discontent (Roberts 1994). 
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between being and doing (Arendt 1990). An act can never tell us anything about the 
intentions of the actor. When we try to search out sincerity, human relations sour. 
Rosalind’s flagrantly fake self-possession, her confidence in approaching the unknown, 
her devil-may-care posturing: this is courage, because, in the public sphere, as Arendt 
says, “being and appearance are indeed one and the same” (Arendt 1990: 98). “In 
politics, more than anywhere else, we have no possibility of distinguishing between being 
and appearance” (ibid.). In the public sphere, we are judged for what we do not for what 
we are. I can be a coward, but I am not judged for being a coward, just as I am not judged 
for being an American. I am not evaluated based on my identity. It is character made 
manifest in action, not what I am before I act—that is what I am judged on. Arendt values 
courageous action as the basis of all politics, and she also values acting itself as 
courageous. Indeed, for her, as for Aristotle, “the theater is the political art par 
excellence” (Arendt 1998: 188). Arendt’s conception of courage is so close to my own 
conception of comic courage because of its glib disregard for authenticity. She seems to 
describe Falstaff perfectly when she writes that a hero “needs no heroic qualities” 
(Arendt 1998: 186), and that the “original courage” of going out and “disclosing and 
exposing one’s self” in public “is not less great and may even be greater if the ‘hero’ 
happens to be a coward” (Arendt 1998: 186-7). 
 Falstaff’s performance as a man who gave his life in battle transvalues courage by 
mocking it in a courageous refusal to submit to the aristocratic terms of the Henriad. 
Falstaff knows how to change the frame of the scene (of life) and laugh in the face of 
death and meaninglessness, celebrating life in all its infinite variety. On the battlefield at 
Screwsbury fighting the rebel forces, Falstaff offers Prince Harry what he says is his 
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pistol with, “There’s that will sack a city” (I Henry IV 5.3.53). When Harry finds a bottle 
of sack (dry white wine) instead, he says, “What, is it time to jest and dally now?” (ibid., 
54) and leaves, appalled. This line recalls Brutus’s line to Cassius, speaking of the brash 
poet who inconveniently interrupts their meeting: “I’ll know his humor when he knows 
his time. / What should the wars do with these jigging fools?” (JC 4.2.188-9). Both 
Brutus and Prince Harry treat wars as solemn occasions to prove one’s honor, a serious 
manly pursuit. Falstaff does not divide humor and war so. C.L. Barber argues that the 
prince’s sense of timing “contributes to establishing the prince as a sovereign nature” 
(Barber 1990: 196). The prince lives in the historical time of mono-tragedy, where 
greatness is static. One is deemed honorable by one’s performance in battle, and comedy 
can tarnish one’s reputation. Falstaff, by contrast, possesses what Barber calls “the power 
of humorous redefinition”—the power to change the mood of the scene, from serious to 
playful (Barber 1990: 198). Falstaff redefines the terms of battle. This is why he fakes 
being dead in battle to survive. His is a form of courage that clings to equality in death 
rather than hierarchy in life. He does not want honor on the terms that the aristocrats set. 
Falstaff reasons, “Can honour set-to [mend] a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the 
grief of a wound?” (I Henry IV 5.1.130-132). If the tragic reveres the sacred, the linear, 
the static, the paternal, the comic by contrast offers us jokes instead of meaning, 
empowerment among a group (Falstaff and his buddies, or Rosalind, Celia, and the 
clown, e.g.) instead of solitary privilege (Prince Hal), friends instead of fathers, life 
instead of meaningless abyss, the emotionally playful instead of the aristocratically dour. 
 Even Othello has a moment of jocund courage in the face of death that establishes 
a sense of comradery among Venetian citizens. When confronted with an angry lynch 
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mob on his wedding night, led by his newly wed bride’s father, he calmly jokes, “Keep 
up [put away] your swords, for the dew will rust ’em” (Othello 1.2.60). Similarly, when 
called before the Venetian duke and senators, after he stakes his life on Desdemona’s 
good word, he then proceeds to make them laugh. William Marshall, a talented character 
actor, emphasizes Othello’s good humor that night in his portrayal (Othello 1981). What 
begins as a confrontation with an angry, hostile, and worried group of nobles, thanks to 
the mood of Othello’s speech, ends in jest. In Othello’s case, as in Rosalind’s, we see a 
comic courage used by an actor in a playful mood to empower himself and bring himself 
closer to others (his bride, his comrades). Comic, playful courage creates assemblages of 
persons and welcoming affects; it brings people together similar to how acting in a play 
with a cast brings together the ensemble. This is a wholeness rather than a oneness that 
tragedy or melodrama seeks. Wholeness would allow us to embrace the tension between 
our individual and collective selves, acknowledging the linked fates of us all (e.g., the 
Venetian rulers acknowledging Othello’s humanity, his likeness to themselves and his 
role in protecting their welfare; or Touchtone’s role in protecting Celia and Rosalind’s 
good mood). Oneness, by contrast, does not imply such multiplicity.66 Setting things 
“right,” restoring order, establishes a rule of singularity and patrilineage. Comic courage 
ends in togetherness, wholeness. 
 Again, to emphasize, Othello wins over the senators not solely with his tale, but 
with the mood of that tale, with what might be his acting skills (is it possible he takes his 
life in such urbane stride and fails to fear at all when faced with the angry mob?), with 
the humor and lightness in his bearing. W. H. Auden has argued that the mood of charity 
                                                
66 I borrow this distinction from the work of Danielle Allen (2004) and George Shulman (2008). “The 
effort to make the people ‘one’ cultivates in the citizenry a desire for homogeneity, for that is the aspiration 
taught to citizens by the meaning of the word ‘one,’ itself” (Allen 2004: 17). 
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is comedic and the mood of justice is solemn and serious (Auden 1968).67 Certainly this 
holds true for courage: comic courage is more charitable for bringing various postures 
and characters together, for sliding between moods, for extending our repertoire of 
actions.  
 To get further at the flexibility—a flexibility that opens out onto a vast panorama 
of gestures, languages, desires—within comic courage, consider again Rosalind. She 
displays an ability to playfully and courageously take up the actorly challenge of 
accepting the divers, sometimes potentially conflicting dimensions of one’s personhood 
(loyal subject and daughter of an accused traitor)—that is, to actively embrace the de-
centering fissures within subjectivity—in order to empower herself and her friends as 
more than meek subjects of Duke Frederick. The second line she utters attests to her 
ability to empathize to the point of self-forgetting: “I will forget the condition of my 
estate to rejoice in yours,” she tells Celia (AYL 1.2.12). She then proposes to take up the 
position of clown and “devise sports” (ibid. 20). To play the fool would by necessity 
draw out various states, contemplative and amusing: as Jaques will wonder concerning 
Touchstone: “That fools should be so deep [profoundly]-contemplative” (AYL 2.7.31), 
that they can have such insight and yet be so playful. The strange combinations and 
admixtures of genre in Shakespeare find their counterpart in the blending of moods. 
Rosalind and Touchstone’s shared empathetic understanding surfaces later as they 
witness Silvius’s lovesickness: “Alas, poor shepherd, searching of thy wound, I have by 
hard adventure found mine own” (AYL 2.4.40); Touchstone immediately follows this 
with: “And I mine.” It is in seeing the other that Rosalind comes to a self-knowledge. 
                                                
67 For a contrasting case with a contrasting result, which proves Auden’s point all the more, consider 
Isabella’s failure to persuade Angelo to pardon her brother in Measure for Measure. Isabelle dooms her 
cause due to her grave demeanor, which sets a tone of justice rather than charity.	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But, like the fool, this self-understanding does not lead to plaintive brooding; comic 
courage is not about the gloomy oppression of pain or ghosts or self-examination but 
rather is about rupture, change, shifts. Both Rosalind and Touchstone are adept at mood-
switching; because of this, they do not find themselves trapped in a genre (in their case, 
they might find themselves trapped in tragedy) as does Cade. 
 The evil Duke describes Rosalind, after her banishes her, as “too subtle…and her 
smoothness, / Her very silence, and her patience / Speak to the people” (AYL 1.3.71-73). 
Paradoxically, when her silence speaks, she moves the people. In another paradoxical 
sense, Rosalind, the daughter of the banished duke, enters the public sphere the moment 
she is exiled. In recognizing her as a proper political subject (which she was not, of 
course, being a woman), but in recognizing her as a political subject in the sense that she 
is a person capable of treason against the ruler, the Duke marks her entrance into the 
public sphere (before she was only his niece, a familial relationship) even as he 
immediately attempts to distance her from it through exile. Tellingly, the Duke does not 
recognize speech, anything resembling an Aristotelian logos, coming from her mouth. 
Silence cannot be heard as logical argument. Silence does not invite engagement in 
rational deliberation among political subjects. Even as it disqualifies her from political 
debate, it highlights her prominent role in it.68 When she marks her status as a political 
subject of the Duke, after he accuses her of treason, she does so oddly, saying: “If with 
myself I hold intelligence, / Or have acquaintance with mine own desires,” then I haven’t 
offended you (AYL 1.3.41-42). Although she says this to protest her innocence, she raises 
                                                
68 See Ranciere 1999: 36. The fracture within identity that Ranciere prizes as “politics” happens due to a 
presupposition of equality. Equality allows subjects traditionally viewed as without logos to “measure the 
gap” between “their condition as animals endowed with a voice and the violent encounter with the equality 
of the logos” (Ranciere 1999: 37). Rosalind, paradoxically with her silence, challenges the Duke’s 
treachery, making him aware of her status as an “animal endowed with a voice.” 
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the question of self-knowledge. Do we communicate our own desires to ourselves in a 
transparent way? Could Rosalind be a traitor and not know it? This issue is never taken 
up; the Duke assumes the answer is “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second, and 
these lines may have added some comic relief to a sad scene, but all the better for my 
point. Rosalind remains courageous and steadfast in forwarding her emotionally 
compelling case in the face of the Duke’s decree, but she does not do so without a playful 
flexibility of character, without a self-questioning that today might serve a democratic 
repertoire. This is her battleground, as here she registers the difference between the 
aristocratic, paranoid assumptions of a man in power and the innocence of her own quiet 
subjectivity; between the fragile self-as-subject, loyal to her uncle, and the strong self-as-
daughter, loyal to her father—this is a political subject’s (public) war waged on the 
grounds of a private chamber within the duke’s castle. 
Just as Rosalind seeks to keep the tension alive between subjectivities, it is her 
comic courage in playfully performing the multiple aspects of her subjectivity that causes 
her to undertake a further disguise: as she tells Celia regarding Orlando, “I will speak to 
him like a saucy lackey, and under that habit play the knave with him” (AYL 3.2.270). 
Just as she does not evade the double-bodied nature of her subjectivity (i.e., the fact that 
she is both niece and political subject to the duke), she embraces new identities—not to 
dialectically resolve them, but rather to keep them in play. This is what acting teaches 
one: to get in touch with the various aspects of one’s identity, the various shades of 
personality. It is due to her special vantage on subjects’ changeableness, and her 
understanding that we all play different roles, that there are multiple subjects within one, 
that she can cheer herself up: just because a person is unhappy today does not mean they 
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cannot be happy tomorrow. To embrace more than one identity is the main part of 
adopting the comic courage of play-acting and mood-switching. Acknowledging the 
multifaceted shades of our identities is also requisite of democratic actors today.  
 In banishing Rosalind so heartlessly, the Duke fails to acknowledge his twin roles 
as both uncle and ruler. His motives are purely political, not grounded in natural family 
ties. Denying the different dimensions of one’s identity—claiming the political over the 
familial, or vice versa—exacts a heavy cost. The consequences of such a denial are 
especially prominent in Shakespeare history plays that chronicle the War of the Roses, 
where families are divided in having to choose which familial relationships to privilege. 
For it is between separate poles of being—uncle/ruler, daughter/subject, political/private, 
etc—that agency hangs suspended. Our world consists of relationships: the relatively of 
worlds between the Duke Senior’s reign and Duke Frederick’s; relatively of point of 
views between characters; relationships between daughter, father, cousin and uncle, 
between duke and subject—and relationships within a subject, the fracture lines or 
fissures within identity that open up new spaces for agency. These incongruencies of 
worlds manifest themselves in the burdens and joys of living in exile, making a new 
world in relation to the old, starting anew in an improvised space. Rosalind plays pretend 
and in the process, if only fleetingly, shakes up the order of things. Only the possessor of 
comic courage—with her multiple perspectives on self and society, with her blatant 
exposure and acceptance of the fissures of identity—can actively embrace potentially 
tragic events playfully. 
Rosalind is exemplary of the ability to change the mood of the scene. She both 
acts and directs. Just as Rosalind tells Celia how the two will dress for their foray into the 
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forest, she is both actor and director vis-à-vis Orlando. She makes Orlando act a part he 
already is: a lover to Rosalind. “Come,” she tells him, “woo me, woo me” (AYL 4.1.59). 
She goes on to critique him, to undergo a fake marriage ceremony with him, and to kid 
him. She is perhaps the most talented manipulator of mood in all of Shakespeare. 
 The Shakespearean characters with comic courage, while not democratic, set as 
they are against a background of aristocratic absolutism, nonetheless trigger nascent 
democratic assemblages in these communities. The democratic can open out to 
encompass the whole, distinct and varied bodies and affects and disguises—facilitated by 
a playful mood. Othello putting the nobles at ease with his good cheer, acting like a 
happy bridegroom; Rosalind disguising herself and bringing a clown; Falstaff making his 
own, anti-aristocratic untimeliness and playing dead. In each of these situations, 
characters adopt ways of being at odds with their normal ways of being, sometimes at 
odds with their noble or otherwise privileged selves. They bring comedy to weighty 
situations, possessing “the power of redefinition” (Barber 1990: 198). They courageously 
resist authority, a resistance that stems from breaking free from any one identity category. 
They are actorly. As Barber notes of Falstaff, “It is the essence of his character, and his 
role, in Part One, that he never comes to rest where we can see him for what he ‘is.’ He 
is always in motion, always adopting postures, assuming characters” (ibid.). Rosalind and 
Othello perform a multiplicity within subjectivity itself: Othello, a warrior hero useful to 
Venice, seeks to be also a romantic lover; Rosalind, a cast-out maid in tragic exile, seeks 
to be also a swashbuckling man. All these characters not only defy their context, but they 
change what could easily be tragic scenes into comedic ones. 
Comic courage today 
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 What is the contemporary purchase of comic courage? Can we find any more 
recent, democratic characters who model the same reaction to exile as Rosalind’s in As 
You Like It? I now turn to examine comic courage on the part of women and men in 
recent film. Similar to Rosalind retreat into play-acting, Madelyn (Marcia Gay Harden) in 
If I Were You (2012) plays the title role in King Lear as a way to recover from learning of 
her husband's affair. In despair—"I'll die alone," she says—she turns to acting. Acting 
permits her to vent her emotions, and playing the male lead becomes a form of 
compensation for the powerlessness and hurt she feels over her husband's cheating. As it 
is for Rosalind, acting is a way to take back control in a situation meant to deprive one of 
it. Her comic courage extends her possible repertoire of actions, allows her to slide 
between moods and go beyond a fixed sense of the occasion. She becomes best friends 
with her husband’s mistress, creating camaraderie where there may have been rivalrous 
enmity. Madelyn changes the mood. 
 Even more courageous than Madelyn (who does not play Lear in drag), however, 
is Victor/Victoria Grant (Julie Andrews) in Victor/Victoria (1982). Before deciding to 
don drag, Victoria laments the cramping limitations of womanhood in the song “If I Were 
A Man.” She catalogues the dreams she could fulfil, the adventurous longings she could 
satisfy: “I'd explore ev'ry far off land, / And I would learn how to fly!” Dressing up as 
another sex, however, does not often involve escapism for these women. For Rosalind 
and for Victoria, it is necessary for survival. For Victoria too, career ambition provides 
another motivating factor. 
 If women who dress as men might seek a measure of control not allowed them as 
women, when men dress as women in comedies, it is usually to escape some immanent 
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peril, as in Some Like It Hot (1959) or Just One Of The Girls (1993). There is always a 
courageous component to drag, even when it does not readily appear so. Men who dress 
in drag in Some Like It Hot and Just One Of The Girls seek to evade bullies or mafia dons. 
As if to compensate for the effeminization of not confronting the danger, to prove 
manliness, the men usually fall in love and find their disguise allows them to establish a 
position of trust with their love interest. Although there seems to be a considerable 
element of danger for a woman to become a man, given their physical weakness vis-à-vis 
men, what is often overlooked is the danger to men under similar circumstances. 
 In Just One Of The Girls, Chris Calder (Corey Haim) turns to drag to escape 
bullies. His father advocates the knee-jerk masculinist approach: “The best way to get rid 
of a bully is to stand up and fight him. Even if you lose, he’ll respect you and leave you 
alone.”69 His father even teaches him some boxing moves. When his father learns that his 
son has pursued an alternative strategy (drag), he says to him, “my son is a coward.” But 
cowardice is not so easily pitted against the courage of bullies. The film shows (in slow-
motion detail) Chris’s advance up the stairway as he brushes past his tormentors for the 
first time in drag. The courage called for in this performance should not be 
underestimated. It is a courage different in kind if not in degree from the courage of 
manly battle. At the end of the film, Chris must defy his father and dress in drag once 
more and confess his disguise before the school in order to stay in his prestigious music 
program. His musical ambitions trump his father’s warning to refrain from cross-
dressing. Perhaps it is not mere coincidence that the films mentioned in this section 
involve actors or performers. The element of play in comic courage is important. Comic 
                                                
69 The rather masculine female gym instructor advises a similar tack: “You put a lot of energy into hiding 
from your battles. Why don’t you put some into facing them?” This is a similar misrecognition of comic 
courage as different from “hiding.” Dressing as a girl takes a courage of its own. Acting is a battle. 
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courage is the courage of cowards who act brave. To pretend is courageous, especially 
when you seek to conceal an inward cowardice. 
 Perhaps no story exemplifies what can be the ultimate futility of comic courage 
and proves its status as courage proper more than Life Is Beautiful (1997). I have no 
desire to rank order the varieties of courage (my argument is not that comic courage is 
more or less courageous than tragic or melodramatic courage); but to act with comic 
courage in the face of immeasurable tragedy certainly requires something rare, something 
akin to an implacable inner strength. The ability of Guido Orefice (Roberto Benigni), the 
lead character in this film, to improvise an elaborate fiction in a Nazi concentration camp, 
to fabricate a fantasy world in the midst of very real terror, to fight the mood of fascism 
with Chaplinesque humor, all for the benefit of his son, would certainly qualify as that 
something rare. Guido, a buffoon like Falstaff, is “always in motion, always adopting 
postures, assuming characters,” clowning about (Barber 1990: 198). Guido does such a 
convincing job in hiding the facts of their imprisonment from his son, that despite the 
suffering and sickness surrounding them at the camp, his son believes it is all a game. In 
acting courageously, despite whatever inner fear he may have, Guido recovers humor and 
hope from a tragic situation. His nimble wit, colorful dynamism, and flexibility of 
character perhaps mask profound inner distress. I say this film demonstrates the final 
futility of comic courage because Guido’s imagination and comic courage do not save 
him in the end. But his brand of courage certainly has a place of value in certain 
situations. Tragic, masculinist courage is not outmoded—we certainly need serious 
models of courageous behavior to fight terrorists, just as we needed it to fight Nazis. But 
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fighting for the more inclusive, better world that democracy offers, where everyone’s 
voice counts, sometimes calls for a variety of tools. 
Conclusion: comic playfulness and democratic possibility 
 Being a victim to the genre in which you find yourself, imposed on you from 
above, as the comic genre was upon Cade, is inimical to the democratic temperament, 
which deploys playfulness as a means of freedom. Caught in tragic scenes, for example, 
the ability to laugh at the situation is salutary. As Nietzsche writes about the invention of 
laughter in The Will To Power: “in order to endure this type of extreme pessimism...I had 
to invent a counterpart for myself. Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: he alone 
suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter” (Nietzsche 1968: 56). Rosalind, Falstaff, 
and Guido: whether in low comedy, high tragedy, or middle history, they can be playful. 
Taking oneself and the situation too seriously would mean giving into the imposed genre, 
passively accepting the context one has been dealt, hanging up one’s virtu in the face of 
fortuna. In the way of the actor who can shed and adopt various roles with courage and 
aplomb, being playful allows one to act. As noted above, how characters see themselves 
and their world and how audiences see them often diverge, and audiences have 
prerogatives that scripted characters do not. But democratic actors today, as audience to 
Shakespeare’s plays, can learn from his characters. If ghost-seeing is a paralyzing 
moment of looking into the abyss, enough to “unman” even the bravest of our aristocratic 
male heroes, comic courage bespeaks a celebratory moment of change and 
prospectiveness, a turning towards the future. 
 Comic courage today might also entail what social theorists like George Lakoff 
call changing the rhetorical frame (Lakoff 2004). (Of course, I have been calling for more 
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than a change in speech only, since I have offered as exemplars comic characters who act 
differently as well as speak differently; but speech and action work in tandem, naturally.) 
For example, using the term “exploring for energy” rather than “drilling for oil,” “tax 
relief” rather than “tax responsibilities.” A person with comic courage might rip the veil 
off euphemisms that disguise inequality or injustice. Rather than positing one frame as 
“correct,” one plays with various frames to show the shifting surface languages that 
attempt to describe reality. As opposed to tragic and melodramatic courage, which is 
about justice and setting things “right,” comic courage experiments with various frames 
and realities. One stands not on principle or right—only on experiment and adventure. 
One’s convictions change as the circumstances change. If tragic courage is about the 
devastating reality of seeing your own complicity in evil, then comic courage denotes 
what happens afterwards. We act out roles, trigger new assemblages of meaning, of 
character, of political events, of ethics, playfully, forming new groups of friends, clusters 
of affects, taking different shapes, become something new, like a pile of old costumes 
discarded in a backstage trunk, accomplices, co-creators, sometimes in the face of death, 
sometimes in the interest of an amorphous concept called democracy. 
 Moreover, perhaps the courage displayed in the comic genre, most often cast 
within a playful mood, allows us to go even further, beyond subjective moods and 
interpersonal affectspheres, to dramatize democracy itself, to reckon with its many 
guises. There is no one, universally agreed-upon definition of all that democracy can 
encompass, and rightly so. Being playful about politics is not a luxury: it becomes an 
imperative when the alternative is opting out or giving in to anger or resentment, getting 
sour about gridlock and partisanship or nurturing nostalgia for the good old days. It is not 
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humor that prevents things from being done; on the contrary, a spontaneous comic 
playfulness can grease the wheels of change. Beyond being completely right or 
completely wrong in the moralistic way of melodramatic courage, with only a moderate 
certainty and a generous modesty, comic courage can infuse the political process with a 
rich vitality, can keep politics from becoming too zero-sum, and can condition our 
thought and ways of being with a flexibility worthy of the highest caliber of democratic 
citizen. Melodrama does not give our politics the dynamism a healthy democratic polity 
requires; we cannot judge with a complex and subtle discrimination between candidates 
for office, for example, as melodrama remains more likely to present one-dimensional 
characters personifying good or evil (as in Welles’ production of Julius Caesar where 
Brutus = good, Caesar = bad). If a tragic frame, with its meaning-making, its rigid 
linearity, hierarchy and order, can direct or orient us in disciplinary ways, towards 
unquestioned social ideals, in the world of comic playfulness, we can be skeptics but not 
melancholic ones. The best place to be is moving, acting, where all manner of activity 
unfolds prismatically, not with the grand scope of the tragic but in pursuit of the 
domestic, the local, the minor. Hold unquestioned dogmas to scrutiny, reshape and widen 
the terms of political debate, develop new tools for analysis—to do these things at all 
requires courage, but to do them in a playful manner adds immeasurably not only to the 




Dissatisfied With The Now: Optimism And Equality Amid Villains 
 
“We are disoriented by the literal loss of trajectory following the collapse of historical metanarratives in a 
present that appears fraught with injustice and misery and not only apocalyptic danger. It has become 
commonplace to describe our time as pounded by undemocratic historical forces yet lacking a forward 
movement. This makes the weight of the present very heavy: all mass, no velocity.” 
—Wendy Brown, “Untimeliness and Punctuality: Critical Theory in Dark Times”70 
 
“The weight of this sad time we must obey, / Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say.” 
—King Lear71 
 
Introduction: Richard versus Lear 
 
 At the opening of Richard III, the star player complains that “discontent” has 
turned to gregarious revelry, and that he is never in the mood for such frivolity. Peaceful 
time-wasting distends ordinary time in ways that make it a bore for our eponymous hero, 
who thrills to the rhythms of his own fantasies of crown-capture through intrigue and 
battle. “Now is the winter of discontent / Made glorious summer,” he moans, maybe rolls 
his eyes (Richard III 1.1.1-2).72 We start with this “now” as he constitutes us, the 
audience, as his accomplices, sharing his plot to undo the trust between his brothers to 
ease his way to kinghood. This plotting quickens his pulse so much he must steady 
himself: “But yet I run before my horse to market” (R3 1.1.160). His optimism is a force 
that energizes the present, that keeps the present open to change and newness. 
 King Lear is another play that starts in a peaceful yet heightened mood of 
expectation, and, early on, builds climactically into high-stakes crisis in an airless and 
desolate atmosphere. King Lear attempts to fix the future in this “now,” giving away his 
kingdom “that future strife / May be prevented now” (Lr. 1.1.42-3). To his oldest 
daughter Goneril, he says, “To thine and Albany's issue / Be this perpetual” (Lr. 1.1.64-
65); “To thee and thine hereditary ever / Remain this ample third,” he says to his middle 
                                                
70 Brown 2005: 10, original emphasis. 
71 5.3.342-3. 
72 References to Richard III are hereafter abbreviated as R3.	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child Regan (Lr. 1.1.78-79). He mistakenly envisions his authority holding force after his 
reign ends and his lineage extending into eternity. He lacks the temporal control he would 
like to possess, as the “now” quickly slips away from him. Compounding the problem, he 
lacks Richard’s optimism. 
 Another salient difference between these two is that Richard would appear to be a 
villain and Lear would appear to be a hero. This chapter stands up for villains as 
optimistic killjoys whose proto-democratic energies drive them forward to challenge the 
unfairness they see around them. My first chapter considered theatrical acting as a 
performative model for political action, my second chapter examined comic courage as a 
character trait within a democratic sensibility, and now this chapter explores optimism as 
a mood, in light of the current heightened academic interest in affect and the emotions. 
The characters highlighted in this chapter generate moods at odds with the prevailing 
ambience of the play, prevailing moods of complacency and normative languor. Richard 
in Richard III and the villains in King Lear advance towards—without ever fully 
achieving or sustaining—a revolutionary mood that is both sensitive to forms of social 
oppression that estrange them from the present and that bind them to a future fantasy of 
the good life of equality and respect, with their previous subjugators punished. As both 
Richard III and King Lear are tragedies, this mood is what I will call a “tragic 
optimism.”73 
 I consider this chapter complementary to empirical studies of optimism over the 
past ten years. Optimism makes people happier, lengthens their lives, and lowers their 
cortisol levels. Optimists feel more satisfied in their jobs (studies cited in Cassity). Over 
                                                
73 I am referring to the quarto title page, as the First Folio classifies Richard III with Shakespeare’s history 
plays. In this I follow Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin who note, “In Shakespeare’s time, the story of 
Richard III was repeatedly identified as tragic” (Howard and Rackin 1997: 100). 
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80 studies find optimism to greatly improve physical health (Holloway 2016). Optimism 
leads to better psychological well-being as well, reduces hypertension and cardiovascular 
disease, and allows one to better cope with stress (Mayo Clinic Staff 2016). Optimism is 
also the most significant predictor of resilience, people's ability to recover from adverse 
situations (studies cited in Smith 2013). Indeed, researchers credit the mutual care and 
optimism of the group of prisoners in the “Hanoi Hilton” prisoner-of-war camp in North 
Vietnam with the low rates of PTSD that developed among the American servicemen 
released (4 percent, compared to PTSD rates of 85 percent by Americans held in 
Japanese camps during World War II; Morris 2015: 49). 
 Different but related to recent theoretical accounts of optimism as a structural 
force or relation that helps maintain hierarchies of domination and rigidified patterns of 
social injustice (Berlant 2011; Ahmed 2010), I look at optimism as a mood that can be 
fostered by a set of practices that might also affect that social order, one’s (affective) 
relationship to that order. I credit optimism as a good tool to have in one’s armory against 
anti-democratic forces, a much-needed mood that can foster better democrats. One might 
wonder that I am holding up a king (Richard) and other aristocrats (the villains in King 
Lear) as exemplary of a democratic mood. But I emphasize that these characters are 
villains first, villains dissatisfied with a structural order that fails to recognize their 
fundamental worthiness as human beings, their fundamental equality, and aristocrats or 
kings second. They are outsiders who follow a set of theatricalized techniques to generate 
appropriate moods for the occasion. For example, Richard’s talents as a showman are 
obvious, especially as Richard describes himself with the same language used to describe 
actors (III Henry VI 3.2.182-93). In occupying the marginal space on the stage called the 
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platea, shared by “clowns, outsiders, or deceptive villains,” Richard III and Edmund 
perhaps also shade between all three figures (Gurr 2012: 12). Authority figures like kings 
and fathers stand center stage while comedians and villains occupy the margins. 
Shakespeare’s villains demonstrate the uses of optimism to challenge inequality. 
As this dissertation is concerned with bringing to attention the ways in which 
Shakespeare’s theater gives us access to experiences that could allow us to imagine 
democratic practices or techniques of the self, I should make clear the element of 
democracy that I most wish to draw out, as democracy is a constellation of (contested) 
concepts. The main concept, the primary value within the multivalent “democracy,” to 
which I give priority is equality. 
 Richard III and King Lear give us initial settings that constrain the play’s villains 
within inegalitarian institutions and social structures. The villains are ignored, 
demonized, or at least demoralized before they have a chance to thrive within the 
normative institutions (rigidly hierarchical) and settings (peacetime) and moods 
(amusement) they come to hate. The existing order does not recognize them as fully 
human—Richard for his deformity; Edmund for his illegitimacy. True, these villains 
desire to rank above others, never dislodging the hierarchical ideal in place in monarchy. 
They are aristocrats at the top of an aristocratic order—Richard even eventually ascends 
to the top of that order by becoming king. It may seem as if they have an enormous 
power and freedom that the majority of Americans lack. I would argue, however, that the 
structural constraints that hem them in, the injurious attachments cemented through their 
dreams of being recognized by their fellow men, the sustaining relations that seem so 
cruel and unjust to them, the system that keeps them in a position of inferiority, the 
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conditions of life that might just as easily wear them out, similarly place them in a 
situation akin in degree if not in kind with the limited options for upward mobility 
available to a majority of Americans. I argue that their optimistic mood helps them 
achieve the mobility they so ardently desire and will do anything to attain. They are 
initially motivated by the lack of being afforded basic rights of equal consideration with 
others they consider their equals. What motivates them is their unique brand of optimism. 
This is not the optimism of the naif, the cockeyed, impractical sort. It is an optimism 
borne of the terrors of struggle for right. I am not advocating villainy as an appropriate 
route to higher social status, but I do think that, for one, villainy is a matter of 
perspective, and two, there is something to learn from Shakespeare’s optimistic villains. 
 Recent critiques of optimism expose the trap of pinning one’s hopes on a future 
time that may never materialize, or, if it does materialize, is bound to be disappointing. It 
is hard to actualize our desires, as all objects of our desire are just “rest stops amid the 
process of remaining unsatisfied” (Berlant 2011: 42). This chapter addresses those 
critiques before answering them with close analyses of the moods displayed and put into 
circulation by Richard III, Edmund, Goneril and Regan (in Shakespeare’s plays and in 
American adaptions)—all morally unredeemable villains who, I argue, nonetheless show 
us what a tragic optimism has to offer, one unattached to a moralism. I now first examine 
optimism as it is conceived by Lauren Berlant (2011), Sara Ahmed (2010), and Joshua 
Dienstag (2006). Then I will respond to these scholars critically in order to defend 
optimism. In doing so, I turn to Shakespeare’s optimistic villains to demonstrate the 
motivational force of optimism, these villains’ challenges to the normative, their 
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alternative paths forward, their vibrant imaginations and theatricality, their refusal to be 
oppressed, and their ability to thrive in a world of upheaval and change. 
Literature Review: Recent Critiques of Optimism 
 One might object that Berlant’s work Cruel Optimism addresses specifically late 
capitalist societies amid a crisis-ridden neoliberal transition. Berlant’s argument is 
pitched so firmly in the present scenario of global capitalism and the neoliberal 
restructuring of the US and Western Europe over the last 30 years that it may seem 
foolish to answer its claims with Shakespearean characters anchored in an alien historical 
space. Her diagnosis of our present seems so hopeless in part because of capitalism’s 
“refusal of futurity” (Berlant 2011: 189)—similar to Brown’s insight into the loss of 
forward movement in my epigraph. Capitalism in the present is a place of risk, threat, and 
ongoing anxiety (Berlant 2011: 203). 
 But insofar as all optimism must exist alongside “the structural cruelty of risk, 
exposure,” misrecognition, lack of reciprocity, and contingency, Berlant’s is not only an 
historical but also an existential problem (Berlant 2011: 267). Capitalism accentuates 
these problems, mobilizes them in unparalleled ways, but Richard III and King Lear are 
also places of enormous instability. Some 20th century American versions of these plays 
have emphasized that—like the 2012 Brooklyn Academy of Music production of Richard 
III that used a raked stage, a stage set at an angle, putting every actor in a place of 
imbalance, thrust forward or sideways, so that Richard, in his warped posture, is the only 
actor onstage in balance. Additionally, Jane Smiley’s retelling of King Lear set on an 
Iowan farm in the 1980s reveals a forward-looking attachment to the capitalist dream of 
more land and its devastating effects. In reclaiming these stories for America, these 
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authors and producers allow us to consider Shakespeare alongside critiques of optimism 
situated at our present historical juncture. 
 Further, Marxist and humanist Shakespeare scholars view Lear as poised in the 
historical transition between feudalism and capitalism (Aers and Kress 1981; Turner 
1988). What Victor Kiernan describes as “the tormented process of social change, the 
whirlpool at the conflux of two eras, and the impossibility of any smooth, easy 
progression from one to another” might just as well describe the transition Berlant 
describes between a post-WWII liberalism and the neoliberalism of today (Kiernan 1996: 
108). Walter Cohen, in his reading of the play, even goes so far as to suggest that we can 
catch sight of sentiments eventually to be shared by the Levellers and Diggers, proto-
democratic social movements for equality (Cohen 1985). Annabel Patterson (1989) finds 
evidence of Shakespeare’s egalitarian leanings.74 Although I will not weigh in on this 
question, my point is that our post-Fordist moment should not be taken as incomparable. 
 Now I will review Berlant’s critique in order to better grasp the problem with 
optimism as seen by contemporary theorists. Her book Cruel Optimism considers how 
optimism manifests in attachments, the structural relationship between objects and the 
subjects who desire them. This she separates from the feelings of optimism itself. 
Optimism can feel like anxiety, hunger, fear, cheerfulness, anger, etc (Berlant 2011: 81). 
And indeed it does for Shakespeare’s villains, who envision objects that would make life 
better: being equal to one’s brother or winning his land (Edmund); securing the crown 
(Richard, the Macbeths, Cladius); a life of beauty (Iago); a pound of flesh (Skylock); 
                                                
74 (Of course, it is also possible to place Lear on the side of the feudal status quo.) I am indebted to 
Kiernan Ryan’s enlightening conspectus of the critical literature on Lear between 1980 and 2000 (Ryan 
2002). 
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having one’s honor and one’s eldest son (Tamora). Although it can feel like anything, 
optimistic attachment makes life bearable. 
 Such optimism is cruel when the object of desire threatens subjects’ well-being. 
The desire for the object gives the subject a purpose to life. People become so tethered to 
certain objects that “object loss entails loss of world” (Berlant 2011: 16)—consider 
Richard’s last plea, “My kingdom for a horse!” (R3 5.7.13) (This may be read as a 
heartsick statement that he’s lost his kingdom for want of a horse to fight on, but it can 
also mean, if he is so at the height of his despair that he’ll say anything, that he will give 
you his kingdom for a horse—that’s how much I want to fight. Then the horse becomes 
the ultimate object of attachment.) Fantasy becomes a “life-sustaining defense against the 
attritions of ordinary violent history” (Berlant 2011: 45). Berlant does not counsel 
relinquishing our fantasies of the political altogether—this will not solve the problem—
because we need fantasy “to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of 
what the present can become” (Berlant 2011: 263). She recommends fantasies of 
“politically affective immediacy”—feeling communal, “a more sustainable optimism 
through absorption in the present process” (Berlant 2011: 262). We can produce images 
of the good life that do not hinge on unreal images of the sovereign subject. This is one of 
Berlant’s main critiques: that optimistic attachment to modes of liberal normativity (i.e., 
conventional desires, for things like the nuclear family, fame, work, wealth) fuels the 
fantasy of sovereignty, the sense that one can achieve because one can desire, a sentiment 
encapsulated in the feel-good bromide, “if you can dream it, you can do it.” This view of 
sovereignty wrongly conflates desire, intention, decision and action (Berlant 2011: 97). 
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 Instead of the sovereign subject model, Berlant suggests an alternative of “agency 
without intention” (Berlant 2011: 18) attentive to “the hesitancy and recessiveness in 
ordinary being” (Berlant 2011: 124). We take “small vacations from the will itself” 
(Berlant 2011: 116). Neoliberalism’s labor demands and the pressures of reproducing 
ordinary life—and the outlet fantasies that blossom into optimistic attachments—exert 
itself especially on subjects who believe themselves sovereign. Sovereignty and the 
object one desires are locked in an inextricable relationship: they depend upon each other. 
“The object of cruel optimism here appears as the thing within any object to which one 
passes one’s fantasy of sovereignty for safekeeping”—even as (perhaps mostly when) 
subjects feel utterly powerless over their own lives (Berlant 2011: 43). One clutches to 
the fantasy of “being X and having X,” to promises—the hollow shells of unfulfilled, 
perhaps unfulfillable, desires (Berlant 2011: 44). The practice of wanting an object 
“provides a way to negotiate one’s incoherence” (Berlant 2011: 135), organizing a 
subject to cover over the cracks in normative agency. The subject seeks reciprocal 
relations with the world outside itself in order to reproduce that world intelligibly and 
sustain feelings of autonomous individuality. We desire to find forms, objects and people 
in relation to which we can sustain a “coasting sentience.” Sovereignty is just one more 
fantasy in a cluster of fantasies about “the good life” that sustains subjects’ false 
consciousness about the world, blinding them to the reality of their oppression. 
 These optimistic fantasies “justify so much exploitation” (Berlant 2011: 105)—
they are cruel, in large part because they soften the blows of their cruelty; cruelty comes 
to feel comfortable (a comfort people confuse with happiness). Many holding these 
fantasies lack control over the material shape of their lives after the dream of upward 
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mobility following WWII has evaporated in the wake of major post-Fordist structural 
transition and economic downturn. Yet they hold to these life-organizing ideals, which 
keep them hoping again and again for something that continues to disappoint and 
demoralize: 
The world economy now is revealing that there is little structure on which to hang the 
‘good life’ fantasy of upward mobility and intimate continuity that was sold as a 
domesticating package to postwar urban national/global subjects. My claim is that the 
insistence on normative fantasy objects in the absence of a world for them isn’t just 
psychotic or personal but a general situation now, fomenting a ‘drama of adaptation’ 
in which people have to be seen seeing that they no longer have an account of how to 
live (Berlant quoted in Berlant and Prosser 2011). 
 
Without usable scripts with which to enact one’s life, it is not individually “psychotic” 
but structurally necessary to believe in these. Optimism is at once a coping strategy, 
allowing them to cope with the radical upheavals in the neoliberal present, and something 
that allows them to keep on keeping on. The subjects in Richard III and King Lear also 
misrecognize a world that is clearly failing—one of kingly rule and authority and 
hierarchy and the right of primogeniture—mistaking it for a world that they can exist 
healthily in. For example, so many generations of chasing the crown in Richard III has 
made it next to impossible for subjects cathected to this ideal to relinquish it. 
 The way Berlant describes it, subjects become so cathected to their optimistic 
attachments, that optimism becomes an economy onto itself. You become optimistic 
about optimism itself, as optimism generates its own structure of feelings. The subject 
protects herself from threatening objects by “animating new ones, animating animation 
itself…” (Berlant 2011: 145). You can protect yourself from a depressing reality (or you 
think you can) by investing in optimism. Of course, this analysis dichotomizes reality and 
fantasy in perhaps too rigid a way. Sometimes Berlant writes as if dream and reality are 
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like light and shade, without penumbra or ambiguity: for example, when she decries 
“Splitting off political optimism from the way things are” as a move that “can sustain 
many kinds of the cruelest optimism” (Berlant 2011: 228, my emphasis). Further, to 
establish this distinction between a “dreamy” optimism and “the way things are” is to 
forget, as Arendt believed, that politics is not a sphere where reality and fantasy can be so 
easily discerned and to speculate about the “genuineness” of another’s reality breeds 
hypocrisy. “In politics, more than anywhere else, we have no possibility of distinguishing 
between being and appearance. In the realm of human affairs, being and appearance are 
indeed one and the same” (Arendt 1990: 98). Just as an actor will by necessity put part of 
themselves into any role, these scenes of optimistic attachment Berlant describes involve 
too the concrete realities of those that dream. 
 Berlant, along with Ahmed, also links optimism to the desire for conventionality. 
Optimism is always, Berlant says, “normatively mediated” (Berlant 2011: 184). Even as 
heterofamilial-economic and national-racial norms are collapsing, people continue to 
shape their dreams by them. What is worse, people aspiring to the good life’s 
normative/utopian zone are stuck in what Berlant calls “survival time—the time of 
struggling, drowning, holding onto the ledge, treading water—the time of not-stopping” 
(Berlant 2011: 169). Especially now, as the stuff of one’s dreams is unraveling, anxiety 
intensifies and there is all the more desire to hold onto what seems right. Instead of 
reinventing new life forms, new ideals, people take refuge in normalcy “as a ground of 
dependable life;” they reinvest their hopes in the cruelly deferred promises of capital, or 
in the desire for reciprocity and recognition within the family, the state, the corporation, 
or simply in the quotidian aspiration to “feel normal” and worthy and a comfortable, 
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unconflicted sense of belonging (Berlant 2011: 170). People are drawn into “a circuit of 
reseduction and despair that so often absorbs genuine energy for social change” (Berlant 
2011: 259). Most of the subjects Berlant highlights in the book are coasting in feedback 
loops of normativity, reproducing its patterns indefinitely. 
 Berlant’s arguments are not quite allegations of “false consciousness.” When she 
describes what she calls “stupid optimism,” the stupid subjects manifesting such 
delusions seem to be made “stupid” by the system, not because they started out that way. 
“By ‘stupid’ I mean that faith that adjustment to certain forms or practices of living and 
thinking—for example, the prospect of class mobility, the romantic narrative, normalcy, 
nationality, or a better sexual identity—will secure one’s happiness” (Berlant 2011: 126). 
One adjusts in the hope that today’s disappointment will materialize into tomorrow’s 
success, if I just try one more time. Berlant offers an analogy from a novel to visualize the 
pattern of this disappointment: the person who tries just one more time is like “a starving 
lab animal which will keep pressing the button that once supplied it with food, even 
though the button now jolts its poor small body with increasing doses of electric shock” 
(Gaitskill quoted in Berlant 2011: 148). The rat is driven toward what harms it: not only 
because it expects food, but also because of familiarity with the scene. Rats hope they 
will be fed, but all they get is shock, which is also a comfortable scene they recognize. 
This is the “double bind” of cruel optimism: the scene of everyday comfort is also the 
scene of violence. Despite Berlant’s efforts to detach her analysis from familiar narratives 
of critique, this analogy of “poor small bodies” desiring happiness aligns with traditional 
ways in which optimists are portrayed as naifs and dupes. One thinks of innocents like 
Pollyanna more often than villains like Richard III, sustaining the traditional connection 
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of goodness = innocence = happiness = optimism. Optimists are often child-like, not yet 
jaded by the tragic realities of life. They do not know enough. The argument of this 
chapter is that when we refuse the traditional association between intelligence or 
craftiness and a pessimistic cynicism, and embrace the optimism of (highly intelligent) 
villains, new political moods come to view, energies to revitalize contemporary politics. 
As I shall show, optimists are not always impossibly perfect, innocent, or stupid. 
 To summarize Berlant’s critique of optimistic attachment: 1) it nurtures the ideal 
of the sovereign subject; 2) it attaches one to unfulfillable modes of life and begins a 
cycle of longing for objects that distract from present misery; 3) it attaches us to the 
desire for conventional belonging and makes alternative imaginaries harder to engage; 4) 
it makes people politically vulnerable or weak, strengthening the link between optimism 
and their exploitation. 
 Sara Ahmed examines optimism as an emotion, not, as Berlant does, as an 
affective structure. Nonetheless, Ahmed’s criticisms resonate with Berlant’s, partly 
because she conceives of happiness as future-oriented. Ahmed questions happiness’s role 
as the main aim of human action, as what gives “purpose, meaning and order to human 
life” (Ahmed 2010: 1). Both Berlant and Ahmed believe happiness and optimism to be 
disciplinary. Subscribing to the authority of future-oriented desires, fulfilling the mandate 
to imagine the future in a certain way, one affirms the orders that be, which “define and 
regulate what is thinkable in advance of thought” (Ahmed 2010: 161). When researchers 
use data to reach conclusions as to certain ways of living that make people “happier,” 
they reinvigorate the hold of a conservative set of ideals (research cited in Ahmed 2010: 
3-4). Again, like Berlant, Ahmed assumes both that normative ideals of self, family and 
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society from the post-WWII era are failing today and that such ideals acquire an even 
tighter grip on our psychic and political lives in times of crisis. 
 Again, like Berlant, Ahmed criticizes happiness for the insular economy it 
generates. Not only do people view happiness as an endpoint but also it becomes a means 
for achieving more happiness (Ahmed 2010: 199). One first links happiness to certain 
ways of living, then correlations (married people and happiness, e.g.) become causalities, 
and then certain types of family arrangements are refigured as the cause of happiness. 
Scholars who champion happiness, according to Ahmed, come to “redescribe what is 
already evaluated as being good as good” (Ahmed 2010: 7). This research both tells us 
what we value and teaches us what we should value, and—surprise!—what we should 
value is already what we value. 
 Optimism can be a technology of control and stabilization. Promises of happiness 
can “keep things in place” (Ahmed 2010: 189). Ahmed argues that happiness norms are 
about predictability—stable families, loves, etc.—losing touch with the original 
etymology of happiness as “hap,” chance. Happiness has been seen as “outside the reach 
of fortune,” beyond contingency. One thinks of Pollyanna’s “Glad Game”—a technique 
for looking on the bright side—that helps one secure happiness despite the slings and 
arrows of bad luck. “This fantasy of happiness is a fantasy of self-control” (Ahmed 2010: 
207). The normative demand to live life “the right way” forecloses other possibilities. 
The expectation of a happy future is not alive to chance encounters or accidental arrivals. 
The normative system survives by “grounding itself in inevitability” (Ahmed 2010: 165). 
Instead, an unhappy politics opens up “possibilities for being in other ways” (Ahmed 
2010: 223). 
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 If alternative futures threaten this happy fantasy, so do alternative affects. Ahmed 
also criticizes happiness for shutting out what she terms “affect aliens.” Affect aliens 
stray from the normative paths to happiness, “because they live in the gaps between its 
lines” (Ahmed 2010: 223). A queer pessimist, for example, “refuses to be optimistic 
about ‘the right things’ in the right kind of way” (Ahmed 2010: 162). She is estranged 
from the present, opening up the conditions of possibility for the new. “This is why affect 
aliens can be creative: not only do we want the wrong things, not only do we embrace 
possibilities that we have been asked to give up [e.g., refusing to just ‘get over’ past 
injustice and move towards reconciliation], but we create life worlds around these wants. 
When we are estranged from happiness, things happen” (Ahmed 2010: 218). Affect 
aliens allow us to return to the “hap” of happiness—the chance element that disappears in 
normative notions of happiness. 
 Normative models of happiness blind us to forms of injustice by screening out the 
suffering of “affect aliens.” “The wrong of happiness is that it participates in the 
localization and containment of misery, the misery of those who cannot inhabit the 
apparently empty sign of happiness” (Ahmed 2010: 195). If happiness is the usual, then 
misery stays “within walls” (ibid). Unhappiness “gets in the way” of the general norm, 
which is never questioned (as happiness stays the agreed-upon telos of human action). 
Suffering is ugly to look at, so we conceal it in order to pursue our happiness in 
uncompromised fashion. She writes: “Revolutionary forms of political consciousness 
involve heightening our awareness of just how much there is to be unhappy about” 
(Ahmed 2010: 222). Happiness is complicit in prolonging suffering by not 
acknowledging it. Happy imagined futures also allow us to endure suffering in the 
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present, as the future is imagined to be a long-awaited compensation for present suffering 
(Ahmed 2010: 183). Berlant would call this “slow death” optimism—daily dying made 
bearable by an imagined future that never comes. 
 To summarize the above critiques of “happy futures” expounded by Ahmed: 1) 
visions of happy futures tend to rehearse normative ideals that are, for most, unfulfillable; 
2) they tend to recycle themselves in our psychic lives; 3) optimism colonizes the 
imagination and eliminates scenarios of alternative futures; 4) happiness shuts out “affect 
aliens” and 5) disguises present and persistent suffering in non-normative populations. 
 As with Berlant’s, Ahmed’s arguments tend to invoke a logic of deception: 
Optimists do not see how they contribute to the reproduction of the violence in the social 
order because they do not see what lies beyond the opaque horizons of their happiness. 
Promises of happiness never keep their word. Optimism perseveres because desire is a 
bottomless abyss. Affect aliens are smarter than all that. The world, rather than enabling 
their fantasies, presents stumbling blocks. In refusing to engage with the world as they 
know it, affect aliens hold the most promise for alternative futures. A revolutionary 
moment happens as affect aliens recognize the cause of their suffering—which happy 
subjects misrecognize. “[T]he revolutionary is the one who refuses happiness” (Ahmed 
2010: 192). 
 The last critic of optimism I consider, Joshua Dienstag, sets optimism against a 
more respectable pessimism (from his position as a self-described Nietzschean pessimist; 
Dienstag 2006). Dienstag claims that in Nietzsche’s thought, tragedy is allied to 
pessimism.75 Nietzsche found that in being awakened to a tragic pessimism, knowledge 
                                                
75 Dienstag (2006) acknowledges that Nietzsche finds the dichotomization of pessimism and optimism 
untenable: they are not “two equal, if opposite, ways of looking at the world” (Dienstag 2006: 167). Rather, 
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of an illogical world-order, “I had to invent a counterpart for myself. Perhaps I know best 
why man alone laughs: he alone suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter. The 
unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as fitting, the most cheerful” (Nietzsche 1968: 
91). For Nietzsche, optimism or pessimism are not ways of being attached to objects or 
the world; they are simply outlooks. If the pessimist can be cheerful, then there is the 
same lack of correlation in emotion (cheerful) and the ways of organizing the world 
(pessimism) that Berlant tracks: one can have optimistic attachments and be nervous, or 
fearful, or happy. 
 Like Berlant and Ahmed, Dienstag too see pessimists as more realistic, since they 
embrace an imperative to coexist with endless suffering, welcoming “the pessimistic 
annihilation of illusions” (Nietzsche quoted in Dienstag 2006: 190). All three critics of 
optimism link optimism to a certain blindness to suffering. Suffering comes with an 
acceptance of the brutal inability to control our course over time. If the pessimist is the 
realist, again, the optimist is the delusioned dupe—Nietzsche goes further in calling him 
a moral coward. Optimists indulge in “active self-deception that ma[kes] life more 
tolerable but less genuine” (Dienstag 2006: 172). Here again, optimism is tied to the 
insistence upon a “just” and ordered universe, and upon conventionality morality that 
spins that tale. 
 Dienstag associates optimism with a rationality that “insists that there is only one 
path and one means with which to walk that path” (Dienstag 2006: 185). This is similar 
to Ahmed’s fear. Pessimism, in contrast, sets out on no preordained path; it “promotes an 
unblinkered reexamination of the world, and of the self, without built-in moral 
                                                                                                                                            
pessimism is “older and more original,” Dienstag quotes Nietzsche as saying (ibid.). I do not want to 
quarrel with Dienstag in claiming optimism to be “better” than pessimism—Nietzsche himself says at one 
point that there cannot be answers to the question of which worldview is “right” (Nietzsche 1968: 38). 
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assumptions” (Dienstag 2006: 187). It is optimism that “inhibits truly free inquiry” (ibid). 
The horizon of human possibility shrinks under its gaze. What is more, optimism tends 
toward asceticism. It is easier to have faith in an ordered universe if one denies the 
fluidity of the self, our lack of complete self-understanding and definitive ego-
boundaries. “We ourselves are no different from the world to which we are condemned; 
we are not islands of being in a sea of becoming. We too are nothing else but a constant 
transformation and development” (Dienstag 2006: 198). The self is more vulnerable for 
the pessimist, as pessimists embrace change and becoming. This can be liberating. 
Optimists of the Socratic variety would rather eliminate the joys of becoming and exist 
instead in a static state where our best interests are eternally transparent. 
 To sum up the above, Dienstag argues that optimism: 1) is a less genuine way of 
looking at a fundamentally tragic, illogical world; 2) blinds people to suffering and 
allows them to embrace a prefabricated set of moral values of deservingness; 3) insists on 
only one correct path forward; 4) denies the fluidity of the self and the flux of the world. 
 We can compile from Berlant, Ahmed, and Dienstag this compelling critique of 
optimism: it 1) perpetuates myths of the sovereign subject; 2) attaches one to normative 
traditional modes; 3) propels one into a cycle of longing and therefore distracts from the 
present misery of “affect aliens” (Dienstag/Nietzsche adds the insight that traditional 
moral notions of deservingness allow us to blame these aliens); 4) is normative, so in this 
cycle of longing for objects (especially alluring in times of crisis), it seems that there is 
only one path forward, the well-trod one; 5) makes change harder to imagine; 6) makes 
 159 
people stupid, enabling their continued oppression; and 7) does not deal with the tragic, 
immoral, illogical world, a world of becoming.76 
What Is Villainy To Optimism? 
 To address each of the above critiques, either to register subtle disagreements, to 
debunk them altogether, or to suggest an alternative approach, I turn to Shakespeare’s 
optimistic villains, in his plays and in their afterlives in American productions and 
fiction, who 1) think of themselves as sovereign in motivational ways; 2) are attached 
only to traditional values that suit their designs; 3) are themselves affect aliens within 
their world; 4) take alternative paths forward; 5) imagine change; 6) are brilliant and 
refuse to be oppressed; and 7) thrive in a world of becoming, even if it eventually 
overtakes them. This vitally affirmative mood is essential for getting “unstuck” from the 
present. It is true that these villains all have an attachment to what turns out to be, by the 
end of the play, what Berlant calls “compromised conditions of possibility whose 
realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic” 
(Berlant 2011: 24). These attachments are “cruel” because the object of desire threatens 
their well-being, but the desire for the object allows them to redeem their existence, 
which has been given no value in the world they inherit. These villains do not seek 
happiness; their games—techniques through which they reshape the world they have 
been given—lend purpose to their lives. Shakespeare’s villains, particularly in Richard 
III and King Lear, provide us with alternative ways to think through the (sometimes 
broken) promises of optimism and to defend optimism against its critics. 
                                                
76 Berlant (2011) and Ahmed (2010) and I are all speaking of subjects caught in unjust structural situations. 
The difference is that those in Berlant’s study fail to repudiate their failed lives (because of optimistic 
attachments to unfulfillable ideals or fantasies), whereas my villains take action against those they hold 
responsible. 
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 Of course, even in a play like King Lear where good and evil seem to manifest in 
such extremes, good and evil also register as personal judgments, perspectives, 
implicated in each other.77 Villainy almost assumes a will for evil, but we are shaped and 
scarred by the times and places in which we put our lives, the atmospheres that provoke 
our moods. Villains are villains only from certain angles; Smiley makes Shakespeare’s 
villains heroes. Perhaps we are all villains, insofar as we can never be 100% not villain. 
Good and evil is a knot impossible to undo. Of course, not all of us are as morally 
unredeemable as a Regan or a Richard, but nobody’s perfect. 
 In the world according to Shakespeare, even the supposedly “good” characters act 
in morally questionable ways: for example, both Edgar and Cordelia refuse their fathers 
the consolation of knowing their offspring loves them.78 A testy Cordelia speaks with 
scorn to her sisters in the first scene: “I know you what you are, / And like a sister am 
most loath to call / Your faults as they are named” (Lr. 1.1.270-72). Not a very becoming 
line; again, Cordelia is doing her “duty” and speaking according to her “bond” as a sister. 
But Cordelia’s bonds seem entirely emotionless. When Lear asks her to speak, she 
criticizes her sisters for not being bonded to their husbands properly. Only she knows the 
right “bonds.” Consider too Kent’s abuse of Oswald and his insolence to characters who 
are not yet revealed to be evil in 2.2. Kent seems to make the world into moral black and 
whites: those who are not clearly for Lear must be against him and therefore punished. 
The non-villains in the play are those who most fervently believe in the morally 
                                                
77 Cavell notes “how radically implicated good is in evil” (Cavell 1987: 283). 
78 Consider how many times Edgar says “Tom’s a cold” (five)—cold being not only a temperature but a 
feeling as well. Bradley also notes how his spiteful lines to his dying brother “chill one’s feeling for him” 
(Bradley 2007: 231).	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unredeemable villain. They consider what’s “right” to be patently unquestionable. Things 
are simple for the “good” characters.79 
 The villains are similarly not always unconditional degenerates. Consider, for 
example, how Goneril is the character least concerned with distinctions of rank.80 She 
and her sister do not see Edmund as an outcast; instead they share a lack of respect for 
rank that disgusts Edgar. When Edgar finds out that Goneril loved “the Bastard” no 
matter his illegitimacy, he cries: “O indistinguish’d space of woman’s will!” (Lr. 
4.6.266). We can easily imagine just how frequently Edmund was reminded of his 
bastardy throughout his life by the fact that Edgar callously mentions it after he wounds 
him: “The dark and vicious place where thee he [Gloucester] got [the adulterous bed 
where you were born] / Cost him his eyes” (Lr. 5.3.171-2). Edmund then responds with 
pathetic defeat: “Thou’st spoken right. ’Tis true. / The wheel is come full circle. I am 
here” (Lr. 5.3.172-3)—“here” naming the lowest point on Fortune’s wheel, a place that 
Edmund has occupied his entire life. Even as his enemy smarts to death crushed by 
fortune’s wheel, Edgar raises the matter of his illegitimacy in moral judgment—adding 
insult to injury.81 
 The villains in these plays drive the play forward. Their optimism is deviant, 
cruel, motivated, animated, full of feeling. Sometimes we lose sight of the ultimate aim or 
                                                
79 It must be admitted, however, that the plays seem to affirm the importance of respecting right. When 
Buckingham dies, he notes that God has given him “in earnest what I begged in jest” (R3 5.1.22). God 
seems to be no respecter of moods or jokes; He seems just as cheerlessly dour and morally upright as 
Cordelia or Edgar. 
80 Consider too Oswald’s unswerving faithfulness to his mistress, Goneril—as selfless as the service of 
Kent and the Fool to Lear (Booth 1983: 46). 
81 Gloucester treats Edmund no better than Edgar does. Although in the first scene he professes to love him 
as much as Edgar, other lines betray his partiality (Lr. 1.1.19). Gloucester confides to a disguised Kent in 
Act 3 that “No father [loved] his son [Edgar] dearer” than he (Lr. 3.4.157). It is not coincidental that 
parents in both plays at hand play favorites—and the least favorite becomes the villain (Queen Elizabeth 
favors Edward and Clarence; Gloucester Edgar, and Lear Cordelia). We know from the first line of King 
Lear that favoritism is a theme of that play, and that Lear favors Albany over Cornwall.	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the moral valence of the schemes, just to delight in the movement and the velocity. It 
sometimes seems even the villains delight more in their infinite energy than in any 
outcome they hope for, absorbed as they are in rocketing past their enemies, kicking up 
their heels at prescribed patterns of existence. Although this energy might be a 
fortification that eventually buckles under, without it, we remain captive in a despairing 
present, as does Lear. Their happy machinations keep them from being “stuck.” Berlant 
speaks of the present moment as an “impasse,” with the sense of passivity it implies 
(Berlant 2011: 4). The present moment becomes elongated in times of “crisis 
ordinariness”—a term that describes the imperial violence of these plays as well as 
today’s environment (Berlant 2011: 10). These optimistic devils bypass the impasse. 
They do this by viewing the time of the past as provisionally finished, cut from a 
manipulatable present that must be woven into the future. 
 Richard III and King Lear are appropriate plays with which to address the 
question of the sovereign subject because the crux of the play bears on the question of 
sovereignty—reign over self and other human subjects. Identifying with the sovereign 
subject has become problematic today for a number of theorists in addition to Berlant. 
Liberal individualism burdens subjects with heroic expectations of control and self-
empowerment, fantasies that they can bootstrap their way up in the world, even as most 
subjects experience forms of domination and dependence (Anker 2012). This easily leads 
to what Wendy Brown has described as the “starkly accountable yet dramatically 
impotent…late modern liberal subject” (Brown 1995: 69). There is a belief that, as 
Berlant puts it, “world-building at a historic scale requires the drama of inflated 
sovereignty, or politics” (Berlant 2011: 258). This is certainly what Lear and Richard 
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think. For both, their fantasies end badly, but the positive benefits of the mood of their 
desire for sovereignty cannot be discounted. Without that, the only alternative for these 
villains, trapped by circumstance, crushed by cramping limitations, would be to indulge 
implacably a Nietzschean ressentiment (Nietzsche 2007). Subjects who seek the crown, 
like Richard, quite literally seek an identification with the state. Thinking one is 
sovereign bestows a measure of (however problematic) self-respect on a subject, and for 
Richard it becomes a kind of warped, sacred patriotism: I want this for the state shades 
into I am the state. Edmund asks the gods to “stand up for bastards” (Lr. 1.2.22) because 
society has not; society has done everything possible to undermine his sovereignty and 
sense of self-worth. This scene he frames with his asides, which gives a strange sense of 
holding the scene in place temporally despite developing circumstances within it. It 
allows him to revoke his faith in an ordered universe—hubristically, yes, but otherwise 
he would be paralyzed. These villains’ minds are so fabulously canalized—their primary 
thought all the time is of themselves—but this seems to be their only mode of survival in 
a world that was always against them. The fantasy of autonomous agency allows them to 
imagine alternative futures with courage. To doubt the sovereignty of the will rehearses 
what Edmund call “the excellent foppery of the world” (Lr. 1.2.109), that is, the world’s 
foolish belief in fate and a superstitious ordering of the universe. Faced with this 
simplified choice between free will and fate, these villains imagine agency as something 
that elevates and transforms. If sovereignty is, as Berlant says, “a nightmarish burden,” it 
can also be a joyful one (Berlant 2011: 43). This is true not only for kings: Edmund, for 
example, simply aspires to inherit his father’s lands and be “master” of an estate (Lr. 
1.2.16). His self-esteem impels his desire to have land commensurate with his view of 
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himself. Berlant does not altogether deny the uses of sovereignty or jettison the concept 
wholesale because of its association with democracy. Because the concept of sovereignty 
is closely associated with the liberal notions of individual autonomy and liberty, to 
renounce a politics of sovereign persons might give dominant groups the privilege to 
define sovereignty in a way that could be damaging for equality (Berlant 2011: 98). 
 Nonetheless, what I hold up as laudable here is more the general mood of these 
villains rather than what their hopes of sovereignty do or do not get them. Optimism not 
only drives these villains forward but also outward, into an expansion of self and world, 
an assemblage—an ever-increasing archive of selves, encounters, affects, postures, 
actions, and objects of desire. Personality is a series of episodes, elusive yet indelible, 
each new experience rewiring the make-up of our supposedly sovereign subjectivity—
even though these villains do not view themselves this way. 
In their minds, Shakespeare’s “villains” already inhabit theatrically—perform—
the sovereignty they so desperately seek. Feeling a certain way becomes a form of self-
fashioning. Other characters engage in maintenance for the majority of the play: Kent and 
Cordelia seek to keep their relationship to Lear what it was; Edgar seeks to keep his 
father alive. This maintenance is no better than endurance. As Edgar tells his miserable 
father, “Men must endure / Their going hence even as their coming hither. / Ripeness is 
all” (Lr. 5.2.9-11). Men are just waiting around for death like fruit rotting off a tree. 
Oddly, this is Edgar’s response to Gloucester depression, his “ill thoughts” (ibid., 9). 
Cheering him up is to remind him that life is about endurance for the ethically “good” 
characters. But our villains want more than to maintain; they seek to make. The 
spectacular actions of our villains could not be accomplished without possessing the 
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trifecta overlap of 1) performative, theatrical action82, 2) optimism, and 3) the courage to 
act. They stage their sovereignty, heroically, with a frank, flagrant fakery in order to 
preserve the motor of their lives, their optimism. They do not seek to achieve security, to 
arrange normative ideals at becoming angles; they want thrills beyond what the love plot 
or other conventional narratives can offer them. Their fantasies may seem grandiose, but 
to them they fall within the ambit of the achievable. Berlant talks about the "many 
sacrifices people make to remain in proximity to mirages of sovereignty" (Berlant 2011: 
119), but for these villains, acting as if they did not have sovereignty would be the most 
difficult sacrifice. 
The Anti-Normativity Of Tragic Optimism 
 Villains have a fraught relationship with the traditional order of things. Many 
seem to suffer a sort of boredom with the normal quotidian of the present that compels 
them to try and bestow meaning on, or at least an excitement on, their lives. They arrange 
a small portion of an otherwise meaningless world for themselves to give purpose to their 
individual existence. When Goneril worries that her sister may take Edmund from her, 
she says that all her built-up fantasies may come crashing down “Upon my hateful life” 
(Lr. 4.2.88). It is her fantasy of love that makes her life not “hateful.” Villains play by 
another set of rules but with the same deck of cards. This is what traditional readings of 
King Lear, which assume the villains are the villains without a second thought as to their 
motives, overlook. Paul Cantor, for example, argues, “The characters who scorn 
conventional laws as merely arbitrary distinctions turn out to behave criminally, even 
                                                
82 Howard and Rackin note that “the sheer theatrical energy of Richard’s performance supersedes the moral 
weight of the hegemonic narrative” (1997: 112). Rossiter notes Richard’s acting skill and goes further in 
noting his “sense of humour, his function as clown,” as he generates “roars of laughter at wickedness” 
(Rossiter 1961: 15), likening him to Falstaff (ibid., 21). Bradley notes Edmund’s sense of humour (Bradley 
2007: 227). These villains are entertainers. 
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among themselves” (Cantor 2008: 233). What readings like this miss is the fact that these 
villains do not always “scorn” convention and sometimes act as if conventional laws 
matter, as when Regan kills the peasant for standing up against his master. Master-
servant distinctions must hold.83 
 Richard and Edmund buck tradition through a marked countertemporality. Both 
were sent early into the world. Edmund tells us he puts no stock in time as measured by 
“the dragon’s tale,” or “Ursa major” (Lr. 1.2.118, 9). If their alterity was already marked 
before they were born, they continue it in an evolving scene of repetition, their asides and 
soliloquies. Both Edmund and Richard use asides as self-emancipation, liberation from 
the time of the undervalued images of themselves projected onto them by others. They 
see themselves as sovereign and valued in some way they currently are not, and this 
idealization of their future selves frees them from themselves as they exist in the world of 
the play. The asides constitute a form of oblique time, at an angle to the linear, freeing 
them from a forced sociability.84 They seek a new audience in us, far from the scalding 
scrutiny of the other characters. Asides are a technique for drawing in a transcendent 
world vis-à-vis the world of the play and sending it away at the time of their own 
choosing. 
 Traditional meanings have a special applicability to Richard as a deformed man. 
Richard’s relatives treat him according to the neo-Platonic physiognomical assumption 
                                                
83 Repentance when evil characters die would signal a final heeding of moral categories, but not all villains, 
even in these plays, repent. Richard simply regrets not winning; the only thing Regan and Goneril probably 
regret is losing their man. As for other plays, consider how the queen in Cymbeline, in a comically placed 
caesura, “repented / The evils she hatch'd were not effected” (Cymbeline 5.5.59-60)! 
84 Drew Daniel argues that dramatic asides disturb temporality and the fiction of the playworld in the way 
that soliloquies do not (Daniel 2013: 139-141). Asides also “seem to trouble the division between private 
thought and public speech” and allow the audience “a kind of sidelong participation in moments of shared 
perception and audition” (Daniel 2013: 133, 133-4). A.P. Rossiter calls Richard’s asides an “actor’s 
technique,” “the essence of his chuckling private jokes” (Rossiter 1961: 18). 
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that the outside is a transparent window into the inner soul.85 Early modern English 
culture entertained both the idea that selves are unknowable and that they can be fully 
transparent—which work together in dialectic with a figure like Richard, who is 
supposedly knowable in his deformity but dissembles (Maus 1995: 28). Richard’s 
deceptive skill complicates the semiotic identification of his disfigurement. Francis 
Bacon states that, “Deformed persons are commonly…void of natural affection” (Bacon 
quoted in Torrey 2008: 136). One might observe this common void to all our villains—
and an optimistic sheen covering it over. Or perhaps it is truer to say that they invest in 
unnatural affections. Regan, Goneril and Edmund create through their adultery a parallel 
sensory space of love that cannot be attained within the normative world of the marriage 
contract. In a play where striving for love is the main theme, the ugliness of what passes 
for normative love drives these villains elsewhere. Hence the touching nature of 
Cornwall’s invitation to Edmund that he “shall find a dearer father in my love;” this new 
family embraces Edmund the way his blood family did not (Lr. 3.5.20-1).86 Families 
disappoint these villains. Excited about the possibilities stretching out into the future 
before him without the encumbrance of his family, Richard says his brothers’ deaths will 
“leave the world for me to bustle in” (R3 1.1.152). Right now he can only bustle in front 
of us, in secret, in his own corner of the world. These villains “grow,” they “prosper,” as 
Edmund says (also in secret; Lr. 1.2.21), within these dreamscapes in which they shape 
                                                
85 See Torrey 2008 for a wonderful overview of the contemporary opinion on the “science” of 
physiognomy. 
86 In some notable ways, Lear’s villains counterpose a social environment of acceptance and belonging over 
Lear’s of ownership and possession. Ownership rights (e.g., the 100 knights he insists upon) seem to 
produce in Lear a domineering truculence, a testy mood of defiance, limited as his insight is to the 
oversized alphabet blocks of his childish anger in which he seeks a meaning to his existence in his ability to 
dole out his possessions for the lack of anything more meaningful. 
 168 
for themselves avenues in which to “bustle in.” They make trouble to disrupt normative 
patterns of social order. 
 There are no prefabricated values for these villains. Nietzsche admires something 
similar when he writes in The Will To Power 382, “I assess the power of a will by how 
much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage” 
(Nietzsche 1968: 206). Contra Dienstag, optimism is not tied to the idea of an ordered 
universe for evil-doers like Edmund and Richard. It is rather the ability to make 
everything work. Optimism is optimization, flexibility. Edmund designates events as 
means to his optimism: “All’s meet with me that I can fashion fit” (Lr. 1.2.168). What 
comes his way, he can fashion to his own designs. When Cornwall is unexpectedly 
expected, Edmund thrills at the prospect, “The Duke be here tonight? The better! best! / 
This weaves itself perforce into my business” (Lr. 2.1.14-15). Everything can be turned 
to his advantage. 
 These villains earn our regard for challenging an existing order that excludes them 
from the realm of the fully human. Optimism, then, need not always be tied to a 
normative vision. Shakespeare’s villains refuse to be optimistic, as Ahmed puts it, “about 
‘the right things’ in the right kind of way” (Ahmed 2010: 162). Ahmed considers false 
consciousness as a way to understand “how the social is arranged through the sharing of 
deceptions that precede the arrival of subjects” (Ahmed 2010: 165). False consciousness 
can “block other possible worlds…such that possibilities are lost before they can be lived, 
experienced, or imagined” (ibid). Perhaps we can imagine a pre-history to the play where 
Edmund and Richard were under the spell of false consciousness. One must first 
recognize that one’s wretchedness is caused by social forces, not nature, before one can 
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rise against those forces. Edmund is something of a wretch, a stranger and an exile. 
Edmund “hath been out [away] nine years, and away he shall again” (Lr. 1.1.30-1). 
Perhaps this is not a going that Edmund desires. It was perhaps far from his homeland 
that he became conscious of his bastardy as loss, that he began to feel the sense of 
estrangement. He has never been well-adjusted to this world. The cloak of the normative 
veils “structural violence” (Ahmed 2010: 170) so well, it is impossible to see it. Just as 
Edmund’s whereabouts the previous nine years are veiled to us, so too are the 
circumstances of the structural violence that may have befallen him. Bracketing judgment 
as to the “justness” of his cause, we can at least recognize how his being away has made 
him an outsider, and obviously a pained one. 
The Alienation Of Affect: Richard Versus The Heavy Mood Of Mourning 
 Another critique of Berlant’s is that optimism propels one into a cycle of longing 
for objects one can’t have. Here Berlant credits misrecognition—the psychic process by 
which fantasy recalibrates what we encounter so that we can imagine that something can 
fulfill our desire (Berlant 2011: 122). Edmund imagines that being an equal will make 
him happy, Richard imagines that having the crown will give him satisfaction. The crown 
offers a way for Richard to achieve a worth and recognition from his immediate family 
that he has been denied. I do not mean to suggest that democratic subjects should desire 
the total power of kings the way Richard does. Democrats’ aspirations, if they are not 
delusional, are by necessity less totalizing. What I admire in Richard and Edmund are 
their methods, the techniques of mood, their courage, and their theatricality, in their quest 
for a kind of equality on their terms. It fails for them—they end the play as the outsiders 
that they were from the beginning—but their desires are not nothing. The purpose we 
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give our hopes are not nothing. They may fuel our very desire to live. You cannot 
untether the desire from the object from the identity of the subject who desires. Richard is 
happiest87—with his energized sense of possibility, lightness of bearing, and hearty 
anaesthetics towards what might bode pain—when he is alone, plotting, or carrying out 
his plots with a rich theatricality. All villains delight in drama. Richard delights in being 
an affect alien with only his dreams to sustain him. This resonates with Ahmed’s 
description of affect aliens as creative, as actors (theatrical and otherwise), people who 
“want the wrong things,” embracing possibilities that they “have been asked to give up” 
as Richard “gave up” the crown to his older brother (Ahmed 2010: 218). 
 Not only is Richard an affect alien, but he makes affect aliens of others. If he 
himself cannot move forward in time without optimism, the mood he generates among 
others is an intense dissatisfaction with the present with the intent of keeping them stuck 
in time. Richard depresses the hopes of others so that he can grow: “it stands me much 
upon / To stop all hopes whose growth may damage me” (R3 4.2.60-61). This is not to 
deny that Richard is himself an affect alien—the director of Richard III in The Goodbye 
Girl (1977) who envisions a queer Richard indicates as much with his suggestion that 
Richard is “the queen who wanted to be king.” But Richard also makes it impossible to 
tell for sure who the alien is. Sorrow disrupts the rhythm of life—“Sorrow breaks seasons 
and reposing hours, / Makes the night morning, and the noontide night” (R3 1.4.72-3)—
specifically the rhythm of the life of his enemies, and Richard fosters that disruption 
among others. Mood must have the right rhythms on which to coast, and Richard is a 
great orchestrator of pacing. When Anne resists his kindnesses with quick rejoinders, he 
                                                
87 Happy also means suitable, fortunate and convenient, a meaning it carries in Richard III (“In happy time, 
here comes the Duke…” [R3 3.4.21)—and villains pursue this side of its meaning more energetically; they 
desire things suitable to their wishes, not necessarily to achieve happiness as a goal. 
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beseeches her, let us “leave this keen encounter of our wits / And fall something into a 
slower method” (R3 1.2.115-6). To argue less hastily untangles her from her rage. Tempo 
lubricates a change in mood. 
 When Richard tries something similar at the end of the play—in 4.4., which exists 
as a microcosm of the play until this point—when he tries once again to turn a scene of 
woe into a scene of wooing, it fails so extravagantly because he has made from his family 
members too many affective aliens. At the start of the scene we witness a circle of tears, 
cursing, and general woe, a scene that Richard attempts to interrupt. Margaret reminds us 
that the time of grief is long, that the causes of this grief travel far back into the past. Joys 
have been “intestate,” past, short-lived, bequeathing nothing. Language, Margaret’s 
cursing, is a means to mitigate the agonies. She schools Elizabeth and the Duchess how 
to curse, a weak sort of homeopathic antidote to evil. The women become united in their 
sorrows and intercept Richard and his train. The mood Richard brings to the scene is one 
of confidence and bravado. He attempts to drown out their exclamations with his fanfare. 
How desperate his attempts at changing the mood have become. Richard is unaware of 
the affective exchanges between his mother, sister-in-law and grandmother at the start of 
this scene. Like the scene before where Anne mourns her husband, these women too have 
been mourning. But the cycle of emotional exchange these women set into motion has 
congealed into affect. The present and the future are closed for these women, whereas for 
Richard the present remains open. Knocked about by insufferable agonies, the women 
under Richard’s reign remain stuck in the cycle of grief, a cycle that Richard remains 
impervious to and is eventually overtaken by. He fails to turn the mood because he 
underestimates the engrossing economies of grief. Ironically, he has created their 
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affective world: Queen Margaret early on calls Richard “troubler of the poor world’s 
peace” (R3 1.3.218). In that same early scene, Richard’s quip (“I did think / That thou 
hast called me all these bitter names” [ibid., 233-4]) can puncture the mood of Margaret’s 
cursing. Yet now the time created by this affective infrastructure is too heavy to move. 
If Richard aspires to an optimism of the present that unspools into a future, the 
play often remains fixed in these self-sustaining economies of sin, grief, or hope. “I am in 
/ So far in blood that sin will pluck on sin,” Richard says (R3 4.2.65-66). Sin incites sin, 
just as hope breeds hope and sorrow breeds sorrow. Even if we may envy Richard his 
cool acuity, intellect seems helpless against the hardened affect of others in the end. 
Consider Queen Elizabeth’s image of cyclical grief producing grief: “All springs reduce 
their currents to mine eyes,” she says (R3 2.2.68). Her tears will fall but lead back to her 
eyes again, which in turn produce more tears. She is a circular weeping machine. Her 
mother-in-law says: “I am your sorrow’s nurse, / And I will pamper [overfeed] it with 
lamentation” (R3 2.2.87-88). Sorrow feeds on sorrow; it becomes an economy unto itself. 
Margaret says, “If sorrow can admit society, / Tell o’er your woes again by viewing mine 
(R3 4.4.38-9). They reinfect the wounds they bear as they recount stories of grief over 
and over again. Try as he might, Richard beats helplessly against the binding affects of 
their tragic story. 
Richard’s lack of control in puncturing the moods generated by the female 
characters at the end of the play mirrors his lack of control over the time. The time of 
grief—the time of the sigh, gentle pauses in the moment that keep trapped within them 
the mood of past actions, telescoping a litany of linear, multigenerational losses—clashes 
with the time Richard inhabits, which is more akin to a heterotemporal whirlwind of 
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excitement and optimistic expectation. The time mourned is like a series of episodes 
blending particular grief and collective grief, the climacteric and the commonplace. Time 
stops for them in the moment of wailing and becomes an anxious waiting for death. 
Hence the need to verbalize their woes, to learn how to concoct curses, to preserve woe 
forever meaningfully in endless conversation, or a curse that endures. 
We see the distance between Richard’s worldview and those of the women in the 
play most plainly in the exchange between Richard and Queen Elizabeth when he makes 
plain his intentions to marry her daughter. Richard thinks a happy future can right the 
sorrows of the past: “all the ruins of distressful times / [will be] Repaired with double 
riches of content. / What? We have many goodly days to see. / The liquid drops of pearl 
that you have shed / Shall come again, transformed to orient pearl, / Advantaging their 
loan with interest / Of ten times double gain of happiness” (R3 4.4.273.31-37). Elizabeth 
refuses two things here: Richard’s quantification of happiness (“double riches,” “ten 
times”) and the idea that goodly days in the future can repair the past. In answer to her 
comment reminding him of her murdered sons, Richard replies, “Harp not on that string, 
madam. That is past” (R3 4.4.295). The past is past for Richard. He is the only character 
in the play so fixedly in the present at all times. The present is all he has, definitely, at the 
play’s end. What Elizabeth tells him in this scene is that he’s already used up the future. 
People will continue crying and grieving for their parents and children that Richard has 
killed: The “time to come,” Richard has “Misused, ere used, by times misused o’erpast” 
(R3 4.4.326-327). The mood of his actions will accompany them into the future. Richard 
has caused “temporal disruption,” as he is misaligned with the times, “sent” before his 
time as his mother notes (R3 1.1.20). Richard’s countertemporality, the way he not 
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merely obstructs but fractures smooth, normative time, is especially marked in a play 
obsessed with linear family “lines” of succession: figuratively his “start” was already his 
end, as his mother says, “O my accursed womb, the bed of death!” (R3 4.1.53).88 Richard 
promises things in the “time to come,” but this time is empty. Like Lear, he has already 
given the future away (as Lear does in the first scene). His future is but a graveyard of 
past events and emotions. 
As with the springs of woe in Richard, in King Lear, we witness a similar cyclical 
river of tears, the flood of the rainstorm, and other “overflowing liquids, representing the 
superflux that disorders psyche, cosmos, and polis respectively,” collapsing high into low 
(De Grazia 30, 28). But the storm scene also telegraphs Lear’s uncontrollable affects, 
notably his wrath. Everything Lear does seems utterly reasonless, yet he clings to the path 
he chooses, or doesn’t choose but nonetheless pursues, with a tenacious hopelessness, his 
misery abstract yet singular, borne of this wrath. Nothing can reassemble his soul in the 
face of such harsh excess. There is only so much horror one can take before one must pull 
up anchors in reality and detach, taking refuge, as Lear does, in insanity, the ultimate 
misrecognition. Mad as he becomes, Lear bears his emotions honestly, a moving theater 
of all things done him by his oldest daughters—perhaps one must be mad for this kind of 
emotional transparency, its truth value compromised by madness. Richard’s victims also 
sometimes engage in emotional outpourings: Clarence’s moving repentance, the women’s 
unhappiness, Buckingham’s final turn to “That high all-seer” (R3 5.1.20). Perhaps 
whatever normative values the main characters hold can only be expressed through a 
pessimistic hopelessness, as affective aliens. But affective expression, so uncontrollable, 
so incontinent, expresses too a weakness that easily leads to surrender (something our 
                                                
88 On Richard III’s fascination with connective familial lines, see Burnett 2002. 
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villains never do). Although moods are the dynamic undercurrent to Richard’s 
astonishing confidence, driving him onward—he stabbed Edward on the battlefield “in 
my angry mood,” he says—moods are still malleable, and he always directs the current’s 
forward flow (R3 1.2.238). Unlike villains who keep their emotions in check, no 
emotions for Lear are within proper limits, just as his present warps into a future he 
cannot control.89 
 But Richard’s masterly control of mood finally slips in the end. Towards the end 
of the play it becomes obvious that Richard “reigns in the galled eyes of weeping souls” 
(R3 4.4.52). This mood of mourning ultimately is Richard’s undoing. He becomes 
powerless against it. For everyone but Richard, the dominant emotion is fear and sorrow. 
Fostering distrust may have got Richard so far, but it cannot sustain his triumph. The 
trouble begins when we hear that the “melancholy Lord Northumberland” is “cheering up 
the soldiers,” however that is supposed to work (R3 5.5.21, 24). Then Richard admits that 
“I have not the alacrity of spirit / Nor cheer of mind, that I was wont to have” (R3 5.5.26-
27). The onset of a melancholy conscience. Conscience is particularly bound to the past. 
He pursues his thoughts and examines his past. This is the moment we know he is sunk. 
His turn to the past is an index of his evaporated optimism. The ghosts who appear in 
Richmond and Richard’s dream bring with them many emotions: despair and heaviness 
for Richard, cheer and joy for Richmond. Feelings propel the actions of the following 
scenes. At the play’s end, hope and joy pass from Richard to Richmond, with the 
                                                
89 In Lear, as Booth notes, we witness the destruction of time in ordinary definition, as seen in the Fool’s 
supposed “prophecy” (Lr. 3.2.79-90). “By definition, a prophecy concerns future time, but in this play all 
definition is illusory” (Booth 1983: 41). The fool’s ostensibly vatic account seems to concern both future 
time and the present. The Fool “blows apart the chronological limits of the fiction [recounted in his 
prophecy] and, indeed, all divisions between…past and present, present and future, future and present” 
(Booth 1983: 43). We are utterly unable to judge present or future, as it is impossible to navigate the time 
of crisis and get our bearings in this fantastic world of these characters’ minds. 
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difference being that Richmond intends an affective distribution, enriching “the time to 
come with…smiling plenty” (R3 5.8.33-34). Richmond promises to distribute smiles 
among his people where Richard had doled out angst and misery. 
 Optimism empowers Richard through the play. One might counter that instead of 
optimism, this is just delusion and madness, the hollow quest after power, but it cannot be 
denied that Richard’s mood propels him forward and allows him to achieve a kind of 
respect and regard among those who despised him and did not consider him an equal. 
Combine optimism with theatrical techniques and courage, and you have a formidable 
force for change. Whenever he encounters any hint of possible setback—for example, 
“the censures of the carping world” for his execution of Hastings, i.e. negative public 
perception (R3 3.5.66); or when citizens populate the market place looking “deadly pale” 
when they hear of Richard’s desire to be king (R3 3.7.26)—his affect (channeled 
skillfully into the theatrical) helps restore his bearings. To overcome the majority of 
citizens dubious about Richard’s entitlement to the thrown, Richard has Buckingham pull 
his theatrical tricks. Mood propels the theatrical.90 His second-in-command assures him, 
“I can counterfeit the deep tragedian” (R3 3.5.5). And not only tragedy, for he can do 
blood-curdling looks (horror) and fake smiles (comedy) too. Richard anchors his 
optimism in moods and genres designed to scupper the doubts of his countrymen: if they 
can get away with this bit of play-acting, Richard tells Buckingham, “No doubt we bring 
                                                
90 Both Richard and Edmund’s flagrant theatricality is sustained by tones of tender concern, by senses and 
signs and gestures and modes of comportment that others find comforting in their crisis. These plays 
frequently emphasize the impossibility of reading another’s “heart” because the implication is that we are 
all actors. What Richard does with the citizens, uniting them in a faint “Amen” while pretending his own 
religious zeal, is precisely the affective drivel Richmond promises to provide when he asks the heavens to 
“smile” and asks God to “Enrich the time to come with smooth-faced peace, / With smiling plenty” (R3 
5.8.33-34). Not coincidentally, Richmond’s oration ends with another “Amen.” Cementing the public on 
the affective register, a placeholder for “a potential political world” as Berlant puts it (Berlant 2011: 238), 
helps unite them in peace and common vision. 
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it to a happy issue” (R3 3.7.54). The main obstacle the citizens present is their mood: 
overwhelming pessimism. “Seldom comes the better,” the second citizen says (R3 
2.3.4).91 This pessimism ultimately triumphs against Richard, but not before his 
empowerment, not before he shows his family and the world that he can meet them at 
their own level. 
The Onwardness Of Optimism’s Temporality 
 Part of what makes the future so exciting for our villains is that they do not exist 
in a narrative. The script they have been given, they refuse to follow. One might argue 
that being high-ranking aristocrats gives them this latitude, but I want to see them here as 
subjects located within a position of inequality and who refuse that situation. Richard 
begins the play with the word, “Now,” as if he plans to re-write the course of history 
from the given moment.92 His acting ability aids him in directing the course of events. In 
fact, each of these villains is a good actor: Regan and Goneril convince their father of 
their love; Edmund stages elaborate shows to “prove” his brother’s evil; and Richard 
                                                
91 In this scene, we are privy to what we are not in Julius Caesar: a tyrant being offered the crown and 
refusing that offer in a show before the citizens—and indeed, perhaps Richard is what Caesar might have 
become had he dismantled the republic and built the empire on the blood of others. 
   Besides acting, what wins this scene for Richard is the affective structure of communication between 
politician and citizenry. Buckingham tells the people that Richard is at his prayers and “So sweet is zealous 
contemplation” (R3 3.7.94). Richard seeks to draw his audience into an immediacy between he and they not 
unlike the immediacy between priest and congregation. He wants his mood to circulate without mediation, 
to bracket out the anxious stuff of politics, the unsettled question of who is rightful heir. The people seek 
affective reassurance. Better to invite them into the zeal of Richard’s religious moment. Buckingham says, 
“pardon us the interruption / Of thy devotion and right Christian zeal” (R3 3.7.102-3). Richard seeks to 
create what Berlant calls an intimate public, where “affective communication is the medium of the 
political” (Berlant 2011: 226). So that there will be less independent	  judgment and reflection among his 
audience, Richard engulfs them in his religiously contemplative mood. It is his mood that, he feigns, allows 
him to accept their “offer” of the crown: “I am not made of stone, / But penetrable to your kind entreats” 
(R3 3.7.214-5). His sense of solidarity with their feelings (“kind entreats”) ostensibly makes his own desire 
one with theirs. As Berlant notes, when politics is “reduced to the demand for affective attunement,” our 
citizenly skills for judging various visions of the good life atrophy (Berlant 2011: 228). So the citizens 
mumble a halfhearted “Amen” and return to their private lives. 
92 Of course, he also remains caught in the fabric of his times: Richard was “raised in blood,” as Richmond 
says (R3 5.5.201)—that is, he was raised during internal family wars (it also carries the meaning, he was 
raised to the position of king through bloodshed). The War of the Roses had been fought several 
generations before his birth. He didn’t start the fire, but he certainly fanned the flames. 
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delights in showing the world a mood diametrically opposed to his true one. These are 
not actors who follow convention. Richard even seeks to throw Church law to the wind in 
marrying his own niece.93 
These villains distinguish themselves in the exceptional ways they upend 
traditional values. There is a progressivism implicit in my argument for their optimism94; 
it is a weapon with which they escape from a present that devalues them. This “forward!” 
“onward!” tilt does not necessarily presuppose future improvement. In other words, it is 
an “onward” but not necessarily an “upward.” If Lear’s pessimism is weighty and 
immovable, obstructing the lure of alternative (better) imaginaries or paths, these villains’ 
hopes illustrate Richmond’s statement that (the mood of) “True hope is swift” (R3 
5.2.23). Richard’s nimble switching of emotion shows mood as malleable in his hands, as 
it lives moment-to-moment, not fluidly or with a steady continuity (as we might imagine 
sovereignty to do: e.g., “for always I am Caesar” [JC 1.2.213]). Richard can alternate 
between childish, petulant schoolboy and mastermind-seducer of Queen Anne in a 
moment. It is this cameleon-like change that drives the play forward. 
Shakespeare’s villains make something strange in the appearance of everyday life. 
The present is, for them, ugly, and they need disguise to navigate the present moment—
why so many turn to acting. They latch onto the cracks in the dominant historical 
narrative, the cruelties in the grand forms of intelligence for daily living—ones that call 
human beings “illegitimate,” that fail to recognize Iago or Iaicomo’s worthiness, that 
                                                
93 William C. Carroll puts the matter well: how Richard and Edmund both denounce and desire the social 
order. Richard, he writes, “accepts his place in this [his family’s] hierarchy even as he works to undermine 
hierarchy in general” (Carroll 1992: 213). Gillian Murray Kendall argues that Edmund is “co-opted into the 
ideological society he initially rejects” (Kendall 1992: 255n25). I would not go that far, as I seek to 
celebrate their radical anti-normativism for the initial step it is. 
94 Berlant describes optimism as a propulsive force: optimism is “the force that moves you out of yourself 
and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own 
but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene” (Berlant 2011: 2).	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laughs at Richard’s deformities, Shylock’s religion—and galvanize these fissures for 
their own alternative imaginaries. While we might not feel comfortable identifying with 
Shakespeare’s villains or lending them our sympathy, we can surely identify with their 
complaints. For these are the complaints of the egalitarian-minded. We can commiserate 
with their feelings of subordination and identify with their campaigns for justice on their 
own terms. They are have-nots who want what their fellows have. Edmund would like to 
change places with his legitimate brother Edgar. Richard would like to change places 
with his older brother Edward. Optimism manifests in the desire to sustain alternative 
images of what life could be. Of course, their worldview is too limited for them to take 
the next step to imagine anything near to what we today would call democracy, a 
completely different world, but their moods allow them to project scenes of change, 
elsewheres constructed in the wake of current failures. 
In contrast to the progressivism of optimism, the space between Lear’s mood and 
cognition suspends the present within an evolving event that freezes narrative time in the 
drama of his moment. Consider his anger at Kent: “Peace, Kent! [There is a break here in 
the line, meant to indicate a pause for the time it takes to speak eight iambs—presumably 
allowing Lear’s anger to build.] Come not between the dragon and his wrath” (Lr. 
1.1.121-2). But if the dragon is supposed to be Lear, and wrath is supposed to be Lear’s 
emotion, what can drive a wedge between a man and himself? Here anger registers as 
something outside oneself, something you catch like the flu. The head-spinning leaps in 
this speech between Lear’s immediate “wrath,” his nostalgic wistfulness at how Cordelia 
used to be (“I loved her most…”), and the future-oriented ceremony of his pomposity (“I 
do invest you jointly with my power, / Preeminence…” [Lr. 1.1.123, 1.1.130-1) certainly 
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indicate that the waning of Lear’s powers and the shifts in his mood correspond to the 
waning of his ability to distinguish present, past and future. In the chaos of his mood 
swings, he seeks to freeze the present moment like the grieving women in Richard III. 
Lear tries to hold onto reality with a stake in time that the play makes impossible, 
because emotions like wrath keep one tethered to a moment without perspective. In 
Richard III, for example, King Edward blames wrath for his suspicions of his brother, 
closing off from view Clarence’s kindnesses: “All this from my remembrance brutish 
wrath / Sinfully plucked (R3 2.1.119-20). There is no past in wrath’s present. 
There is no future either. Lear feebly tries to match pace with his fool in joke-
telling (Lr. 1.5)95, but he can barely hold back his darker thoughts about what he takes to 
be Cordelia’s denial of love. As Harold Bloom has said, King Lear’s first three acts could 
play as comedy. If pessimism is the pervasive atmosphere of the play, Lear’s attempts at 
something resembling joy get co-oped. The affect of the play shifts definitively when we 
lose the professional clown, Lear’s fool, in Act III. Eventually, Lear cannot leave the 
circuit of wrath that has absorbed his every thought. His being stuck in the past keeps him 
from embracing an optimism that would carry him forward as Edmund and Richard go 
forward. 
Only Lear’s present stretches out indefinitely. Lear’s futile line, “I’ll resume the 
shape which thou dost think / I have cast off forever,” (Lr. 1.4.286-7), chronicles the 
                                                
95 Consider also Orson Welles’ 1953 portrayal of Lear’s frenetic delight in upending the rules of order as 
his men display a joyous rowdiness at Goneril’s palace (“King Lear” 1953). The fool’s jokes put Lear and 
his men in a jovial mood but it is terribly chaotic, so much so that we sympathize when Goneril criticizes 
the “insolent retinue” and complains they make her place appear “more like to a tavern, or brothel” (Lr. 
1.4.176, 220)—although it is true she admits to Oswald she does not mind the excuse the rowdy knights 
give her to upbraid her father (Lr. 1.3.13, 24-25). The place looks like a dump when Lear and his men 
leave: chairs knocked over, trash littering the floor, goblets strewn about. It’s hard to take Lear’s measure 
given the contrast of his sour mood in the first scene to his reluctant yet reckless joy in this one. 
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pathos of his desired relapse into the past. Lear’s suffering is so prolonged, and it is the 
ethically good characters that help stretch it out. Edgar—who prolongs his father’s 
suffering by failing to reveal his own identity to the dying man and by pretending to lead 
him off a deadly cliff (extending and perhaps contributing to his suffering)—ends the 
play with, “The weight of this sad time we must obey, / Speak what we feel, not what we 
ought to say” (Lr. 5.3.322-3). Weight can signify feelings of guilt, as it does with 
Clarence when he tells his prison-guard, “My soul is heavy” (R3 1.4.70), and as it might 
with Edgar. But perhaps this is something here learned from villains: Edgar is not 
proposing a return to convention, niceties, the dressage of court life. He seeks a brutal 
honesty, a refusal to “say the right thing,” leveling any system that would dictate what 
“the right thing” is. All this lacks is the insight that lighter affects like optimism propel 
one out of weighty times. 
Equality, Brilliance, And Becomings 
In tracing proto-democratic patterns within these villains’ optimism, I am 
concerned with the affectively democratic—democracy as a sensibility, a visceral 
experience, a sentience, a dynamic set of forces, norms, and practices that we embody 
through moods and states of being and perceiving. Given this concern, it is easier to 
conceive how I can easily follow Sam Chambers in positioning democracy as something 
distinct from liberalism (Chambers 2013). This is perhaps why I care less about the 
concept of sovereignty as essential to liberal notions of the individual (something Berlant 
cares about)—I am only concerned with how these villains use a fantasy of sovereignty to 
posit their equality. Here I would cite democratic theorists who take an agonistic 
perspective on politics, in particular Rancière because, for him, politics happens when 
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what Chambers calls “a logic of equality” interrupts the hierarchical order of things 
(Chambers 2013: 28; Mouffe 2000; Honig 1993). One of the problems with how 
democracy is thought today, Rancière reminds us, is that people identify “mass 
individualist society,” the limitless growth inherent to the logic of the capitalist economy, 
with democracy (Rancière 2006: 20). For Rancière—and for me—a political system 
“tends toward democracy only to the extent that it moves nearer to the power of anyone 
and everyone” (Rancière 2006: 72)—moves nearer to the power of (even) the basest 
villain. I do not mean by democracy, then, any institution or form of government—
Rancière goes so far as to say “We do not live in democracies” (Rancière 2006: 73)—but 
only the idea of the sensual experience of equality, which releases us from the hierarchies 
that structure our existence. These villains hate hierarchies in which they are not on the 
top. But as Adam Phillips notes, the whole idea that you do not need people (or gods) of 
extraordinary status to rule “turns the world upside down” (Phillips 2002: 25). This 
world-toppling is the result of the gods “standing up for bastards,” as Edmund bids them 
do (Lr. 1.2.22). Hence democracy, for me, is about equality but also about an affective 
placelessness, dislocation, the loss of a set place in the (hierarchical) world. Loss and 
dislocation are the unintended consequences of the motions these villains set in place. In 
initially seeking equality, or recognition of their worth as human beings, they often get 
more than they bargained for. 
Villains are immensely sensitive, both intellectually and emotionally. They feel 
their way by intuition. Although, as noted above, they invoke a model of the sovereign 
self in their discourse as something they aspire to, their personhood does not express any 
central orientation or telos. Instead, as Berlant notes, agency and causality are “dispersed 
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environmental mechanisms at the personal as well as the institutional level” (Berlant 
2011: 114). Richard so easily manipulates others in large part because of the moods he 
puts into circulation. Villains often distribute moods contrary to the ones they themselves 
inhabit. If will and mood are rarely aligned, Richard takes will out of the equation and 
sends subjects reeling in the centrifugal gyres of his affectspheres. Mood is the hinge 
between perception and (theatrical) action. Although will and mood can run at cross 
purposes, by directing moods, villains shape how others perceive and believe. If 
Richard’s deformity is an index of his out-of-syncness with the affectsphere he has been 
given, changing his surroundings requires imagining alternatives. It is the spectacular 
positioning of his actions within the mood he creates that makes him a genius. 
 As opposed to the subjects that critics of optimism imagine—dupes or almost 
dupes who enable their continued oppression—these villains display a brilliance that far 
surpasses the other characters. Being smart shields them from the everyday 
disappointments that structure their lives. Richard continually challenges himself with 
games designed to test his skill. His grossest display of audacious optimism is wooing 
Anne at her husband’s funeral after having killed her husband. “Was ever woman in this 
humor wooed? / Was ever woman in this humor won? / I’ll have her,” he confidently tells 
us (R3 1.2.215-217). He gloats not only on his conquest but on his masterful 
manipulation of mood. Congratulating himself afterwards, he jokes with himself: “I did 
mistake my person all this while” (R3 1.2.139). He displays himself here as a mastermind 
of the affective switch. He marvels that he approached her in the mood of “her heart’s 
extremest hate” (R3 1.2.219). He plays the Pollyanna here—exhorting kindness with, 
“Lady, you know no rules of charity, / Which render good for bad, blessings for curses” 
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(R3 1.2.68-69)—so that Anne might slip from one mood to another, one more favorable 
to his advances. Richard doesn’t lose in the end because his plans fail. He loses his 
kingdom—unlike King Lear’s villains whose passions get the better of them—because he 
loses his horse. That’s all. That can happen to anybody. It’s fate, not virtù. His 
Machiavellian virtù (as opposed to his fortuna) is perfect. 
 This scene further brings to the fore Richard’s concern with comparisons between 
himself and his cousin (Anne’s late husband), and Richard’s ultimate concern to prove 
his equality and worth. Once alone, he outlines Edward’s gifts and advantages—he is 
“young, valiant, wise, and no doubt right royal” (R3 1.2.231). He then compares them to 
himself, “whose all not equals Edward’s moiety [half]” (ibid., 236)—very self-
deprecating. Although they are persons of aristocratic personages, these villains 
ultimately seek an equality with their fellows. 
 Finally, consider again Dienstag/Nietzsche’s point that this is a world “of constant 
flux and chaos, where no moral order can be sustained” (Dienstag 2006: 197). Tragic 
pessimism involves “the realization that we live in a tragic, disordered, immoral world” 
(ibid.). But our villains are optimistic and still thrive in a tragic world. One can be an 
optimist and believe that the world is tragic, disordered, and immoral—in fact, that can 
be the basis for hope, that things can change because they always do, because our fate is 
not already written. The good characters—Albany, Lear, Gloucester, Edgar—keep saying 
that heaven will show her vengeance eventually in her final crowning glory. Everyone in 
the play expects revenge/justice. It is telling, however, that one of Albany’s final lines—
“All friends shall taste / The wages of their virtue, and all foes / The cup of their 
deservings—O, see, see!” (Lr. 5.3.301-303) is interrupted by Lear keening over Cordelia. 
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There is endless deferral. While the “good” characters locate their hopefulness in the 
prospect of revenge, the evil characters harbor no such faith in the universe’s tilt toward 
rightness. They know that the extraordinary and unnatural are just as much a part of the 
universe as the ordinary. 
 I have considered the mood of optimism in these villains against contemporary 
theorists in order to get some present-day purchase from Shakespeare and his American 
inheritors. Shakespeare’s villains are of an almost impossible villainy, but sympathy with 
them is not impossible. There is a reason why King Lear is a tragedy (at least according 
to the Folio, and how it was subsequently staged) and does not often play as 
melodrama.96 Tragedy gives characters a softer light in which to drift; melodrama is 
black and white, with justice in the end distributed accordingly. What is justice in Lear? 
In the end, even the supposedly good characters would seem to reap their comeuppance. 
So to say the villains are not beyond our sympathy may even be an understatement. In 
fact, American author Jane Smiley so identified with the villainous sisters in King Lear 
that she chose the oldest sister Goneril to narrate her novel A Thousand Acres, based on 
King Lear but set on an Iowan farm in the 1980s (Smiley 1991). This novel reveals a 
bleak sort of forward-looking attachment to the capitalist dream of more land and its 
devastating effects, and the sustaining efforts of the Goneril character and her sister to 
locate hope elsewhere. 
                                                
96 Despite Robert White’s contention that “King Lear can travel in a family saga or a western” (White 
2008: 324), two melodramatic forms according to Peter Brooks (Brooks 1976: 204). As White notes, Lear 
disrupts generic expectations. “A play which we regard as archetypically tragic, the touchstone of tragedy, 
may not have been anything of the kind in the mind of its creator and first audience. It is possible that the 
text as Shakespeare originally conceived and wrote it, is unsure of its genre or at least uneasily contains the 
potential for several contradictory genres (history, tragedy, tragi-comedy), and that it was his posthumous 
editors who made the decision” (White 2008: 319). Further, each character seems to think a different genre 
structures their relationship to the world. “In a somewhat strange way, each character seems to know he or 
she exists in a play, at the mercy of its plot and genre, but each has a different notion of what kind of play 
they are in and what the plot is” (ibid.). 
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Feminist Revision: Tragic And Enabling Optimism In A Capitalist Setting 
Seeing King Lear as the “master’s text,” as Iska Alter puts it, Smiley’s novel is 
more than another interpretation of the play, a counter to all the patriarchal interpretations 
that privilege Lear’s perspective over that of the women in the play (Alter 1999: 145).97 It 
is also a response, one that allows us to zoom out from the play enough to see the 
construction of good and bad from various viewpoints. No longer must the villainy in 
Lear seem so motiveless. No longer must the reason for Lear’s madness seem so 
completely causeless. There is no conspiracy here to gaslight a blame-free old man. 
Changes in his mood—from optimistic about his decision to retire to despairing over the 
outcome—seem to accelerate his mental declivity. Whatever strain put on Lear’s 
narcissism by Coredlia’s answer, this delicate break surely can’t account for the 
explosive crack up that follows. Smiley does not tell us the cause of madness but at least 
it is clear that there is illness (“environmental poisoning, patriarchy, or playacting”), and 
it is not invested with the “cosmic destructive grandeur” of Lear’s (Alter 1999: 154, 153). 
Such constructions of good and bad in the master text follow from ideas about whose 
feelings are more worthy, and we see hard-boiled judgments of evil in the master’s text 
more clearly for what they are. Cordelia and Lear were never sympathetic figures to 
Smiley. “On the other hand, the older sisters, figures of pure evil according to 
conventional wisdom, sounded familiar…. They were women, and the play seemed to be 
                                                
97 For a classic example, consider A.C. Bradley, who notes Lear’s “love of absolute power,” his “despotism” 
and “presumptuous self-will,” his “autocratic impatience,” but chalks it up to his “folly” (Bradley 2007: 
187, 212,  214, 196). Goneril is similarly criticized by him for “her imperious will” (Bradley 2007: 225) but 
Bradley goes on to say of her: “She is the most hideous human being (if she is one) that Shakespeare ever 
drew” (ibid., 227). This is clearly because she is a woman, Bradley adds, when comparing the villains in 
the play: “For Edmund, not to mention other alleviations, is at any rate not a woman” (Bradley 2007: 226). 
In short, Bradley takes Lear at his word that he is a man “more sinned against than sinning” (ibid., 211) and 
assumes that we can all agree where audience sympathies lie. 
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condemning them morally for the exact ways in which they expressed womanhood that I 
recognized,” Smiley writes (Smiley 1999: 161). 
 What Smiley brings to the fore, and what must be considered in any reading of the 
play, are the circumstances that exist underneath any narrative. A circumstance unfolds 
not neatly but can either intensify the present, percolate quietly through the surface of 
things, or explode in your face—all three ways making impossible any tidy narrative 
explanation of events. Smiley reminds us that what we do not know must be taken into 
consideration too when we set the characters on the scales of justice. Goneril is a 
milquetoast in Smiley’s adaptation. We must ask ourselves: What did Lear do to them 
before the play began to earn their wrath? Feminist critics Coppelia Kahn (1986) and 
Lynda Boose (1982) have suggested incest as a theme in King Lear. Cavell takes incest in 
Lear more literally than do these critics, suggesting that Cordelia, being Lear’s favorite 
daughter, might also have been abused by him (Cavell 1987: 299). In Smiley’s version, 
the older daughters were victims of rape as children. Perhaps this play, then, is really 
about redress. The problem is that, even when critics embrace such a reading, they, like 
Booth, assume that Lear’s punishments are “out of all proportion to his crime” (Booth 
1983: 53; Bradley 2007; Cantor 2008). The question I raise is: How can we be sure? 
 Smiley’s novel uncovers another kind of optimism of the so-called villains, one 
less ambitious, tethered to the present instead of the future. The villains are now the 
“good guys” but their residual optimism remains. Larry is the name of the Lear character 
in A Thousand Acres, and he is never happy. Perhaps this is because Larry has 
expectations about what he deserves98, and, as Rousseau teaches us, there is nothing so 
                                                
98 When Larry divests himself of the farm, it is with a reasonable expectation of something in return. In the 
original text, Lear reveals that he hopes, after divestment, to rest his head on the charity of his youngest 
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crushing as recognizing the gap between our desires and our reality. The trouble stems, as 
it does in the original play, from Lear’s valuation of himself so completely in accord with 
his traditional standards—as he credits “The offices of nature, bonds of childhood, / 
Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude” (Lr. 2.4.172-173)—to the extent that he cannot 
value others according to their standards. Just as Lear’s belief in the longevity of his rule 
led him to try to freeze time, making decrees running into the future when he can no 
longer make decrees, Regan suggests that Lear does not properly value his daughters in 
their new position. When Lear slanders Goneril to Regan, she replies with a calm, “I pray 
you, sir, take patience. I have hope / You less know how to value her desert / Than she to 
scant her duty” (Lr. 2.4.131-133). Lear does not know how to value them. “Hope” is an 
interesting choice of word. It suggests Regan’s willingness to assume the best, or an 
optimism that Lear will change his judgments of value. Any optimism about the future 
must also be about how the future assumes value, how we judge it. Handicapped by his 
old-fashioned “bonds,” and expected “dues,” Lear cannot “value” Goneril’s “desert.” 
Just as Lear holds to values that orient him to the past, Larry believes the 
capitalist incentive that hard work pays. There is little optimism in hard work, in 
inheritance and maintenance. His grandparents sought “the American promise, which is 
only possibilities,” (Smiley 1991: 46), but Larry’s farm expands due to discipline. Larry’s 
father’s generation removed the water from the soil and Ginny imagines the water as 
always ready to come back over the soil: “the sea is still beneath our feet, and we walk on 
it” (Smiley 1991: 16). Walking on those drained marshlands requires a sort of tragic 
                                                                                                                                            
daughter. He hopes that his youngest child will minister to him in his old age. Cordelia, in emphasizing her 
“bond,” perhaps hopes that love confined within a set of formal social norms provide some sort of 
infrastructural screen against her father’s demands (Lr. 1.1.93). How can she flourish as the wife of a 
nobleman if she must care for an aging father indefinitely? 
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optimism, which Ginny (the Goneril character) possesses. Larry’s motto, “What you get 
is what you deserve” (Smiley 1991: 35), is the motto of the privileged; it also forecloses 
any need for optimism about the future. When you work hard, you expect the rewards. 
Larry’s goal is expansion, “to buy more land” (Smiley 1991: 45). Meritocracy, of course, 
is one of the most cherished fantasies of capitalism: “All men are born equal...but the 
cream rises to the top!”99 
 The villains in the play, then, can project their hopeful emotions into the space left 
by the abandonment of those emotions by others. Each party—the good and the bad—
believe they have vengeance on their side. Feeling is so heavy at the end of the play, the 
mood is so “cheerless, dark and deadly” (Lr. 5.3.289), that the present moment of time 
sinks into the ground. Only here do motives, the circumstances behind the moods of 
vengeance and hope, disappear as trifles. No one gets what he or she deserves because no 
one is innocent, no one is not a villain, no one can judge what those deserts would be. 
Larry, in particular, can deny circumstances, being at fault, by ignoring the past. Rose 
says, “Daddy thinks history starts fresh every day, every minute, that time itself begins 
with the feelings he’s having right now. That’s how he keeps betraying us, why he roars 
at us with such conviction” (Smiley 1991: 216). Both versions of Lear show us the 
inability of revenge yet the imperative of hope. 
 Hope for Ginny lies in children. Of course, what Ginny expects from children can 
never materialize. “I let myself, just twice, imagine a baby, a child who would turn all my 
miscarriages, and everything else, into good luck, whose birth, after the onset of self-
knowledge (Daddy’s, mainly, but ours, too), was timed for happiness” (Smiley 1991: 
207). But the kind of future of another generation would only replicate the past: As Jess 
                                                
99 As the Henry Ford character says in Ragtime (2009). 
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(the Edmund character) tells Ginny, referring to his father and Larry, the older 
generation: “Oh, Ginny, they have aimed to destroy us, and I don’t know why” (Smiley 
1991: 183). Instead of hope tied to a good future, the novel ends in an affirmation of the 
present: the anger we feel towards injustice existing side-by-side with an optimism that 
fills the present. Ginny finally leaves her husband and takes a waitress job in 
Minneapolis. She likes the fact that there is “nothing time-bound” about her new location 
and job: the cars on the adjacent interstate pass at all hours; “you could get breakfast, the 
food of hope and things to be done, any time” (Smiley 1991: 333). Here optimism can 
exist frozen in time. There is no future to hope for, at least not one that can be readily 
measured. “The noise was the same, continuous, reassuring: human intentions (talking, 
traveling, eating) perennially renewing themselves” (Smiley 1991: 333). By throwing 
herself into the continually fleeing moment, renewing itself indefinitely, Ginny shields 
herself from a change in her relation to optimism, the want of hope. She must finally face 
the fact of no children. Contrast this to Richard, whose optimism evaporates at the end as 
the object striven for (not children, but the crown) eludes him. 
 Ginny’s optimism, in the end, exists as a mundane, everyday thing, something 
below the radar of any set of intense feelings. If Ginny makes peace with the past to exist 
in an ever-recurring present, her father and her sister Rose latch on to anger as fuel for 
their revenge. But anger too can have its optimistic uses, as when Audre Lorde expresses 
hers: “I have suckled the wolfs lip of anger and I have used it for illumination, laughter, 
protection, fire in places where there was no light…” (Lorde 1984: 133). On her 
deathbed, Rose tells Ginny, “We’re not going to be sad. We’re going to be angry until we 
die. It’s the only hope” (Smiley 1991: 354). Anger, for Rose, gives hope because it is the 
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only way to avoid self-pity at being raped as a child, having cancer, being beaten by her 
husband, losing her farm. “The more pissed off I get, the better I feel,” Rose says 
(Thousand Acres 1997). Queen Elizabeth in Richard III similarly vents her angry words 
because “though what they will impart / Help nothing else, yet do they ease the heart” 
(R3 4.4.131-2). Unfortunately, the film gives this story more of a Hollywood ending, one 
that robs anger of its optimism. Ginny ends the film with: “my inheritance is with me in 
Rose's children. As each year goes by, I watch them grow. And in them, I see something 
new. Something my sister and I never had. I see hope” (Thousand Acres 1997). This is a 
heritage, the extension of time possibly into an eternity of family descent that we never 
got in King Lear (despite Lear’s early attempt to fix the future), but this optimism is 
empty and sentimental. Optimism is again located in the future, where it is much less 
tangible and much more conventional. The point of Smiley’s story is to rewrite the 
history of these women from their point of view, stuck forever in the hellscape of a 
patriarchal, hopeless history, where only an optimism of anger (or, in the movie, of 
children), can push them forward. 
 Jess/Edmund is by far the most optimistic of all characters. He reacts with vitality 
and elasticity to the failures of the older generation. He tells Ginny, “Everything will be 
fine. Life is good. Change is good” (Smiley 1991: 38). Taking this perspective brings a 
calm happiness, but it remains impossible for those attached to the land. This is what 
optimism looks like in Jess: a “fluid grace,” an “acceptance of change and movement that 
ran through him” (Smiley 1991: 230). By contrast, Ginny says it took “mere instants” for 
Ty, Pete, and Rose “to take possession in their own minds” when Larry raises the idea of 
giving them his land (Smiley 1991: 30). What being attached to the land takes away from 
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you is this breezy optimism attached to no time or place that Jess can inhabit as a 
wandering vagabond. Without the ability to mentally detach from the land, the only 
optimism Ginny can embrace is a bagatelle optimism of breakfast, “the food of hope and 
things to be done,” regrettably brief but always recurring (Smiley 1991: 333).100 
Conclusion: Shakespeare’s Villains And American Optimism 
According to recent research, Americans are among the happiest of countries’ 
populations around the globe (UN World Happiness Report cited in Rayman 2015).101 
Compared to people from other wealthy nations, Americans are more likely to rate their 
day as a "particularly good day" when asked (41%), compared to 21% in Germany and 
8% in Japan (Pew Research cited in Poushter 2014). Optimism seems an essential part of 
the American Dream. Perhaps mirroring this optimism, Kevin Spacey describes his 
interpretation of Richard, in the 2012 Brooklyn Academy of Music production of Richard 
III, in terms of “overcoming,” likening him to the soldiers he visited at Walter Reed 
hospital returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who, when asked what they mean to do 
when they recover, all said they could not wait to return to their unit (cunytv75, "Theater 
Talk"). There are many reasons for this. It is not uncommon for war veterans, from any 
economic background, to long to return to the front (Morris 2015: 100). Many find 
civilian life so different that it is difficult to readjust.102 But Spacey puts the highest gloss 
                                                
100 Ironically, on this Iowan farm in the 1980s, it is precisely what goes into producing this breakfast that 
kills Ginny and Rose’s hope. The way humans have abused the land, using pesticides to protect the crops, 
robs them of the future, as its leads to Rose’s cancer and Ginny’s miscarriages (drinking the well-water 
with runoff from the farm). 
101	  Other studies, for example by the Gallup polling group (Gallup 2016) and the OECD (2015), rank the 
US a little lower but still relatively high.	  
102 Movies, book and articles chronicling the veteran's hardships at readjusting to civilian life abound. For a 
moving example in film, see William Wyler's The Best Years of Our Lives (1946). As the most decorated 
war veteran of WWII, Audie Murphy. said, “Things don’t thrill you anymore. It’s a struggle every day to 
find something interesting to do” (Murphy quoted in Morris 2015: 136). Thus, I do not think we need 
necessarily assume that these soldiers have so few options in their own communities and that this is what 
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on their desire to recover and to return to their previous lives, evidence of a positive 
mindset. For Spacey, Richard is a man driven to overcome: 
Overcoming the disability is what they set out to do, and I thought, that's exactly how 
I want to approach Richard. I want to be able to turn his disabilities into weapons, so 
that he is able to achieve things and do things that we might not expect he could do. 
… Just in terms of the psychology of understanding, how does someone overcome 
something that either they’re born with or that happens to them through no fault of 
their own. I was very inspired by that, the notion of overcoming, and that was what 
ended up making, I wanted that [Richard’s deformity] to be a weapon (cunytv75, 
"Theater Talk"). 
 
Here is overcoming—the quintessential American hope, to be better, to achieve more—
translated into Richard’s dream of achieving the crown. If Richard tries to overcome 
being stuck in a dull moment of complacency as a subject, overcoming the grossness of 
his disfigured body by exaggerating his commitment to piety, patriotism, his family line, 
making a great show of it to others, it is his outsider’s perspective that he most slyly does 
not overcome; astute to the hypocrisies of his fellow schemers, he outwits them by 
pretending to be satisfied with the status quo, all the while working steadily against it. 
Richard is not in time with the world he inherits, the world that defers to those considered 
more worthy, and he seeks to overcome his now, to give his moment some velocity. 
 I have focused on Edmund and Richard in this chapter because of the way their 
structural attachments both hinder and enable them. As outsiders, they have been granted 
a special vantage on those attachments, a different moral perspective on society. Yes, 
they maintain attachments, attachments that Berlant would call cruel, that preserve their 
fantasies. But there is something laudable nonetheless in the way their optimistic moods 
enable them to challenge these structural obstacles. Through the techniques discussed 
elsewhere in this dissertation—namely acting and courage—they foster a mood that 
                                                                                                                                            
drives them to return. As the film Whiskey Tango Foxtrot (2016) demonstrates, war can create adrenaline 
junkies. 
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dismantles organized barriers to their achieving a positive sense of selfhood. Both 
Richard and Edmund unravel the social threads that treat them unfairly. Both Richard and 
Edmund, although they fail, attempt to change the terms of estimation in which their life 
has been cast. To think of Edmund as a “bastard”; or Richard as a “deformed lump” (III 
Henry VI 5.6.51; see also R3 1.2.57); to think of either of them as a villain only: How can 
anyone think of a human being in the light of such terms? Motivated to fight against such 
injustice, their affective, personal moods go some way in changing what could otherwise 
be damaging optimistic structures of attachment. 
 Cruel optimism is a structural attachment Richard nurtures in others. For example, 
Buckingham lives in hope that Richard will reward him for his service. When 
Buckingham says he will claim his recompense, Richard says, “look to have it [“the 
earldom of Hareford, and all the movables / Where of the King my brother stood 
possessed”] yielded with all kindness” (R3 3.1.195). Richard does not say he will give 
Buckingham what he wants, only that he should keep himself in that relationship to cruel 
optimism, in other words, only that he should live in hope and “look” that it will happen. 
Buckingham wrongly believes there is a reciprocal relationship between them. 
Reciprocity, for Richard, would mean unthinkingly reproducing the coherency of the 
(old) world. He refuses, preferring instead to nudge a parsimonious mood into line with a 
steely, non-normative pragmatism: He tells Buckingham: “I am not in the giving vein 
[mood] today” (R3 4.2.119). Villains refuse to reproduce confidence in reciprocity. Of 
course, this may be a cause for our condemnation: It might pain us to see that Edmund 
betrays a father who so implicitly trusts him. But the mirage of reciprocity between 
villains and the world was destroyed long ago. Again, we must consider what the before-
 195 
the-play-began circumstances may be, and we get hints of these. At the start of the play, 
right in front of Edmund, Gloucester says how ashamed he has always been of his son 
(Lr. 1.1.9). We can then admire the villains for not getting attached to insensitive family 
members who devalue them. 
 Berlant says that the future is not “the primary lubricant for counter-normative 
political consciousness” (Berlant 2011: 68). She criticizes optimism’s ever-onward 
quality. But for these villains, the future is the only place they can put their dreams for a 
different sort of life. Future-oriented optimism is what unshackles them and braces them 
for a more livable life. These villains reconceptualize the future and time itself. Berlant 
thinks that there is a certain experience of time specific to our neoliberal culture, and that 
cruel optimism is a structural imperative of our time. We maybe cannot fully refashion 
hierarchical structures by adopting a mood, but we might make progress toward 
eventually dismantling them. The actorly techniques these villains employ and the moods 
that drive them forward attempt to do just that. It is these villains’ creative misrecognition 
of structuring, historical forces, the way they refuse customs of law that hold them back, 
that keep them in a position of inequality, the structuralisms that distort, isolate, and 
unfairly singularize their experience—it is this refusal that allows them to lean 
optimistically, passionately towards the next possibility, negotiating the landscape by 
feeling their way. Optimism can lead to material change. As antagonisms mount, as 
between Clarence and Edward, or between Gloucester and Cornwall, the villain unravels 
his own brand of affective entrapment. These villains refuse the scenes or acts already 
scripted for them, predictable conditions to endure. They take a crisis trickling onto the 
scene and put a magnifying glass to it, arranging and foregrounding it, making it 
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resonate. Whereas other characters desperately try to forestall despair—think of King 
Lear pleading “O, how this mother swells up toward my heart! / Hysterica passio, down, 
thou climbing sorrow!” (Lr. 2.4.54-55)—these villains make that despair their canvas. It 
is their experiential differences from others, which have shaped their affective bearing, 
that hinder them from ever “fitting in” but that set them instead toward a future fueled by 
their counter-normative fantasies. 
 Unlike the other characters in these plays, the villains are mood virtuosos: They 
can so easily become “affect aliens”—something my techniques for the democratic actor 
help nurture—because of their skills in slipping smoothly from one mood to another, 
gathering up an arsenal of masks to wear in different scenes, or as the genre changes. 
They are masters of adaptation. When a mood does not suit them, they either change it or 
organize it around the conditions of their own experience. Every event they can place on 
their (non-chronological) timeline (“All’s meet with me that I can fashion fit” [Lr. 
1.2.168]). Time for them emerges, there is no arc to their narrative, no logical unfolding 
of a present into a future. Thus, for them, contra Berlant, the future can be “the primary 
lubricant” for a counter-normative consciousness in large part because the future does not 
exist in linear narrative. The future is with them always, animating their present. Like 
Richard, Edmund came “into the world before he was sent for” [Lr. 1.1.20-21]—and 
there is some connection between villainy and untimeliness. They are out of time, not in 
the flow of the moving present, experience reality as strain. Their optimism 
fundamentally changes the visceral rhythms of their being. What they feel is calibrated 
according to the potency and impact of their actions. An achievement (e.g., killing a 
brother) generates a felt sense of achievement. They use the standards they set for 
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themselves, separate from inherited norms, to determine what feeling should follow a 
thought or action: happiness after killing off a rival. Their unredeemability lies not in 
their habits of personality but in their habits of affect. The present is temporally flexible, 
mediated through spectacularly labile affects. They embrace instability and precarity 
without solution or resolution because it feels like freedom. The world being upside down 
is the only setting in which they can rise. The clash of their affect with the general mood 
is a defining condition of their sense of success. 
 Vulnerability makes existence perilous in a world of power-grabs and scheming 
and continuous civil war. The similarity between Richard’s world, or Lear’s world, and 
21th century capitalism—its dislocations, disruptions, casualties, failures—is one of 
degree, not kind. Facing exclusion or extinction, deemed sub-human, better to possess a 
bare-swept soul and to connive one’s way onto the edges of the map of the humanly 
intelligible. Richard is the allegorical vice figure of morality plays, the Machiavel103—but 
it is a certain glee, an em(over)powering optimism, an all-out desire for power and 
belonging (belonging by way of making the rules of belonging) that negotiates the 
underlying one-dimensional coherence of his villainy. What can de-stabilize a nation 
stabilizes him. The dissolution of Lear’s empire for Edmund, or of the stability of the 
English throne for Richard, releases energies for new patterns of order that serve our 
villains. But perhaps Richard is only as villainous as he is smart—smart to harden up the 
soft, vulnerable edges of his identity and mask or disavow any disquieting remainders. 
The pediment of his success is his actorly energy. These villains’ inviolable resolve rests 
upon their optimism. 
                                                
103 Torrey notes how “Richard embodies several ways in which early modern England worried about 
duplicity” (Torrey 2008: 140). 
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 In the end, when the future is no longer assured, when they have stretched the 
present beyond recognition, their fantasies, along with their optimism, die. Without a 
past, without having inherited anything, without a zone of comfort, only to glide on this 
dream-affect, they cannot survive. They cannot even act optimistic anymore. Their goals 
go unfinished, but that was never really the point. The present was the only time they had 
or wanted, but they confused it with a future that never arrived. They did not suffer the 
present in hope of future pleasure, or “scavenge enjoyment in a present beyond which 
there is nothing,” as Berlant (2011: 221) and Ahmed’s subjects do, but the thrill of their 
emotions blended the present and the future in their minds. That their future becomes 
“nothing” is not really important. In the time of their life, they lived.104 
 What does all this tell us about our dreams for a better politics? What are the 
political energies of this vitally affirmative mood in Shakespeare’s villains? What can 
their mood do for our politics today? These villains use optimism to disrupt the normative 
political sphere. They envision with self-inflating intensity what an alternative life could 
be like when one is not afraid to challenge the terms in which one’s life must be fit. One 
does not have to mimic or applaud the composure of evil to understand the benefits of 
such composure in the face of crisis: the courage to pry open the possibility of future 
flourishing by any means necessary, to invent new political possibilities by cultivating 
the visceral art of mood. The wayward energies in the moods of these villains manifest 
energies for a politically active, non-normative individualism unconnected to a 
                                                
104 As William Saroyan so memorably put it (Saroyan 1943). I speak in this chapter of both the historically 
specific time of neoliberal capitalism and the similar ruptures and uncertainties that Shakespeare’s 
characters, in their historical time, experience. Time is not the same in every cultural setting, and I speak 
here not as Heidegger, for example, speaks of an abstract Time (Heidegger 2008), but I find the similarities 
between these times (Lear’s time, Richard’s time, our time) to justify my general argument about tragic 
optimism in what one might call “perilous times.” 
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mainstream liberal individualism said to be vital to democratic participation.105 Although 
optimism may be cruel, life without it is a submission to complacency, tradition, and 
obligation to a set of values utterly hateful to our freethinking villains. 
 Optimism may be a fantasy, but it does not have to be a normative one, it does not 
have to make living “compromised,” in Berlant’s terms (Berlant 2011: 24). If these 
attachments “organize the present” (Berlant 2011: 14), our villains teach us how 
optimism can also help us get unstuck from the present and go forward not linearly 
perhaps but multichronologically. Each way to the future passes through the gateway of 
optimism. The grieving or bitter characters—Lear and all the women of Richard’s 
wrath—take pleasure in the dissipation of their energies, a disconnection from the rapid 
pacing of the positive emotions; their sadness is a ballast, anchoring us in the present 
moment, as Edgar says, so affectively weighty. They embrace the physical exhaustion of 
their bodies, their souls long dead. These villains, by contrast, remind us of the lack of 
complete innocence in any being in the world, and the importance of optimism in a 
restructured future without boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate, between 
favorite daughters and non-favorites, between servants and kings, between good guys and 
villains. If not for their optimism, these villains might harbor ressentiment, the reaction of 
the weak against their “well-bred” masters (Nietzsche 2007). Instead these villains point 
the way to alternative ways of living because they point the way to alternative ways of 
feeling. 
                                                
105 I would cite here, for example, in the liberal-communitarian debate, liberal arguments drawing on the 
individualism of Locke, Kant, most recently Rawls—writers who see individual agents as autonomous, 
rational decision-makers (Grant 1988; Nozick 2013; Doppelt 1989; Rawls 1999). Many deliberative 
democrats also assume this sort of political agent.	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 We could never assemble an etiology of their villainy, only guess that it seems a 
form of self-medication as they resist the structural inequalities of their times. These 
villains thrive in unstable, even shattered, environments, like war profiteers. They 
perform a persistent optimism without exhaustion, until their villainy becomes a world of 
its own, its anarchy—they follow not the sign of the Ursa Major—adopting a sort of 
mythical grandeur and godly prerogative, which is nothing but the creative license of the 
actor-director. Life is a project of continual reconstruction; existence is something to be 
employed to sustain their mobility. They are continually in a state of fragile disturbance, 
assembled for the experience of others, animated by their own internal mood. They 
change with and in the scenes they create; these villains magnetize a mass of moods that 
they then disperse noncoherently to confuse and fluster and disorientate. This is the 
optimism of villains, the optimism that could be ours. 
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Democratic overhearing: cultivating a ‘third ear’ and repartitioning the sensible 
Introduction: conversations and democracy 
 
 In 1940, sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues observed the effect of 
mass media on voters (Lazarsfeld 2003). They found that political conversations were 
more influential than campaign items in the newspaper. Those they studied were more 
persuaded to change their mind about a candidate if they were caught unawares rather 
than if they planned to listen to a political speech. They wrote of one waitress influenced 
to vote for Roosevelt after overhearing the conversations of her customers: 
[S]he was in a position to overhear bits of conversation that were not intended for her. 
There are many such instances. Talk that is 'forbidden fruit’ is particularly effective 
because one need not be suspicious as to the persuasive intentions of the speakers; as 
a result one's defenses are down. … [S]uch chance communication is particularly 
effective. … The respondents mentioned it time and again: ‘I’ve heard fellows talk at 
the plant. . .I hear men talk at the shop. . .My husband heard that talked about at work. 
. .’ (Lazarsfeld 2003: 15). 
 
Overheard talk seems truer. The waitress (assumes she) overheard what was not intended 
for her, not packaged to her understanding or specific needs. This study was the first in a 
large wave of research demonstrating how interpersonal communication effects citizens’ 
political behavior—research easily assimilated to a Habermasian communicative reason 
model. More recently, deliberative democrats like Seyla Benhabib worry that citizens 
must be exposed to a diverse set of perspectives, since, as some researchers claim, 
“[c]onversation is the soul of democracy” (Kim et al. 1999: 362), democracy “begins in 
human conversation” (Greider cited in Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg 1996: 13; 
Benhabib 2002). Healthy, robust democracies need communicative, participatory 
citizens. For Habermas, as for these empirical researchers, the circulation of words brings 
one closer to the truth as we exercise our rationality when arguing with others (Habermas 
1990; Habermas 1984). Reflecting critically in public forums, individuals contribute to 
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the process of enlightenment. Within this tradition, the waitress was allowed to hear a 
truth that was circulating. Through free speech, there is a gradual accretion toward truth. 
Other liberties stem from this bedrock. Hearing and listening are the pillars of democracy 
as deliberative democrats like Habermas envision it (Habermas 1990; Habermas 1984; 
Bohman 2000; Dryzek 1990).106 
 Shakespeare shows us that this model is wrong. When words circulate, and 
especially when people overhear, the most likely results are intrigue and disruption. 
Tragedy often ensues. Overheard scenes add to the abundance and ambiguity of 
knowledge, interpretation, and meaning in a given play. It is no coincidence that Measure 
for Measure, one of Shakespeare’s most controversial plays and perhaps the one most 
given to irreconcilable disagreement both within the play itself and in critical 
commentaries on it—as Harriett Hawkins writes, “So far as I know, there is no single 
interpretation of it that cannot be countered by a dialectically opposite interpretation” 
(Hawkins 1987: xi)—is also the play with an overheard sequence at the heart of the 
dramatic action. 
I am not the first to recognize the disruptive potential of overhearing. This 
disruption need not be socially neutral but can acquire subversive, that is, specifically 
counter-hegemonic, qualities. Lauren Berlant notes that “To overhear the political, and to 
speak back from a position of not being addressed as the majority to be represented in it, 
is to seek to interfere with the feedback loop whose continuity is at the core of whatever 
normativity has found traction” (Berlant 2011: 249). If political conversation, the way 
Habermas imagines it, takes place between two subjects who can recognize each other 
                                                
106 For a critique of Habermas’s account of communicative action as that which assumes “unproblematic 
hearing,” see Levin 1989: 111. 
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within the dominant terms of subjectivity, and communicate with each other as equals 
(one must assume each dialogue partner’s equality, Habermas believes; Habermas 1984), 
to overhear is to interfere with this circuitry. Properly hearing one another (hearing, that 
is, sanctioned by institutions and other grounds of the police order—which also includes 
not hearing some) gives us a consensus model of politics, but since overhearing is 
oblique, comes at the community of speakers from a sly angle, there is this disruptive 
potential. The impure act of overhearing is a renegotiation of the very terms of listening. 
One may not be interpellated into the normative social order. Overhearing, then, has the 
potential to reorganize the sense experience of two-way conversation.  
The one who overhears flies beneath the radar, or over the radar, hovering beyond 
the modes of intelligibility that sanction certain communicative frames, forms, idioms 
and subjecthoods embedded in the cultural surround. Each subject is not interpolated as 
an equal subject of exchange that is knowable in advance because the circumstances 
within the scene of overhearing can easily change or undermine the epistemological 
certainties each hearer brings to the scene. Oftentimes, the overhearer actively reframes 
and interpretively refashions the exchange witnessed. Considering Rancière’s notion of 
“the excess constitutive of politics” (Rancière 2006: 69), there is something excessive 
about overhearing: it doesn't always need to be heard. You overhear what is not meant to 
be heard by you. Words circulate freely “without a legitimating system,” which can 
undermine the sensible order of what words mean (Rancière 2000: 91). Thus the 
overhearer can reconfigure the realm of the sensible. 
 Of course, in Shakespeare, sometimes eavesdropping leads to a clarification of 
matters. In Love’s Labour’s Lost, for example, the King and his lords overhear truthful 
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confessions and all consequently decide to pursue their love interests instead of keeping 
them hidden (Love’s Labour’s Lost 4.3). But in this chapter I will focus on scenes of 
overhearing that bring Habermasian assumptions about the nature of conversation into 
question. They do this in what I will call, following Rancière, democratic ways. Whereas 
Habermas (at least in an early version of The Theory of Communicative Action [1984]) 
posits the equality of speaking beings already formed in the social sensorium before 
entering into dialogue, a dialogue that takes places within the parameters of democratic 
institutions (even as it shapes those institutions), Rancière questions the very act of 
speaking—the Aristotelian logos, and how sound is (and whose sounds are) recognized. 
His idea that politics, and the moment(s) of disagreement it makes possible, involve a 
“contention over what speaking means” will help me make the argument that overhearing 
is a potential redistribution of the sensible (Rancière 1999: xi). The “democratic 
moments” in overhearing remind us that democracy is always messy. I first give a quick 
overview of some exemplary scenes of overhearing that demonstrate that overhearing 
often takes place where logos meets phone, where public meets private, but where the 
distinctions are anything but easy to decipher. Then I zoom in on Measure for Measure, a 
play in which one repressive order of things succeeds another with a rare glimmer of 
what Rancière would call politics. 
Overhearing with a third ear: Othello, Troilus, and Polonius 
 
 The overhearer models what the theater audience, what readers, and what we as 
participants in the public sphere, do: listen to others without necessarily taking part or 
shaping that conversation. Nietzsche uses the term the “third ear” to capture what 
Shakespeare’s overhearers manifest in great abundance: the ability to hear passionately 
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and sincerely (Nietzsche 1966: 182). To listen with a third ear would mean to possess a 
“real profundity of spiritual perception” (ibid., 190), to be alive to the tempo of a book, to 
“lend a subtle and patient ear to every stoccato and every rubato, [to] figure out the 
meaning in the sequence of vowels and diphthongs and how delicately and richly they 
can be colored and change colors as they follow each other…” (ibid., 182). Nietzsche 
notes that the ancients read like this—and they did so in the Renaissance too. Jane P. 
Tompkins has highlighted the long tradition in which meaning and signification are 
secondary concerns to how auditors sense rhythms and moods as they listen or read. The 
ancients viewed language “as a force acting on the world, rather than as a series of signs 
to be deciphered” (Tompkins 1980: 203). They speak in terms of the “intensity,” “force,” 
“irresistible might” of a text (ibid.). What makes texts visible in the first place is their 
effects, what Austin calls their perlocutionary force (Austin 1962). The perlocutionary 
dimension denotes what effect an utterance has on its hearers, how it might make people 
happy or sad to hear it, the affects it produces in others. Herein lies the fundamental 
uncertainty of all text or speech, for perlocutionary effect lies beyond the control of the 
speaker or writer. 
What Nietzsche refers to as a “third ear,” Bruce Smith describes as “hearing 
green” (Smith 2001). Hearing was held to be the primary sense in the Renaissance. 
Shakespeare’s theater was an auditory theater: as Andrew Gurr notes, “Proximity to the 
source of the sound used to be the highest priority in the design of a theater” (Gurr 2012: 
4). Hearing green involves listening through and with the body and “hearing the totality 
of sound, its extralinguistic as well as its linguistic components” (Smith 2001, 3.2, 
emphasis original). “[G]reen is not something that one sees; it is something one sees with. 
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It is an internal state of being” (Smith 2004: 150). This requires a subtler attention to 
what a text produces in its audience. Overhearers in Shakespeare usually have this “third 
ear,” which means they hear too passionately, too sensibly, without regard to the 
normative frame of the conversation. Where Plato’s ideal rational man would hear logos 
(see discussion in Rancière 1999), Shakespeare’s overhearers hear passion, or affective 
circuits or currents. 
In dramatizing the unreliability of visual (Othello’s case) or auditory (Troilus’s 
case) sense perception, Shakespeare invites us as an audience to ponder the surety of our 
own judgments—for we, too, are eavesdroppers. What we see or overhear can mislead 
us. This epistemological quandary indexes a broader problem without a solution, but one 
that is essential to grapple with in a democracy that prizes communication above all. 
Overhearing can reconstitute the terms and meanings of things around us, what is legible 
and perceptible and what is not. How we overhear is part of the production and possible 
transformation of the relational networks and beings involved in the encounter. 
 Overhearing involves intense feelings of passion. Take Othello. He has just come 
out of one of his epileptic fits (so in not too stable of a mental state) when Iago requests 
that he withdraw into the corner to listen patiently and restrain himself. In responding, 
Othello says, “Doth thou hear, Iago? / I will be found most cunning in my patience, / 
But—dost thou hear?—most bloody” (Othello 4.1.87-89). Othello’s reply has the feel 
more of an initiatory remark than a response. Othello pathetically seeks confirmation that 
Iago hears him, as if trying to confirm that he himself possesses logos, rational speech to 
communicate, whereas it is Othello about to do the hearing. It is almost as if Othello 
resents being put in the (passive) position of a mere overhearer—he also seeks the agency 
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of one who is heard. Alas, Othello will be overcome by utterances that, on one hand, 
cannot make sense to him but, on the other, make too much sense in that they produce 
sense, plunging him into a state of murderous vengeance. 
 It is the gestures of the visible, and, most importantly, the “frame” that Iago sets 
up in which to contextualize those utterances and gestures, that serve to call Othello’s 
madness into being. Iago says to himself, “As he [Cassio] shall smile, Othello shall go 
mad;” Othello will construe “Poor Cassio’s smiles, gestures, and light behaviors / Quite 
in the wrong” (Othello 4.1.98-101). This is not simply a case of misinterpretation. 
Othello hears the same words that Iago and Cassio hear. The difference hinges on 
context, and the way the visual cues are received and digested. An utterance made by 
Cassio does not strike Iago and Othello in the same bodily way. The words are 
experiences first and foremost via Othello’s heart, for example, whereas Iago’s intellect 
tends to take the lead in registering the sound. The words effect Othello’s sensations in a 
way quite different from their meaning as examples of logos. Language, knowledge, and 
sensation are interwoven. It is no coincidence that several eavesdropping scenes in 
Shakespeare concern a woman’s virtue—with so many passionate emotions riding on the 
“truth” about the woman’s loyalty, which can never been proven (Othello 4.1; Troilus 
and Cressida 5.2; Much Ado About Nothing 3.3). 
 As Martin Barker writes, “Facts adduced only look like evidence and arguments if 
you are already within that frame of reference” (Barker 2003: 74). Hence Iago’s ability to 
“frame” Othello’s mind. One doesn’t readily suspect a “message” when one overhears, 
but others can stage a message unbeknownst to the listener. One can accordingly be more 
easily taken in. In Shakespeare’s overhearing scenes, passionate transformations occur 
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when people listen, usually with frames or preconceptions of which they remain 
unconscious. Ironically, factual truths often fall out haphazardly, without logical threads 
connecting a series of events, therefore they seem less true than lies. Facts do not come 
with neatly packaged reasons; they are frustratingly contingent. As the early Christian 
philosopher Tertullian wrote, certum est, quia impossibile est, or "this is certain because 
it is impossible" (Tertullian quoted in Miłosz 1977: 108). Or, as Lucy Warriner (Irene 
Dunne) says in The Awful Truth, “there's nothing less logical than the truth” (The Awful 
Truth 1937). Once misperceptions colonize a majority of minds—as with misogynist 
beliefs about a woman’s fickle affections—the truth is clouded by judgments and beliefs 
that wear the authority of custom, and truth becomes impossible to discover. 
Overhearing, then, becomes risky business in a realm in which the dignity and 
nature of truthfulness is distorted. The liar has latitude to fabricate his “facts,” catering to 
the expectations of his audience, or, as in Iago’s case, weaving his web of lies for his own 
enjoyment and gain. Thus, his lies are often more convincing, woven with more logical 
fabrics. The contingency and unexpectedness that plague real facts need not distress the 
liar. Deceptive Machiavels, like Iago, or like Stalin when he wrote Trotsky out of Soviet 
history books, play on the persuasive qualities of sequential events. The element of 
surprise disappears. Factual truth is never self-evident, though lies can be perverted to 
seem so. When Othello listens, he arguably is not shocked. Because of cultural 
stereotypes about women’s inconstancy, a culture in which being cuckholded is 
recognized as something shameful, coupled with Iago’s deceit, Othello’s mind is 
malleable and the “lies” seem to him much more believable than the facts. 
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 Involved in Othello’s deceit is an instance of what Rancière calls disagreement. 
Overhearing is only a moment of politics when there is a clash of contexts. As Rancière 
says, “Politics is not made up of power relationships; it is made up of relationships 
between worlds” (Rancière 1999: 42). The world comes first, then the subject. It is the 
world that gives subjects their definition: this is the case for Othello. The subjects who 
overhear and who are overheard are constituted by the act of overhearing: Othello 
becomes the jealous husband, the stock older husband figure, a cuckold. This situation or 
“world” is what I would call a context, the social conventions, networks, institutions, and 
surrounding environments that make noise into understandable words, and the context 
changes. Politics happens because surplus subjects are created—and the overhearer is 
one. 
 Disagreement is Rancière’s name for a dispute that concerns the ground on which 
argument takes place, the world in which it exists. It is about “contention over what 
speaking means” (Rancière 1999: xi). But this contention stems, in part, from the 
difference in surrounding behaviors that constitute the utterance as meaningful in some 
way to the listeners (the perlocutionary force of the utterance, which is always different 
for each individual—and can be especially markedly different for overhearers). Key for 
my point here is Rancière’s talk of the “structures proper to disagreement” (Rancière 
1999: xii). “Disagreement clearly is not to do with words alone” (Rancière 1999: xi). It is 
about the field in which those words reverberate, the common stage on which 
disagreement happens. 
 The dissensus Rancière esteems is about the conditions or situation or structure 
around which speech and words are exchanged. These are the conditions that determine 
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perlocutionary force. Eavesdropping changes the context or structure around which 
words are heard—and this is why it is a redistribution of the sensible. Eavesdropping, in 
raising other suggestions as to the meaning of an exchange of words, initiates a struggle 
over meaning because of the different contexts or “worlds” involved. As Zivi notes, 
disagreement over words can reveal “the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: 
the world where they are and the world where they are not” (Zivi 2012: 92). 
 Othello hears the same words Cassio and Iago hear but they register differently 
for him because he has a different context for the words. For Rancière disagreement is 
over who is recognized as having logos, but he criticizes Habermas for assuming that, a 
priori, an intersubjective relationship will support, will provide the conditions for, mutual 
understanding. For Habermas, “linguistic pragmatics in general (the conditions required 
for an utterance to make sense and have an effect for the person uttering it) would 
provide the telos for reasonable and just exchange” (Rancière 1999: 44). But the 
conditions for mutual understanding are often nonexistent, especially in the case of 
overhearing in Shakespeare. Either one party desires to misrepresent the situation or 
epistemological limits simply force themselves upon the overhearer to the detriment of 
understanding. Overhearing disrupts the techne of representation, the regime of rigid 
mimetic duplication and hierarchy of ideal and real. This is because nothing can be 
communicated in its original form, and the changed context warps the message, 
destroying any hope of exact representation. Meaning is unfixed, speech is 
representative—one cannot represent something just as it is. Words change their 
signification depending on who hears, and this is especially true when overhearing 
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happens and there is a clash of worlds because of the different contexts or regimes 
surrounding the utterances. 
 Troilus, like Othello, reacts passionately to what he overhears despite no 
guarantee that he understands what he witnesses. His love is at high pitch, and the shock 
is proportional. Like Iago, the Machiavellian Ulysses urges Troilus to be a quiet, 
unobtrusive observer, and, like Othello, Troilus responds with, “I am all patience” 
(Troilus and Cressida 5.2.63). Again, as in the Othello plot, there is an object of romantic 
exchange (Troilus’s sleeve) that becomes the nexus of conflicting emotions: desire, hate, 
jealousy, humiliation. Based on what he sees and hears, Troilus comes to believe that he 
knows with certainty that his lover’s “mind is now turned whore” (ibid. 5.2.113-4). Once 
the “evidence” of her infidelity sinks in, Troilus begins raving. “O Cressid, O false 
Cressid! False, false, false,” he shouts (ibid. 5.2.177-8). Shakespeare’s characters often 
repeat words in his greatest tragedies—think of the final scene of King Lear ("Howl, 
howl, howl, howl!” [Lr. 5.3.256])—which serves to wring out the pathos. Troilus makes 
a spectacle of himself and Ulysses tells him, “O contain yourself. / Your passion draws 
ears hither” (Troilus and Cressida 5.2.180-1). The scene calls attention to the interpretive 
uncertainty in spying on others’ from a distance: they eavesdrop on Cressida as a scornful 
Thersites eavesdrops on them, just as we the audience eavesdrop on all, spawning a 
yawning gap of limitless regress. Perspectives multiply and it becomes difficult to 
synthesize them into a compatible whole. This epistemological confusion always 
accompanies overhearing scenes, serving to magnify a larger problem of the link between 
the perceptible and passionate listeners whose somatic changes disqualify them as neutral 
observers of “truth.” 
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 Further complicating matters, Harold Bloom says of Ulysses something that can 
be said of Iago as well: that he “says nothing that he believes, and believes nothing that 
he says” (Bloom 1998: 340). Ulysses and Iago drive a wedge between thought and 
speech intentionally, but there is always a gap between speech and thought (and between 
speech and signification) because every sound someone utters is always a representation. 
The misleading words of intrigue undo “the relationship between the order of words and 
the order of bodies that determine the place of each” (Rancière 1999: 37). Sounds are 
never attached to an unchanging essence that signifies the same thing in every situation. 
This is why, for Rancière, speech holds such importance for reconstituting given orders 
which keep subjects in fixed positions along the social hierarchy. Lying between a 
representation and how it registers is always the representation of that utterance: 
Rancière writes, “the logos is never simply speech, because it is always indissolubly the 
account that is made of this speech: the account by which a sonorous emission is 
understood as speech” rather than a simply incoherent babbling or phone (Rancière 1999: 
22-23, emphasis original). Rancière uses this analysis to understand orders of domination 
as sensory orders. Because the listener is thrown into such a passionate, bodily state, 
overcome and sometimes paralyzed by his emotions, the overhearing scenes in 
Shakespeare call attention to the different sensory orders that sound can occasion—
especially via faulty listening. Words are always also an account of those words, meaning 
that the assumptions we choose to take into account when we overhear (that Desdemona 
or Cressida is unfaithful, that Hamlet is a madman ready to kill his mother) shape the 
meaning of the words we hear.107 
                                                
107 For an outrageous example of this, consider As You Like It. Rosalind attempts to change the meaning of 
Phoebe’s love letter to her by reading it as evidence of Phoebe’s “giant-rude” cruelty (AYL 4.3.34). Silvius 
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When Rancière says that speech is always also an “account,” then, we can take 
this to mean “interpretation” as well—as overhearers interpret what they are privy to. The 
blunt force of sound strikes them and they are overwhelmed by the “green,” their third 
ear is too well-attuned. Smith likens hearing green to listening to a language one does not 
understand: “Speech in a language one doesn’t understand seems so rapid precisely 
because the listener is hearing all the sounds coming out the speaker’s mouth and not just 
the discrete phonemes that make sense in that language” (Smith 2001: 3.3). He adds, 
“Post-Cartesian understandings of the body attempt to "filter out" all non-semantic 
sounds” but the green cannot be so easily divided out (ibid.). Overhearing in Shakespeare 
reminds us that when phone meets logos, something strange happens. 
 The fatal overhearing scene in Hamlet is further instructive. Here again, we have 
a scene where a woman’s virtue is possibly at stake. After telling the audience that he 
will “speak daggers” to his mother “but use none” (Ham. 3.2.366), Hamlet stabs 
Polonius. Listening behind the arras, Polonius gives himself away with his “What ho! 
Help, help, help!” after a distress signal from Gertrude as she fears for her life (Ham. 
3.4.22). Polonius also lacks what Hamlet chides his mother for not having: ears with 
hands and eyes (Ham. 3.4.70.9)—a kind of prehensile, seeing “third ear.” Nonetheless, 
Polonius, the eavesdropper, feels things as do Othello and Troilus—literally, the trust of 
Hamlet’s sword. Polonius’s overhearing is sanctioned by King Claudius, but 
eavesdropping as a way to understand one’s subjects fails as a government policy 
maneuver because the overheard (in this case, Hamlet) might outsmart the eavesdropper 
                                                                                                                                            
interjects with confused questions as to Rosalind’s reading of the text—“Call you this railing?” (AYL 
4.3.43)—but Rosalind shows how the text affects her, in the process changing how the lines are read and 
understood. Rosalind reads the text as an extension of the disdainful character Phoebe has already 
demonstrated (“She Phoebes me” [AYL 4.3.39]). Another not-so-outrageous example is Helena’s re-writing 
of Bertram’s letter in All’s Well That Ends Well. 
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by stating false information (e.g., Hamlet’s faking madness) or the eavesdropper may not 
understand utterances correctly (e.g., Hamlet’s intentions toward his mother). True 
meaning is inaccessible to the eavesdropper because one’s hidden intentions go 
undiscovered. But it is misleading because the eavesdropper often thinks they have 
discovered hidden intentions. 
 For Othello, Troilus, and Polonius, overhearing effects what Rancière calls a 
“disidentification”—they become “mad,” not like themselves (what literally happens to 
Othello with his epileptic fits), or, like Polonius, they die. Overhearing gives us another 
order of the sensible, as these words produce “a disidentificaiton, [a] removal from the 
naturalness of place” (Rancière 1999: 36). Even eavesdropping situations in comedic 
settings—in Much Ado About Nothing, for example—effects a change in character or, at 
least, in heart, when Benedick and Beatrice hear it said that they are loved by the other 
and then, after hearing this, decide to love the other in return. Here “words”—or in 
Othello’s case, visible gestures—dislodge subjects from the places they formerly 
occupied, reshaping the sites of intelligibility. Overhearing gives us another order of the 
sensible. 
The overhearer is often recreated by the language, forced to remake himself in 
light of the new information gathered and its effect on him. Here I wish to emphasize 
both the power-agency of language (the sonority-power versus purely semantic-power of 
language) and the act of self-remaking. Overhearing is often an event that produces a 
subject: the emancipated listener, as Rancière calls this subject. In the 20th Century, we 
often do not take seriously the idea that words do things. Habermas, for examples, 
emphasizes “conversation” and its meaning-production over the sounds of words 
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themselves (Habermas 1984).108 But in the Renaissance, it was taken for granted that 
works would “bring pressure to bear on the world” (Tompkins 1980: 210)—hence the 
heated debates about the virtue or vice of the theater and the threat of imitation. Words 
were seen as able to inculcate or undermine civic virtue. The overhearer, just like the 
audience member, is influenced—more so than through “dialogue.” 
When one partakes in dialogue with another, it is possible to give a commentary 
on one’s words—that is, to take care that they are accepted the way the speaker 
intends.109 One can even take steps to ensure the success of one’s argument. For example, 
by engaging in acknowledgment and response, a technique of persuasion, rhetorical 
moves such as prolepsis or occupatio, raising and responding to a counterargument 
before one’s partner has an opportunity to raise it. This smoothes the way for one’s point 
to be taken with less objections. One of the reasons why conversations overheard are 
assumed “truer”—why, for instance, the waitress so readily believed her customers as to 
Wilkie’s abilities as president—lies in the inability of the speaker to make moves 
calculated to make their speech more believable. In short, it seems that there is less 
                                                
108 Jane Bennett and William E. Connolly (2002) have an excellent essay on the sonority-power of 
language that supports my point challenging Habermas here. They write: “For us…language is not only a 
matter of significations and failures of signification. It is also about sound, noise, and differential intensities 
or affects;” “Sonority can distract humans from what someone is saying and propel them to idiosyncratic 
associations and thoughts” (Bennett and Connolly 2002: 252, 253). Bennett and Connolly note, citing 
Deleuze and Guattari, that children are talented at making words vibrate in their mouths, meaninglessly, as 
non-sense. It is no coincidence that in the theater, vocal warm-ups always consist of letting words resonate 
and buzz on the lips and in the mouth to improve diction: “red leather, yellow leather,” or “Moses supposes 
his toeses are roses”—said more to let the words resonate and delight in the sound rather than to express 
any meaning. 
109 Consider how in As You Like It, Orlando seeks to “direct” his words even to the point of fixing his own 
interpretation as the true one. Orlando tells the sourpuss Jacques to stop “marring” his verses by “reading 
them ill-favoredly” (AYL 3.2.238-9). Orlando seeks to stop Jacques from marring his poetry with his 
unsympathetic reading. In similar fashion, Rosalind attempts to change the meaning of Phoebe’s words 
when she reads her love-letter as evidence of “cruelty” (AYL 4.3.31). This is reader response theory in 
practice. Silvius even interjects with confused questions as to Rosalind’s reading of the text: “Call you this 
railing?” (AYL 4.3.43) Rosalind shows how the text affects her, changing how the lines are read and 
understood. 
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calculation involved in overheard scenes. Polonius believes Hamlet’s overheard 
melancholic “To be, or not to be…” whereas he might not have believed Hamlet 
announcing publicly that he had the blues (Ham. 3.1.58). 
I hope thus far I have indicated the radical implications of overhearing. Rancière 
faults Plato for naively believing that the movement and availability of words can be 
controlled and directed, their meaning contained and kept from “rogue” listeners or 
interpreters. In contrast, Rancière celebrates the quality of words that is beyond our 
greatest efforts at control, the mutability of our conventions of hearing, feeling, and 
seeing—something Habermas does not take adequately into account. Overhearing gives 
evidence of our lack of control, by intercepting words, interrupting their context, taking 
speech out of the narrow world in which utterances are being heard by those they are 
directed towards and those hearers only. The “wrong” people can get hold of words not 
intended for or directed towards them. Overhearing can position subjects in unusual 
relationships to dominant modes of understanding. Overhearing a scene brings a whole 
new set of conditions on those utterances—as the original conditions required for the 
words to be understandable and have effect change. The overhearer need not—often 
cannot—submit to the conditions of validity set up by the original conversants in order to 
give grounds for mutual understanding. 
Overhearing as Trigger for Democratic Politics in Measure for Measure 
 Before I turn to the play I will examine in some depth, Measure for Measure, I 
should briefly address a popular understanding of overhearing in Shakespeare put forth 
by Harold Bloom in Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (1998). Bloom’s 
fascinating thesis is that “self-overhearing” is the path to autonomous individuality of 
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character in Shakespeare.110 He argues: “In Shakespeare, characters develop rather than 
unfold, and they develop because they reconceive themselves. Sometimes this comes 
about because they overhear themselves talking, whether to themselves or to others. Self-
overhearing is their royal road to individuation” (Bloom 1998: xvii). Characters revise 
their sense of self over the course of a play through overhearing themselves. But I want to 
highlight how, although overhearing the self can function to push an individual to take 
stock and reassess, overhearing others can form subjectivity or “subjectivate” (to use 
Foucault’s term to describe the subject in relation to norms and authority; Foucault 1995) 
in no less powerful ways. What is most interesting to me about overhearing others is that 
it takes place at the cusp of the public and the private (even if it is typically figured as 
private, insofar as overhearing is associated with the illicit, the hidden, the intimate). 
Michael Warner contrasts “circulating forms of public address” with poetry that is “read 
as overheard” (Warner 1999: 81, 85). In the former, there exists “an awareness of the 
distribution of speech” that is always lacking in the latter (ibid., 85). But I would further 
distinguish between what is read and what is heard as “overheard”: the latter has even 
greater power. For Warner, the private does not have much potential disrupt the 
hierarchical order of things and “bring into being realms of subjectivity,” new 
“vocabularies of affect, styles of embodiment” outside the normative” (Warner 1999: 58, 
57). Shakespeare shows how an attention to overheard speech, which collapses the 
distinction between public and private, brings to the fore the new modes of subjectivity. 
                                                
110 I wish it to be clear as well my rejection, following Rancière (1999), of this liberal model of the subject 
who precedes political actions. There was no model of the rational, autonomous, ultra-distinct self in the 
Renaissance—selves were seen as permeated by feelings and sense and words—despite what Bloom argues 
(Bloom 1998). 
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 Shakespeare’s plays often contest the common belief that what is overheard is 
more “truthful.” Overhearing is often deceptive in one way or another—either we 
misrecognize the words and jump to untoward conclusions (like Polonius, Othello, 
perhaps Troilus) or we stumble upon a scene (as the Duke of Measure for Measure, for 
example, undertakes disguise explicitly for the purpose of overhearing). In this play, at 
the end, the Duke seems to wangle something resembling law and order out of a mass of 
deception and scheming. This is truth built on a lie, a truth cocooned within a lie: The 
dramatic resolution scene at the end, where hidden truths come to light, hinges on this 
one overheard scene. Disguise and fakery and play-acting, paradoxically, leads to a 
greater truth. Disguise even rectifies past mistakes: “So disguise shall, by th’ disguised, / 
Pay with falsehood false exacting, / And perform an old contracting” (MM 3.1.500-502). 
A falsehood perpetrated on another falsehood allows the contract to be fulfilled. 
Marriage—this communal tie—is cemented through deceit. Bernice Kliman notes the 
importance in this play of deciphering “between a lie for gain and a lie to advance the 
truth” (Kliman 2012: 150). In other plays, lies are destructive, but in Measure for 
Measure Shakespeare shows us the necessity of lies to hold together a community. 
 In Measure for Measure, the act of overhearing in itself does not repartition the 
sensible to create what Rancière calls “politics,” freeing subjects from social purpose, 
function and place (what Rancière calls “the police order;” Rancière 2000). I do, 
however, argue for the connection between the two, because overhearing makes 
Rancièrean politics possible in this play. Against what the police order dictates as to what 
can be seen, heard, and done, the overhearer disassembles this partition of the legible and 
illegible. What happens in the final scene of Measure for Measure, when Isabella makes 
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claims on the community in which she declares herself to be a part, is a democratic 
moment—a moment just as democratic and perhaps more so than most of the moments 
happening today under our so-called democratic governments. I follow Rancière in 
separating a so-called democratic regime from democracy, which are practices, “singular 
and precarious acts,” in which equality is verified, practices that interrupt ostensibly 
democratic regimes (again, “police orders” for Rancière): “the laws and institutions of 
formal democracy are appearances under which, and instruments by which, the power of 
the bourgeois class is exercised” (Rancière 2006: 97, 3). If democracy is not a regime but 
rather a force (it is never something we live in), then its elements can exist in any 
historical structure of government. Shakespeare lived in a police order, according to 
Rancière, but so do we. Rancière would see our governments on a continuum—different 
in degree but not terribly much in kind. As Rancière says, there are better and worse 
police orders.  
Instead Rancière’s concern is with equality embodied in “concrete life and 
sensible experience” (Rancière 2006: 3). When I refer to democracy in this dissertation, I 
consider it an assemblage, a relational network of and between ideas and forces, and the 
value I most privilege in this assemblage is equality. Democracy is neither simply a set of 
values (Brettscheider 2006) nor a practice (Zivi 2012), but rather democracy is a practice 
that engenders and reimagines those values every time it is practiced. I follow agonistic 
democrats like Rancière (1999), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000) in associating 
democracy with conflict. Conflict and equality work hand in glove: as Adam Phillips 
writes, “Equality is the legitimation, if not the celebration, of conflict” and this is 
primarily due to the fact that “Conflict that is not between equals ceases to be conflict 
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very quickly” (Phillips 2002: 11, 12). It becomes intimidation and cowering, domination 
and obeying. True democracy is a felt space without those who know “better,” the experts 
or general authorities who tell others how the world works. But democracy, importantly, 
is also not “a world upside down” if that means there is still solid ground under our feet, 
with those formerly on the bottom of the social ladder now occupying the top positions, 
because democracy is without positions at all—for to have any place at all in any order 
would be to just another instance of “police logic.” Instead, democracy entails being 
comfortable with placelessness. Importantly, democracy can be seen in moments of 
conflict and disagreement over words during this final scene. 
 Although the act of overhearing (when the Duke, in disguise, hears Isabella tell 
her brother the proposition the new ruler Angelo has made to her—demanding her 
virginity for her brother’s life) itself is not a moment of politics in this play, it is this act 
of overhearing that ultimately leads to “the sudden revelation of the ultimate anarchy on 
which any hierarchy rests,” the paradoxical revelation that for there to be ruler and ruled 
presupposes the equality of the ruler and the ruled, the ability for each to hear and 
communicate with the other, to recognize logos coming from their mouths (Rancière 
1999: 16). A part of the political order is claimed by Isabella, a woman Rancière would 
say who has no part in that order but who speaks as if she does. Here, it is because the 
Duke has overheard the previous scene and believed, then, that Isabella spoke the truth 
that he is able, now, to believe she is truthful in proclaiming Angelo’s dishonorable 
intentions (though she in fact lies—on the advice of the Duke). In this play, which seems 
to veer towards tragedy and comedy but fly below the level of both, it seems that the truth 
needs the motor of a lie to circulate as truth, to gain recognition as truth. The play in fact 
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turns on the overheard scene, as the Duke gathers information from his people through 
the medium of disguise. 
 The scene in which Isabella exposes Angelo is full of the excess of words—a 
phrase Rancière uses to refer to the uncontrollability of language by human beings. This 
excess is a disordering principle, a force that threatens the police order, interrupting the 
relation between the proper arrangement of words given by the police order and words’ 
functions (Rancière and Panagia cited in Chambers 2013: 116). Chambers notes that no 
philosophy of order, not Plato’s, not Habermas’s, can prevent or control “the excess of 
words”: “politics requires, calls upon, and paradoxically also brings about, an excess of 
words” (Chambers 2013: 91). First, we hear Isabella’s own excess of words: her 
emotional vowels (“O royal Duke!” “O worthy prince” “O worthy Duke”) underlie her 
fervent will to expose how she has been “wronged” (Measure for Measure 5.1.20, 22, 28, 
21).111 Smith tells us that “o is the most intense vowel sound in English: it strikes the ear 
more forcefully than other vowel sounds” (Smith 2004: 166).112 There is also an excess 
of words from observers like Lucio, who is told to shut up numerous times but fails to 
submit to silencing. In discussing a moment of democratic politics from the 18th Century, 
Rancière writes, ”Women were excluded from the benefits of having citizens' rights in 
the name of a division between the public and the private sphere. In belonging to the 
domestic sphere, hence to the world of particularity, they were foreign to the universality 
of the citizen sphere" (Rancière 2006: 60). There is a certain partition of the perceptible 
                                                
111 References to Measure for Measure are hereafter abbreviated as MM.	  
112 These pre-verbal O’s are Isabella’s passageway to subjecthood. She finds herself situated as an 
intelligible being through these fluid, emotional cries. Her intelligibility as a woman is a product of 
language, which precedes her. A wonderful way to describe this coming-into-being-through-phone/logos 
(for it is impossible to distinguish between Isabella’s political request—logos—and her cries as indexing 
her emotional wounds—phone) would be as a moment of politics, “the unstable state and instant of 
language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” (Chambers 2013: 
112). Moreover, there is no way to distinguish logos and phone here. 
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that separates speech from noise in the same way the public and its citizens are separated 
from the private and the unaccounted-for. Men in the public sphere have historically 
made the rules governing women’s “appearing,” deciding what can be counted and 
recognized as discourse and what is simply noise. “There is a mode of being-together that 
puts bodies in their place and their role according to their ‘properties,’ according to their 
name or lack of a name, the ‘logical’ or ‘phonic’ nature of sounds that come out of their 
mouths” (Rancière 1999: 27). This is especially applicable to women, who have been 
seen historically as “hysterical” and “overly emotional” and hence not worthy of being 
understood as sensical, speaking beings. 
 In order to force her male listeners to pay her heed in an environment that must 
have been terrifying to her, Isabella kneels (showing the bodily signs of requesting leave 
to be heard and believed) and repeats her words in a futile effort to make them register a 
certain way (i.e., maybe if she says the word “justice” enough times, she will actually 
receive it). This is a play very concerned with the way words effect others, their 
perlocutionary force, and how this force is distorted when passion effects the hearers or 
the speakers. Klimen notes that Isabella sometimes fails to say what she means, and 
Isabella herself says that “It oft falls out / To have what we would have, we speak not 
what we mean” (MM 2.4.118-9).113 She does not mean necessarily that our desire gets the 
better of us and usurps the “meaning” of our words, but that there is always a gap 
between meaning and motives, or intentions. It is hard for our spoken utterances to align 
perfectly with our thoughts, especially with the added pressure that those words have a 
certain meaning for the listener (which we cannot control). Her brother speaks of her 
                                                
113 Whereas for Isabella this seems unintentional, Angelo brags, in more sinister fashion, “I can speak / 
Against the thing I say” (MM 2.4.59-60). 
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“prosperous art / When she will play with reason and discourse” (MM 1.2.161-2), her 
persuasive skills. This hint that Isabella can “play with” her words foreshadows how she 
repartitions the sensible in the final scene. “Playing with reason” seems a way to make 
one’s listeners “hear green,” hear more than the rational, and it is telling that, when first 
trying to convince Angelo to free her brother, Isabella asks him to get in touch with his 
senses: “Go to your bosom, / Knock there, and ask your heart what it doth know…” (MM 
2.2.136-7). Unfortunately, Angelo becomes more like a lover whose hearts knocks him 
down as he undergoes a passionate transformation as he listens to her. The nature of how 
we hear affects us—disinterestedly, passionately, rationally—and Angelo (perhaps like 
the Duke when he overhears Isabella and her brother and maybe then and there decides 
that he wants to marry her) hears the same way Othello and Troilus do. All three hear 
green. 
 But when Isabella first comes on the public scene, it is she who seems 
overwhelmed with emotion. Give me “justice, justice, justice, justice!” she demands; 
“Hear me, O hear me, hear!” (MM 5.1.25, 32). These outbursts lead Angelo to say, “My 
lord, her wits, I fear me, are not firm” (MM 5.1.33). Isabella then proceeds to mock 
Angelo’s words, almost mimicking him. When he warns the Duke, “she will speak most 
bitterly and strange,” she responds, “Most strange, but yet most truly, will I speak. / That 
Angelo’s forsworn, is it not strange? / That Angelo’s a murderer, is’t not strange? / That 
Angelo is an adulterous thief, / An hypocrite, a virgin-violator / Is it not strange, and 
strange?” (MM 5.1.37-42). The anaphora and repetition of “strange” five times give her 
speech an insistent, poetic quality. In the syntax of her emotion, she affectively 
redescribes the habits of Angelo’s transgressions, rendering his authority vulnerable. Her 
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insistent repetitions signal an excess of words that democratically disrupts the given 
partition of the sensory realm, repartitioning it, remaking it. She supplements and 
unsettles the available structures of feeling in the state’s social imaginary. The Duke 
somewhat comically doubles her by saying, “Nay, it is ten times strange!” (MM 5.1.43), 
but then marks her speech as incomprehensible and not worth the listening when he says, 
“Away with her. Poor soul, / She speaks not in th’infirmity of sense” (MM 5.1.47-8). Her 
words are inaudible. This is phone, not logos, he tells the crowd. But she perseveres until 
he begins to credit her spoken words differently. “Her madness hath the oddest frame of 
sense,” he admits (MM 5.1.61). Perhaps learning her lesson from her previous failed 
attempts to conjure more “heart” in her listeners, or “play with reason,” she now asks the 
Duke to listen with reason: “do not banish reason / For inequality”—by which she means, 
the inequality in rank between myself and Angelo, or you, or between what I say and 
what seems truthful (MM 5.1.65-6). The norms of legitimacy would discredit her speech 
as that of an hysterical woman. But here the logic of equality confronts the order of 
domination—and Isabella conjoins them. Her speech both renders that order visible—
Angelo’s tyranny—and renders intelligible the woman—herself—who was previously 
unintelligible. Whereas before she was excluded from the field of the sensible, the 
perceptual, her words inaudible, now her voice is recognized, her presence made visible. 
She is no longer beyond the limits of Viennese perception. She speaks of her submission 
to authority, admitting dependency, even as she challenges the status quo: as Karen Zivi 
writes, “Sometimes refusing what we are requires that we acknowledge what we have 
been understood to be” (Zivi 2012: 88). She expands our conceptions of womanhood, 
stretches the boundaries of the socially intelligible, demanding to be recognized as 
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neither saint nor whore (the two categories into which women are partitioned in Measure 
for Measure’s Vienna). 
 The word “strange” would resonate in telling ways to Shakespeare’s 
contemporaries: as meaning “unknown, unfamiliar,” but also “difficult to take in or 
account for; queer, surprising, unaccountable” and “having the feelings alienated” 
(“strange,” OED, 7, 10a, 11a). For Rancière, moments of politics are also moments of 
surprise, moments that defy attempts at prediction (Chambers 2013: 5). Shakespeare uses 
“strange” in these senses in other of his plays. Isabella brings into being a new, “strange” 
order of the sensible for this moment. Not because the man in power has fallen (again, 
Rancière is clear that turning the world “upside down” is not necessarily politics) but 
because he is seen, perceived, and heard differently. 
 Critics often lament Isabella’s lack of freedom in this play, the way she is 
controlled by the Duke and becomes, at the end of the play, “a shadow of her former 
articulate self” (Riefer 1987: 132; Cox 1983; Cacicedo 1995; McLuskie 1985). But when 
she accuses Angelo in public, although she is doing as she is told by the Duke, she 
exhibits a courage unparalleled by many of Shakespeare’s heroines. Isabella is brave to 
accuse Angelo at a time when just defending a woman’s virtue in public already 
condemned her as a whore for venturing out in public in the first place. This is a moment 
of politics for Rancière because “Politics has no ‘proper’ place nor does it possess any 
‘natural’ subjects” (Rancière 2001: par. 25). “A demonstration is political not because it 
takes place in a specific locale and bears upon a particular object but rather because its 
form is that of a clash between two partitions of the sensible” (ibid.). Although there is no 
guarantee that her utterance will be understood or even acknowledged, in speaking as if 
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she were a protected subject of the political order, Isabella resignifies what it means to be 
a Viennese woman. 
 When Lucio jumps in to confirm her story, the Duke silences him: “You were not 
bid to speak,” and, later, “you are i’the wrong / To speak before your time” (MM 5.1.78, 
86-7). The Duke has been rightly likened to a “writer/producer/director” of his own 
carefully crafted play (Riefer 1987: 134). He seeks to posit an order of the sensible in his 
ideal image. The Duke “will lie right and left…merely for the sake of squeezing the last 
drops of drama or melodrama from the situation” (Goddard 1987: 31). As a disguised 
friar, overhearing others and unable to respond (this must have been especially frustrating 
when Lucio slanders him to his face), the Duke now compensates for his former lack: he 
imposes an order, partitioning silence and speech. He insists that Lucio know his place. 
This is a police order that regulates “right” and “wrong” speech, the “right” and “wrong” 
time and place for discourse, audible subjects and those without a voice. 
 Isabella maintains that although the Duke may feel her words to be “madly 
spoken,” her words are “to the matter,” i.e., appropriate and reasonable (MM 5.1.88, 9). 
She challenges the Duke’s power to partition the sensible and divide logos so easily from 
phone. Cultivating a third ear, hearing green, means being attuned to phone and logos 
both. Nietzsche is a theorist who continually invites his readers to hear green. As John 
Hamilton notes, for Nietzsche, “rational language, which is based on fixed identities and 
conventional agreement, belongs to the herd” (Hamilton 2008: 208). The Duke wants to 
hear Isabella’s language as “rational,” but it keeps getting clouded over by the non-
rational. This is why Rancière calls attention to the “duality of the logos as speech and 
account of speech” (Rancière 1999: 43). The Duke’s account of Isabella’s speech paints it 
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as phone. But no one can make a “choice between the enlightenment of rational 
communication” and what Rancière calls “the violence of the irrational” (ibid., 43). 
These are false alternatives. 
 Isabella, as noted above, repeats her words. Her efforts at being understood, and 
her ultimately perplexing silence at the end, confirms Nietzsche’s observation that “Our 
true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if 
they tried: they lack the right words. We have already gone beyond whatever we have 
words for” (Nietzsche 1990: 66). This is what Rancière terms “mute speech,” a phrase 
meant to indicate the difficulty of giving an accurate rendering of things in words, and 
also the lack of things existing in already determined places in a hierarchy (Rancière 
2011). Words cannot place the objects of our world in immutable positions: hence the 
political power of language to change our ways of doing and being and speaking. This is 
why cultivating a third ear entails so many democratic possibilities—communication 
through bodies, combining both noise- and reason-based exchange. It is when we hear 
words differently that they disrupt the logic of the police order, the old rigid order of 
experience and perception. Of course there is a risk this listening can lead to an outcome 
like Othello experiences: overcome with the passions, hearing too much green. But the 
risk is worth the consequences. There is more life, energy and dynamism in hearing 
green. 
 Sara Kofman captures the complexity of Nietzsche’s third ear very well: listening 
with a third ear means “understanding” “without demanding logic or demonstration, 
without attempting to ‘unveil’ truth” (Kofman quoted in Vitanza 1997: 167). Listening to 
the tempo or pitch of sounds may distract us from the meaning of the words, but this 
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distraction is part of a richer listening process. Psychoanalyst Theodor Reik, in his book 
Listening with the Third Ear (1948), distinguishes between conjecture and 
comprehension. In overhearing, there is—must be—much conjecture. This is what Iagos 
take advantage of. Reik explains that, when doctor listens to patient, “social sense and 
rhythmic sensitivity are inseparable. … To say the right thing is largely to say it at the 
right moment” (Reik paraphrased in Arnold 2006: 755). But when one overhears at the 
“wrong” moment, this is when either tragedy ensues, or possibilities take root. For Reik, 
rational thought must eventually step in so that comprehension can occur, but I do not 
think Nietzsche would have us make that choice. 
 Nietzsche does speak of understanding when he speaks of the third ear, which 
indicates rationality at work in deciphering meaning, but he prizes both “art and purpose” 
(Nietzsche 1966: 182). Rationality is not the arbiter Reik would make it. To appreciate 
artful language requires “a subtle and patient ear” (ibid.). Nietzsche takes pride in his 
own swashbuckling with words: according to him, he “handles his language like a 
flexible rapier, feeling from his arm down to his toes the dangerous delight of the 
quivering, over-sharp blade that desire to bite, hiss, cut” (Nietzsche 1966: 183, my 
emphasis). Words for him are bodily; they do things both to them that wield them and to 
those that feel their force, dangerous things, but the audience must be receptive to 
appreciate their full power, and this is what Nietzsche laments among his contemporary 
Germans. There are both pros and cons to Nietzsche’s approach to language, the 
approach of the ancients. Having a third ear upsets the order of things, renders strange 
what previously was assumed, makes Brummagem out of the once-genuine, translates 
confusion out of the once-obvious, generates a farrago of seeming absurdities out of the 
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once-serious. Nietzsche aspires to a language that will “grow into German hearts” 
(Nietzsche 1966: 184). The consequences are impossible to foresee. 
 Isabella declares a “wrong”—telling the public she has given her virginity to 
Angelo in exchange for her brother’s life—and although this is a lie, in doing so, she 
defamiliarizes traditional ideas of womanhood. Women are either associated with 
brothels (like Mistress Overdone) or the convent (as Isabella herself once was). In 
declaring herself neither, Isabella challenges the ways in which the city (the Duke and 
Angelo) makes womanhood intelligible in exclusionary ways. In a more literal way, 
Mariana does this as well when she rejects the labels of wife, widow and maid all the 
while refusing to show her face (MM 5.1.170+). She is literally not visible because she 
refuses to locate herself within traditional female identity categories. Isabella’s story of 
rape by Angelo, which she tells in public, makes visible current power relationships 
between men and women, citizen and non-citizen, while at the same time reimagining 
these relationships with her words. Although Isabella’s efforts at persuasion seem to 
fail—the Duke dismisses her with, “thou know’st not what thou speak’st,” her story 
“imports no reason” (MM 5.1.105, 108), lacks logos—she shares her experience and 
invites others to perceive the world around her as she has, a patriarchal world in which 
women are subordinated, abused, and not believed. 
 Also, in declaring a “wrong,” she places the “wrong” in a common world that 
both she and her “betters” share. She enables democracy by making possible a 
clash/coming together—both a division and a gathering together—of worlds. The no-
count (Isabella) “reconstitutes community by placing a wrong in common that reveals 
‘the contradiction of two worlds in a single world: the world where they are and the 
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world where they are not’” (Rancière quoted in Zivi 2012: 92). Isabella creates a 
common stage for both oppressor and oppressed, even as that vertical hierarchy flattens 
out in the moment of politics she calls forth. 
 Isabella anticipates a disastrous reception in public. After Angelo prepositions 
her, she wonders aloud, “To whom shall I complain? Did I tell this, / Who would believe 
me?” (MM 2.4.171-2). Any “reasonable” person would stay silent about the injustice, 
Angelo assumes (MM 4.4.24). The police order has already set up an order of speech and 
the visible, an order that was not a bit disrupted when the Duke left and was replaced by 
Angelo. It is Angelo’s place in that order—and the reputation that follows from that 
place—that make her words nonsensical. Although Isabella at first threatens Angelo, her 
language is telling. “[W]ith an outstretched throat I’ll tell the world aloud / What man 
thou art” (MM 2.4.153-4). There is something grotesque here. The somatic, anatomical 
focus on her “throat” already aligns her words with a mere animal making noise. Both 
animals and humans have throats, but humans, to be understood, must have more. Angelo 
stands as “the voice of the recorded law” (MM 2.4.61) whereas Isabella possesses a mere 
throat. He responds to her threats with reference to “my place i’th’ state” (MM 2.4.156); 
his lofty subject position will assure that his location in the hierarchy stays put. Angelo 
has already defended his reputation by slandering another woman, his betrothed Mariana, 
when she lost her fortune, and here he threatens to do the same to Isabella. Women are 
passive subjects to the order of the sensible set up by the rulers of Vienna. Reputation is 
an order of the sensible, an invisible yet very real frame that structures lives. Angelo’s 
reputation even leads him to take certain actions—ordering Claudio’s death—that accord 
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with this frame of reference. What Isabella does in the final scene is shatter that rigid 
grid, disrupt the order of the sensible by which she is understood (or not understood). 
While traditionally, it is rulers who get to decide whose speech is considered 
intelligible and whose not, the Duke’s speech, while disguised, itself comes under 
question. While overhearing others, the Duke is invisible, outside the order of the 
sensible—although this is his choice. When he disappears from view, he gives up the 
privileges of intelligibility. Often the Duke says one thing and does another, leading to 
confusion in those with whom he interacts. As the Duke tells an unbelieving Provost, 
“Put not yourself into amazement how these things should be. All difficulties are but easy 
when they are known” (MM 4.2.186-8). The Duke is aware of his changeable ways; as he 
tells Friar Peter, “hold you ever to our special drift [purpose] / Though sometimes you do 
blench [swerve] from his to that / As cause doth minister [serve]” (MM 4.5.4-6). When 
the “cause” swerves, so does the effect. The Duke’s “special drift,” which drifts under the 
public eye as that which passes show, that which is private and inaccessible, is ill-
matched with the steady flow of public affairs, which must seem orderly and logical. As 
Escalus notes, “Every letter he hath writ hath disvouched other [repudiated the others]” 
(MM 4.4.1). Angelo seconds this with, “In most uneven and distracted manner. His 
actions show much like to madness” (MM 4.4.2-3). The Duke seems to have no 
constancy of mind.114 Is it really for him to say that Isabella makes no sense? But there is 
no one to put the Duke in his place. 
                                                
114 I would suggest that a main reason for the Duke’s seeming madness, his inconstancy of mind, may be 
that he overhears private truths that change his public plan of action. If facts are not logical, if they do not 
fall into a common-sense sequence, neither do all of the secret facts the Duke becomes privy to. It is easy to 
keep to the structured advance of public activities when the private unexpectedness of secret events are 
kept from one’s knowledge. 
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 In contrast to overhearing scenes where the overhearer is in a position of 
weakness, listening with preconceptions planted in their mind by others (i.e., Iagos, or the 
general misogynic view that assumes women are more inconstant and changeable in their 
affections than men—which would “explain” both Desdemona and Cressida), the Duke is 
in a god-like position as overhearer. The Duke goes about unseen eavesdropping on 
others and this allows him to learn everybody’s secrets. As Katharine Maus observes, 
“English Renaissance writers associate power that takes the form of invisible 
omniscience not only with God with also with the machiavel who denies God even while 
appropriating his attributes. Both characteristics have been accorded the Duke by 
different critics, and each receives some support in the play” (Maus 1995: 178). G. 
Wilson Knight reminds us that Angelo compares the Duke to the “power divine” (MM 
5.1.361) and argues, “The Duke, like Jesus, is the prophet of a new order of ethics,” 
representing “a perfected ethical philosophy joined to supreme authority” (Knight 1930: 
88, 91). This reading, I am afraid, gives the Duke too much. After all, the play does not 
end in a better place than it starts. It is merely an interlude, without a solution to the 
problem the Duke sets out to solve at the beginning: sexual license in the city. Rules are 
still not being followed at the end, and it seems doubtful that the laws will be enforced 
with greater severity given that the Duke cannot even sentence the murderer Bernadine to 
death because Bernadine refuses. Whereas when Othello and Polonious overhear, tragedy 
ensures, that is clearly not what happens here. Just the opposite: tragedy is averted by the 
Duke’s overhearing. 
 What makes the Duke God-like is this omniscient quality, his ability to overhear 
everything. Of course, we overhear everything in light of our own emotions, hopes, 
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anxieties. There is always a frame of reference. I here want to draw on a tradition of 
thinking about reading as a way to create meaning in order to better understand 
overhearing as repartitioning the sensible (de Certeau 1995; Mailloux 1982; Iser 1972). 
While the end of the play concludes with a continuation of the police order, the Duke’s 
overhearing and interception, his decision to recognize Isabella as a speaking being with 
logos, also includes or highlights the moment of politics that Isabella brings forth (and 
quickly vanishes). 
The Duke’s Resistant Overhearing 
The way Rancière describes the police order shares much with the way Adorno 
describes the machinations of the culture industry: everything is manufactured “more or 
less according to plan….ordering themselves into a system almost without a gap” 
(Adorno 2003: 55). The culture industry is a policing system. Subjects are counted 
“according to plan” with the impossible aim that there are no “gaps,” no remainders or 
supplements. As Rancière says, “our governments take great care to banish the 
democratic supplement”—to depoliticize citizens so that “experts can quietly agree 
amongst themselves” (Rancière 2006: 81, 82).115 This leads Rancière to lament what 
passes for politics today: “the logic of the consensual order” (ibid., 92)—the fact that 
voting has come to simply signify agreement with the government’s decisions, a so-
called politics where everyone agrees. Sadly, people just choose between oligarchs when 
they go to the polls; decisions depend upon experts and not popular choice (ibid., 78). 
This leads to “the consensual forgetting of democracy” (ibid., 92). We become a society 
of uncritical yes-sayers, eroding the possibility for a democratic politics. 
                                                
115 We might also figure the overhearer as supplement. Politics makes possible an alternative way of 
counting to the police order’s math, one that might include the overhearer. 
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 Adorno paints consumers of the culture industry as passive children, easily 
influenced by what they hear or see. “The power of the culture industry’s ideology is 
such that conformity has replaced consciousness” (Adorno 2003: 59). The future of 
democratic society hangs in the balance: The cultural industry “impedes the development 
of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for 
themselves. These, however, would be the precondition for a democratic society which 
needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and develop” (ibid., 60). This 
model of consuming does not leave much room for what Michel de Certeau describes as 
resistance, fugitive reading, “tactics and games played with the text” (de Certeau 1995: 
150, 160).116 Adorno underestimates the potential for varied responses to the “same” text. 
 Rancière gives readers more credit than Adorno. Perception is also a form of 
acting that “is already a means of transforming” the world (Rancière 2009: 277). When 
he overhears, the Duke partakes in what de Creteau calls “an initiatory mode of reading” 
(de Certeau 1995: 161)—a mode that undermines the assumptions of passive 
spectatorship. Through his secretive, illicit hearing, the Duke negotiates the terms of the 
problem he overhears. He reinvents new solutions that neither Isabella nor her brother 
could foresee. In overhearing, he not only discovers meaning but creates it. There is no 
unadulterated message that we can locate as originally starting from Isabella and her 
brother and proceeding to the overhearer. The Duke has his own past experiences, his 
                                                
116 De Certeau takes a more cynical view of “hearing green,” the Renaissance bodily response to words. 
Certeau writes, “In earlier times, the reader interiorized the text; he made his voice the body of the other; he 
was its actor. Today, the text no longer imposes its own rhythm on the subject, it no longer manifests itself 
through the reader’s voice” (De Certeau 1995: 160). The less control the text enacts upon the reader, the 
more creative the reader can be (ibid., 157). This is good news for Certeau because “the geographical 
configuration of the text organizes the activity of the reader less and less” (ibid., 161)—the reader is freer 
to escape the long arms of the text. Speed reading with the eye is a technique Certeau recommends to 
escape the prison of bodily reading. De Certeau hates the bodily reading that Nietzsche praises. But 
Nietzsche loves it when words do things, when his readers “read with their ears” (Nietzsche 1966: 182). 
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own agenda and outlook. The meaning of the scene is constituted by the process the 
overhearer undergoes as he (the Duke) cultivates or “extrapolates” meaning—it does not 
fully exist prior to the listening (Mailloux 1982: 28). There is never a way to verify 
objective or “original” meaning, and it is therefore very ironic that overheard scenes are 
considered more “truthful.” 
 One of the first moves the Duke makes after overhearing the scene between 
Isabella and her brother is to lie: He tells Claudio that Angelo “had never the purpose to 
corrupt her [Isabella],” that he was only testing her virtue, and that there is no way for 
Claudio to escape death (MM 3.1.163-4). But even more impressive/questionable is his 
next move. He tells Isabella, "The assault that Angelo hath made to you fortune hath 
conveyed to my understanding” (MM 3.1.184-5), thereby attributing his opportunity at 
eavesdropping to “fortune.” He does not feel any need to excuse his nosiness, that he 
purposely orchestrated the overhearing and asked the Provost explicitly to conceal him so 
that he may listen unobserved. He presents it as a lucky chance. He then unfolds the plot 
he seems to have hatched in mere minutes. He not only lies to others himself, as the 
disguised “Duke of dark corners” (MM 4.3.147), but he forces others to lie in hopes that 
all these lies will come to serve the greater truth in the end—will allow the truth of 
Angelo’s lechery to be exposed to public view. 
 New Historicist critics (Greenblatt 1982; McCanles 1980), following 
Tennenhouse (1986), consider Measure for Measure to be one of a number of “disguised 
ruler plays,” which index an “anxiety-inducing model of Jacobean surveillance” 
(Quarmby 2012: 25). These critics argue that the expression of royal authority in these 
plays resembles a juridico-political power structure described by Foucault, where the 
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state observes everything. The Duke resembles James I, these critics claim, and the plays 
call forth a “‘new and distinctively Jacobean strategy of representing the orderly state’ 
under the absolutist, divine, and lawful rule of James” (Quarmby 2012 citing Goldberg 
1983: 7). Applying this Foucauldian power model to the play, we can see more clearly 
the intrenched workings of hegemony (represented by the Duke and Angelo) and 
subversion (represented by Lucio’s outbursts) in the play. A police order, as Rancière 
tells us, is about roles and parts, who is visible and who is not. In this play, the prostitutes 
are invisible; the nuns are invisible—but the play depends on their invisible presence. 
The degraded and shameful are both unseen and essential to the action. 
 Not only does the Duke overhear others but he also uses overhearing to his 
advantage. The Duke says that because he has “strewed it in the common ear” (MM 
1.3.15) that he has travelled to Poland, it is believed. He circulates rumors instead of 
issuing public proclamations perhaps not only because he professes to hate public shows 
but also because in disseminating knowledge this way, the people think they are 
overhearing some truths and it is more likely to be believed. The Duke never tells Angelo 
directly where he is going. He tells the common people first and has Angelo overhear it. 
We get a sense that in this city, news circulates via gossip. The Duke’s Vienna is 
evidently an enormous whispering gallery. The first thing the Duke says upon his return 
to the city is that “we hear” such good things about Angelo and Escalus (MM 5.1.5). 
Immediately we get this sense of rumors, hear say, what people are talking about, 
publicness. 
 It is because so much that is hidden greases the wheels of action in this play that 
overhearing—existing as it does on the nexus between public and private, blurring the 
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borders of these would-be separate spheres and making any attempt at a pure politics 
futile—has such radical potential to repartition the sensible. In a way similar to Isabella’s 
reconfiguration of the police order’s partition of the universal public man and the private 
sphere of woman, overhearing politicizes the border between public and private. The 
Duke extends the coercive power of his authority when he engages Isabella in his plot 
after overhearing her exchange with Claudio. There is no realm for private individuals to 
go unseen. At the end of the play especially, we are left to ponder the connection between 
inwardness and outer worlds, left with most characters’ silence, heightened next to the 
Duke’s public prolixity. Much of the action of the play occurs in private—or, 
importantly, what characters think is private, but which turns out not to be. Isabella bears 
her secret to Claudio thinking she does so in private. Angelo has sex with Mariana 
thinking he does so in private. Claudio exchanges marriage vows with Juliet thinking it 
will be private. This is a police order that operates on a model of the disguised, the 
unseen. The play also calls attention to the emotional force behind the concepts of public 
and private, as the staging of state power takes over all realms. 
 The Duke turns to the private realm and eschews pubic show at the start of the 
play because he believes it to be more honest. The Duke assumes that what takes place in 
private is more true: for example, the Duke can assure Angelo of Mariana’s virtue 
because he was her confessor (MM 5.1.520). The whole point of his going in disguise 
stems from his thinking that you can have access to deeper truths via eavesdropping. 
There is this assumption that you can ferret out “deeper truths.” The closer one is 
physically to something, he assumes, the closer to the truth of it. He doesn’t like being 
looked at from afar because mere looking will always misjudge. In an unconsciously self-
 238 
aggrandizing speech, he laments alone: “O rank and greatness, millions of misjudging 
eyes / Are fixed upon thee; volumes of rumors / Run with their false and most misguided 
inquiry / Upon thy doing; thousand sallies of wit / Make thee the subject of their idle 
fantasy / And misrepresent thee in their fancies” (MM 4.1.56). Lucio proves the truth of 
the Duke’s worry here—you can only know so much about a public figure and the rest is 
easy to invent and subject to “idle fantasy.” Lucio probably has had minimal interaction 
with the Duke and extrapolates from there. Stagings never quite give the full outward 
truth to the people. In this play, the public is code for the false. Even though the truth of 
Angelo’s dishonesty comes out in a huge public show at the end, this public show keeps 
some truths hidden from its audience—in Isabella’s silent response to the proposal of 
marriage, for example. We are confronted with our very real epistemological limits, even 
as for the majority of the play, the Duke has bravely attempted to deny them. 
 Vienna in this play is a patriarchal society where everyone knows his or her place, 
and after a brief scene of politics, the old structures of power reassert themselves as 
subjects are drawn back into their former positions. The title “measure for measure” 
raises questions of equality and exchange, how to make the punishment “fit” the crime. 
But we learn that the judgments of the police order can only be haphazard and arbitrary: 
hence marriage as punishment. Importantly, the problems that plague the city at the start 
of the play have nothing to do with the positions subjects occupy. Everyone is still 
properly rooted in his or her place at the end. The conventional relations of outcast and 
ruler, baud and priest, remain. Sexual licentiousness does not threaten the fundamental 
order of things. When the Duke disguises himself and leaves Angelo in charge, he does 
not create a new order. Politics only occurs with the improper appearance of Isabella on 
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the public stage to expose the wrong done her by Angelo, the injustice of the police logic 
of carefully partitioned parts and a priori roles. The Duke sets the play in motion because 
he desires to know, when “power changes purpose, what our seemers be” (MM 1.3.54). 
In Measure for Measure, what is unsaid and private is aligned with the “true essence,” 
“what our seemers be,” underneath a false public show, a seeming. Overhearing and 
inwardness, official staging and concealment, obedience and subversion mutually 
construct and require one another in an ongoing give-and-take that only seems to end 
when the friar is exposed as the Duke in Act 5. 
What motivates the action in this police order—what triggers the Duke’s 
overhearing, what generates the excess of words and the blurring of public and private 
that I have been describing—is the lack of effect of written texts: the laws have no power, 
no force, no bodily impact. The citizens are not affected by the laws and go about 
pursuing their vices. Angelo says to Isabella that with him in power, the law is “awake” 
(MM 2.2.93). The law is a sort of sense experience that the majority of Viennese are not 
feeling. There is still a hierarchy of places and functions—a police order—but Angelo’s 
job is to make that order visible, to make people feel the law again. He fails, in effect, 
because he feels too much. He illustrates one of the perils of hearing too much green: 
When he hears Isabella’s words begging him for her brother’s life, his passion for her, 
and his passion for enforcing the letter of the law, outweighs a rational reassessment of 
his extreme position. His third ear distorts his perspective. All manner of ignoble intrigue 
can then transpire due to Angelo’s lack of restraint. The trick to cultivating the third is to 
calibrate one’s listening to some local principal or ideal, measured by a sense of justice 
and morality (what Angelo lacks). Although Rancière never mentions a moral compass as 
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necessary to democratic politics, I believe one is necessary. It grows out of the political 
scene and can never be known in advance. 
 In speaking in public, in swearing that she “did yield” to Angelo (MM 5.1.101), 
Isabella erases the boundaries and distances between herself and the speaking subject 
who is believed. She stages the democratic voice in a scene originally devised by the 
police order, breaking out of that order. But this can only happen because the Duke 
overheard her tell her brother what Angelo proposed. The moment of politics that 
happens in Act 5 can only happen because of the overhearing. What we see in Measure 
for Measure is the fantasy that overhearing can give us access to an unknowable inner 
truth, but if the Duke repartitions the sensible through overhearing in this play, it is only 
to create another order of the police. If it is true that, “His whole plan may be viewed as a 
sort of play within a play to catch the conscience of his deputy—and of the city” 
(Goddard 1987: 25), then it is the Duke who sets the terms of intelligibility and those 
terms stay constant. 
 Sound was the most important sense in the Renaissance. Hearing “casts the 
subject in a more vulnerable position than seeing does;” Bacon writes that “it is Sound 
alone, that doth immediately, and incorporeally, affect most” (Bacon quoted in Smith 
2004: 177). How we react to what we overhear depends upon how we hear, if we “hear 
green” and resist narrowly focusing on speech’s legibility, or if we screen out non-
signifying sound and only hear logos. Each sense produces a remarkably different 
apprehension of scenes witnessed. Do we accept the appeal to the ear and its passions, 
with all the consequences? Angelo’s is a cautionary tale. Democracy, politics, 
disagreement, disordering, and the potential to take into account the unaccounted-for 
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flow through the cracks of word-sounds and their meanings. Overhearing troubles the 
differences between inner thoughts, words uttered in private, and public speech. The 
overheard is the publicly unaccounted-for. The question of how sound is recognized 
comes to the fore, as overhearing a scene brings a whole new set of conditions to those 
utterances. We are reminded of the plurality of perspectives that always helps constitute 
an utterance. We can more easily train our ears to listen well, to listen with all available 
senses, to “green” language, than we can control the outcomes of what we say. There are 
no guarantees when we engage in either activity, but an understanding of sensitive 
listening may draw us closer in our communicative engagement with one another, which 
underlies any notion of democracy—or it may not, given the necessary excess of sound-
words. Our beliefs and what and how we feel—our sentiments—are just as important to 
the act of listening to as understanding—rationally or intellectually—the words someone 
says. Perhaps a focus on cultivating our listening skills rather than only our speaking 
skills can actually enhance democracy. Language’s effects on us are beyond anyone’s 




Conclusion: Why Fakeness Doesn’t Matter, and Why Acting Helps Us Overcome 
Trauma 
 
In this dissertation, I have explored theatrical acting as a set of techniques and 
practices that can revitalize our democracy today. I have argued that the true is not 
always separate from the performed or scripted and that both should be valued when it 
comes to cementing political relationships, that sincerity can come from flagrant fakery, 
that democratic bonds can be forged and repartitioned in new ways through deceptive 
practices of overhearing, that optimism can challenge structures that maintain inequality, 
that there is a certain kind of courage that changes the atmospheric mood in which one 
finds oneself. We can learn in the scenes these plays present before us, in the 
circumstances of their characters and the affectspheres they create, lessons about our 
contemporary situations and the politics of our lives. 
Chapter one made a few points about the value of acting or disguise for fostering 
richer, more open, and more fluent democratic discussions. In chapter two, I took up 
characters in Shakespeare such as Rosalind and Falstaff for the comic courage in a 
playful mood that they exemplified. Comic courage allows them—and their modern-day 
inheritors such as Guido in Life Is Beautiful—to make the most of the situations they 
have been dealt. I then moved, in chapter three, to a discussion of optimism in order to 
show that this mood has the potential to challenge oppressive structural conditions and 
achieve equality with our fellows. My final chapter discussed overhearing as a technique 
to repartition the sensible and create moments of politics. The duke of Measure for 
Measure combines all these virtues: he acts to be more sincere (to learn more about his 
subjects and respond with compassion); he exhibits the courage of the coward (as there is 
cowardice involved in his being unable or fearing to implement harsher laws and 
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abdicating his duty117); and he holds fast to the optimism of the villain (he is optimistic 
about solving the city's problems and some might regard his deceit and seeming disregard 
of Isabella's will in the closing scene as villainous). The Duke is an actor, like Bottom, 
like our villains, like the courageous Rosalind. 
 There is a genre of film in which a character returns, usually just as that character 
is set to inherit some money, and that character’s family is unsure whether the character 
is really the long-lost one.118 In the film Anastasia (1956), for instance, an amnesiac is 
coached into pretending she is the youngest daughter of the assassinated Tsar Nicholas II 
of Russia. Her return is treated by suspicion but is nevertheless a joyous occasion: 
“Anastasia” is reunited with her fiancé and her grandmother, the Dowager Empress. She 
is welcomed by most of the Romanov family. Her return creates—or recreates—
relationships, a renewed sense of togetherness among friends and family. In the end, it 
does not matter any more whether she is real or not—so strong is the bond and the hope 
that cements that bond. The Dowager even tells “Anastasia,” “If it should not be you, 
don’t ever tell me” (Anastasia 1956). In this instance, because “Anastasia” is an amnesiac, 
she clings to that hope just as strongly as her family. She seeks an identity. The false or 
the true does not matter (the film leaves the question unanswered and ambiguous)—what 
matters is the assemblage created, the new sense of family togetherness. 
 Caroline? (1990) is a similar film, but the viewer eventually learns Caroline is a 
fake—just as the viewer of Measure for Measure knows that the friar is a fake (because 
                                                
117 Like a coward, the Duke shrouds himself from visibility as Angelo performs his dirty work: “I have on 
Angelo imposed the office, / Who may in th’ambush of my name strike home, / And yet my nature never in 
the fight…” (MM 1.3.40-42). The Duke, while lending Angelo his authority (“th’ambush of my name”) to 
clean up Dodge, will not engage his “nature” in the fight to morally improve the city. Angelo acts in his 
name but without his “nature”—as if the Duke leaves his empty cloak behind in the boxing ring. 
118 Sometimes these movies are simply thrillers and the returned character turns out to be homicidal or 
violent—but I am not interested in this off-shoot of the genre. Some examples include the TV series The 
Family (Bans 2016); the movies Libel (1959) and The Guest (2014). 
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the friar is the disguised duke). But the duplicity inherit in their identities do not stop 
either the friar or Caroline from accomplishing many good deeds. Recall, the friar 
undertakes disguise in order to overhear the secrets of his community in order to improve 
and to strengthen the bonds within that community. The friar wrests law and order from 
duplicity and deceit—another example of play-acting and disguise leading to a kind of 
truth. In this film, like in Anastasia, “Caroline” returns just before the deadline for 
claiming Caroline’s inheritance. She is up against a suspicious and implacable stepmother 
who undermines her every attempt to make her stepsiblings more self-sufficient. At the 
end of the film, “Caroline” has brought the family closer together, narrowed the 
emotional distance between members, and improved the siblings’ lives. The boy 
overcomes social isolation and the girl overcomes her disability, after having been kept in 
a state of dependence by her mother and father. Again, whether or not she is the real 
Caroline or not is irrelevant. She brings people together, heals rifts, eases strife, makes 
assemblages. 
Sommersby (1993), a film based off the account of French peasant Martin Guerre, 
revolves around the identity theft of Jack Sommersby, returned home after the Civil War. 
The returned Jack allows newly freed blacks to farm his land, collects money from the 
townspeople to rebuild the local church, and earns the devotion of his wife. He too is a 
fake, but is a kinder and more loving man than the real, so that his replacement improves 
the life of the people around him. Similarly, in the Simpsons episode "The Principal and 
the Pauper," the townspeople turn against the real principle upon his return after a fake 
has assumed his identity (“The Principal” 1997). When it comes to building community, 
to establishing democratic assemblages (the ex-slaves in Sommersby benefited the most 
 245 
from the fake Jack), to helping heal wounds, and to re-establishing genuine relationships, 
identity is a side issue. Regardless of identity, one can act in genuine, community-
building ways. 
 I also hope I have made a minor point about villainy. The way Smiley challenges 
the politics of womanhood in the original Lear text, making Goneril into the hero, 
reminds us that our conceptions of villainy change over time—especially for women. 
True, for some, Goneril might unforgivably seem ungrateful to her father. There is no 
doubt about her villainy in the original text. (It is Goneril, after all, who encourages 
Cornwall to "pluck out" Gloucester’s eyes [Lr. 3.7.5].) But the signs of her corrupted 
womanhood, the index of her poverty as a woman, do not resonate with us today. Her 
childlessness, her domineering qualities, do not register in the same way. Shakespeare, if 
he had the word, would call her bossy (a colloquial U.S. term that dates from an 1882 
Harper's magazine article with this sentence: "There was a lady manager who was 
dreadfully bossy;" “bossy,” OED, 2). But today, there is a campaign afoot to replace the 
word bossy with something like “executive leadership skills” (“Ban Bossy;” 
“LeanIn.Org”). Moreover, consider how standards of morality for women have changed. 
Movies like the 1950 melodrama Born to Be Bad excoriates its main character for 
marrying for money and then wanting to have an affair with the man she loves. For a real 
life example, consider the ways successful career woman by necessity spoke of placing 
their family before their career always.119 Would comics like Amy Schumer or Ali Wong 
                                                
119 Margo Jefferson (2015) puts this well in her memoir Negroland: “The famous women we gazed upon 
never stopped reminding us that we must cherish that generic female future. Especially the artistic, 
glamorous ones. … In interview after interview, women celebrities would flaunt their families or their 
dreams of family …[N]othing mattered more than their children, or the children they hoped to have” 
(Jefferson 2015: 235). That happens today sometimes—former Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm 
speaks often of how marrying the right man is important—but it is important to having a strong career, she 
says, which is not the same as emphasizing the “generic female future” Jefferson writes of.	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have been able to tell the same jokes, express the same irreverence towards marriage, in 
the 1960s? It is a sign of a fairer universe that their stars are on the rise. Any judgement 
of villainy takes places among cultural mores and traditional standards of morality. In 
reclaiming Shakespeare’s villains, I hope to have underscored their quests, their fantasies 
of recognition as human beings with the same rights and privileges (though they be 
aristocratic privileges) of their fellows. 
 I want to close by suggesting the idea that since the trauma of 9/11, Americans 
have been healing. A nation is not an individual, and yet we can draw some parallels in 
the way that the time of trauma works, and the role of democratic techniques in the 
healing process. Elisabeth Anker has recently argued that after 9/11, Americans felt the 
need to project strength, sometimes to the detriment of their democratic ideals. Their 
ideals of sovereign agency, when they failed to measure up, left them inflated and 
demoralized. Anker writes, “For political subjects who are shaped by liberal 
individualism’s heroic expectations of mastery, yet who experience dependence, 
exploitation, constraint, and fear on a regular basis, the strength demonstrated by bold 
state actions [after 9/11] was a model” (Anker 2012: par. 2, my emphasis). We might 
read this also as a response to trauma. I share with Anker the sense that the neoliberal 
state is in many ways an ignoble model, and that heroic ideals of sovereignty can let one 
down in the worst ways, but perhaps this need for heroism was a kind of response to the 
trauma of 9/11. 
We can use trauma to interpret our history of the past 15 years, the changes in our 
political culture. Because democracy, I consider to be more of an atmosphere, or an 
affectsphere, rather than a series of phenomena to be separately encountered, processed, 
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and digested. Instead of imagining human beings doing democratic things like voting, or 
running for office, this dissertation has focused on how they make democratic 
atmospheres, democratic affectspheres, how they create democratic cultures and ways of 
being. Looking at it this way, how can we overcome our traumas? 
 Some scholars suggest the ties between modernity and trauma run deeper 
(Saltzman and Rosenberg 2006; Gilroy 1993; Kaplan 2005; Micale and Lerner 2001). As 
Noelle McAfee writes: 
Modernity has not simply been a time in which massive traumas have occurred, it 
is also something borne of trauma. Modernity is the renunciation of tradition's 
authority, the differentiation of society, the Copernican revolution, meaning both 
the astronomical and the philosophical shift in our understanding of our own place 
in the order of things. ... I do not think that we yet fully fathom, nor have we 
worked through, this transformation into modernity. Much less have we recovered 
(McAfee 2008: 33). 
 
My chapter on comic courage argued that, in a world after the death of the sacred, and 
doubt in the transcendent and the absolute, comic courage provides the best alternative, 
for it is courage without faith in an ultimate meaning. Seeking final, fixed meaning the 
way Hamlet and Brutus do, seeking order in things, trying to position things in their 
proper place and time, always oversteps the mark, and can only finally fail. But I did not 
address the trauma involved in making the step from the world where a human being’s 
place in the universe is secure, where the model of autonomous, sovereign agency is 
never doubted, and the world that we cannot yet “fully fathom.” This takes, as 
psychoanalysts would say, “working through” (LaCapra 1998)120 Comic courage is borne 
of a recovery process that the US has yet to attempt.  
                                                
120 Dominick LaCapra also links "working through" to democratic politics. “In respect to an event of such 
incredible dimensions as the Holocaust, it may also be impossible for those born later ever to fully 
transcend this event and to put it in the past, simply as the past. But it may be possible, and in some sense it 
has to be possible, if you believe in anything like a viable democratic politics, to enable the further 
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 Trauma entails endless repetition. Working through would stall that. In my 
chapter on comic courage, I located an untimeliness in the way viewers see Hamlet as a 
tragedy (even as Hamlet himself exhibited a melodramatic kind of courage, seeking to 
affirm linearity and moral rightness). Time is radically broken in Hamlet’s universe. The 
past and future make claims on us that we, simply, cannot answer. It is comic courage in 
a playful mood that, I believe, holds the best response to this untimeliness, for it is comic 
courage that affirms meaninglessness, that gives up the search for meaning. That 
playfulness is most needed to heal from the traumas that untimeliness imposes. 
 If our time is “borne of trauma,” as McAfee suggests, if our old meaning-making 
systems are showing signs of wear, if our sense of order and place has been forever 
altered, then time will work differently for us as well. Here is one account of this 
difference: 
[T]rauma destroys the fabric of time. In normal time, you move from one moment 
to the next, sunrise to sunset, birth to death. After trauma, you may move in 
circles, finding yourself being sucked backwards into an eddy, or bouncing about 
like a rubber ball from now to then and back again. August is June, June is 
December. What time is it? Guess again. In the traumatic universe, the basic laws 
of matter are suspended: ceiling fans can be helicopters, car exhaust can be 
mustard gas (Morris 2015: xii).121 
 
Morris’s specific point is that, for survivors of PTSD, the sight of a ceiling fan will take 
them back to that day in Fallujah when their buddy’s helicopter was downed by ground-
to-air missiles.  
                                                                                                                                            
processes of working-through that are not simply therapeutic for the individual, but have political and 
ethical implications” (LaCapra 1998: 7). 
121 This reminds me of WWII correspondent Ernie Pyle’s famous description of what military life is like 
after weeks under fire: “It all works itself into an emotional tapestry of one dull dead pattern—yesterday is 
tomorrow and Troina is Randazzo and when will we ever stop and, God, I’m so tired!” (Pyle quoted in 
Tobin 1997) 
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But we also live in a “traumatic universe,” sustained by constant fears of terrorism, the 
attacks we have had seared in our memory. Sometimes the kaleidoscope of history turns 
so fast and so uncontrollably, that there is no time to thoughtfully understand historical 
events in retrospect. It is hard to understand much less recover from accumulated trauma. 
Every time we witness a new attack, we move in circles. The event remains a part of our 
psycho-geography, shaping the rhythms of our days, sometime tearing at the very fabric 
of democracy—especially as some react to trauma by desires to undermine freedom, 
police Muslim-Americans, seeking a spurious security rather than forms of collective 
togetherness and flourishing that might instead bring lasting peace and healing. Hatred 
and anxiety is the knee-jerk response to terrorism and threat—to trauma. 
 Trauma could also allow one of gain wisdom and potentially grow from the event. 
One strategy to try and manage traumatic time is through storytelling, locating an event 
in narrative. "All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about 
them” (Dinesen quoted in Arendt 1998: 175). How we incorporate the trauma into a 
continuing story of our lives is also the way we repair the tears in the fabric of democracy. 
Stealing others’ identities, acting in plays, creating actorly assemblages, cultivating an 
equalizing optimism, and doing so with a playful courage, allows us to arrange our 
wounds and traumas in ways to then work through them. It is not necessary that we work 
to restore linear time, but it is important to rearrange time in less traumatic ways, to tell 
our stories with techniques (actorly techniques) that engage with others in democratic, 
creative ways. 
The paradigmatic subject of liberalism does not need acting. In contesting this 
model of the liberal subject and arguing for the importance of acting, I have tried to 
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showcase alternative models for democratic living. The experiences and interactions 
spawned by acting are always unknown and unpredictable, and democracy requires that 
we come to terms with unpredictability. New forms of being and doing are opened up by 
acting, new designs for living. Democratic attributes that characterize institutional 
structures, which could add up to something impersonal and dull, are modified when 
considering democratic sensibilities. I champion not only the model of the actor but offer 
a model of the theater as a democratic space, a collaborative and exciting place where all 
voices are recognized as worthy. Even with a dictatorial director, theater is always by 
necessity a collaborative enterprise. At its best, it illuminates what is possible for 
democracy. For example, renowned theater director John Logan, when a member of the 
cast or crew produces an unlikely idea, although he recognizes immediately its 
improbability, will say, “Okay, let’s try it.” That is because, Logan says, “The most 
tender time is the moment of creation. That’s when you mustn’t hurt a person. You must 
treat him as though he were sick—gently, understandingly, tenderly” (Lincoln quoted in 
Barnett 1949: 104). Perhaps the first moments of democratic deliberation should be 
treated like this: fragile, handled gently, a collective acknowledgment of each party’s 
vulnerability. As Logan recognizes, not only are actors vulnerable and responsive to each 
other, but the director is vulnerable to the prop man, the prop man is sensitive to the 
costume designer, the costume designer is open to the producer—because they each 
depend on each other, just as members of a democratic polity do. Each rates a full share 
of the credit for a successful show. Democratic deliberation would be stronger by reason 
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